The security sector reform debate in post-independent Africa South of the Sahara: a critical ethical investigation based on the concepts of Sovereignty and Anarchy. by Kahuni, Panganai.
 
 
 
 
The Security Sector Reform Debate in Post-Independent Africa South of the Sahara: A 
Critical Ethical Investigation Based on the Concepts of Sovereignty and Anarchy 
By 
 
                                                                Panganai Kahuni 
(Diploma in General Management, Diploma in Defence and Security Studies, MBA) 
Thesis Submitted in the Fulfilment of the Academic Requirements for the 
Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy, 
In the subject of 
Ethics 
At the 
School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, 
College of Humanities, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg 
 
Supervisor 
Dr. Munyaradzi Felix Murove 
 
May 2017 
i 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Panganai Kahuni declare that, 
i. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original 
work. 
ii. The thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other 
university. 
iii. This thesis does not contain other person’s data, pictures, graphs or other information, 
unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons. 
iv. This thesis does not contain other persons’ writing unless specifically acknowledged 
as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been 
quoted the; 
(a) Their words have been re-written but the general information attribute to them 
has been referenced. 
(b) Where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed inside 
quotation marks and referenced. 
v. This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from the 
internet unless specifically acknowledged and the source being detailed in the thesis 
and the reference sections. 
 
 
Candidate: P Kahuni 
 
Signed: .........................                     Date: .............................. 
 
Supervisor: Dr MF Murove 
 
Signed: .........................                     Date: ............................. 
  
ii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
This thesis is dedicated to the Commander of Zimbabwe Defence Forces General (Dr) 
Constantino Guveya Chiwenga. Being a player in the liberation of one of the countries in Africa 
(Zimbabwe) and being also a player in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, the 
Commander of Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), General (Dr) Constantino Guveya Chiwenga 
has always remained a professional, loyal and patriotic military leader who selflessly encourages 
his followers to improve themselves professionally and academically. His vision in promoting 
professional military leadership remains guided by revolutionary morality and patriotism which 
together have significantly contributed to the development of professional military ethics in the 
Zimbabwe Defence Forces. This work is highly inspired by his motto: ‘SHARPEN THE SOUL 
AS A LEADER’.  
  
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
This thesis would not have been completed without the intractable and immeasurable critical 
support from my supervisor, Dr Munyaradzi Felix Murove. I used to call him names such as the 
‘academic taunter’ but all unbeknown to him. This was because of his strictness and unsparing 
brutal truth. Now that the curtain has come down, I wish to unreservedly thank him for his 
forthrightness and academic guidance that saw me successfully sailing through the murky waters 
in my journey to accomplishing this tedious and daunting task. I would like also to thank him for 
his timely feedback, firmness and commitment to quality throughout our stint together. His 
invaluable contribution remains immeasurable. May the Almighty bless him and continue to 
guide him in bringing more to the field of the academia. 
I am also immensely indebted to Hon ED Mnangagwa, the then Minister of Defence through the 
Commander Defence Forces General Constantine Guveya Chiwenga who gave me authority to 
undertake PhD studies with the University of KwaZulu-Natal. I would like also to extend my 
humble and sincere appreciation to the financial and logistics support provided by the Secretary 
of Defence and his staff, particularly during travel to and from the university and for the 
purchase of critical books needed for the research. 
Special thanks also go to Dr Bernard Banda for his encouraging and motivating academic 
overtones. I also would like to thank Corporals Portia Mavhunga, Elvis S. Kanonda and 
Kamwari Chari for providing me with the clerical and administrative support in times of need; 
well done guys. Special thanks also go to Mr Bowden Mbanje for helping me with relevant 
research materials.  
I would like to finally appreciate the moral support I got from my beloved family, my wife 
Violet Kahuni, for her understanding and appreciation regarding the mountain of challenges that 
took me away from my family duties, my children Nyadzai,Shungu, Tonderai, Tsungai Erinera, 
Takawira and Tanyaradzwa who all appreciated that my absence from home was due to my 
academic commitment on this study. The ideas and views expressed in this thesis are from the 
researchers on point of view. 
 
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a concept that first emerged in the 1990s in Eastern 
Europe. It was propagated by Short in the post-cold war era under the guise of a development 
agenda and the need for democratisation of Security Sector Institutions (SSIs) which would 
result in enhancing the rule of law in Sub-Saharan Africa. The main argument from its 
proponents was that this new political and economic dispensation could improve sustainable 
development, democracy, peace and stability. However, critiques have observed that the SSR 
concept has been maliciously employed by the West to destroy local governance structures of the 
Security Sector (SS) in order to benefit the Northern countries’ political and economic policies. 
Evidence of the negative repercussions of Security Sector Reform initiatives in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Middle East can be witnessed in the DRC, Mozambique, Somalia, Iraq and 
Afghanistan’s inability to contain rebel or terrorist groups within their territories. This is despite 
the fact that the above countries underwent Western initiated models of SSR. 
This thesis argues that proponents of SSR end up prescribing how SSR should be done in their 
former colonies in Africa with the objective of weakening this sector by advancing a neo-
colonial agenda. I further argue that the neo-colonial agenda is propagated by civil society 
organisations funded by Western countries to advance Western interests in former European 
colonies in Africa. The call for SSR in Sub-Saharan Africa is done through CSO and neo-liberal 
academics under the guise of wanting to democratise SSI and directing money to development 
projects. It has been observed that this sheep-in-wolf concept has been carefully planned to cover 
the underground Western interests as happened in Libya. In fact, these advocates of SSR want 
continued substance of their interests which is access to the continent’s natural resources. 
The study observes that the debate calling for SSR in Sub-Saharan Africa seeks to portray an 
immediate need for military reforms that might compromise the sovereignty of the continent. 
The other argument also advanced by the proponents of SSR is that it will enhance and improve 
democratic oversight and good governance of the SSR. The major claim here is that SSR will 
end violence in Africa thereby bringing sustainable peace and a secure environment which will 
later allow economic development. However, despite this noble claim of wanting to create a 
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peaceful situation that allows economic development, evidence to the contrary has been given. 
Examples of worse scenarios created by such hideous claims are Mozambique, Libya, Central 
African Republic, Mali and DRC just to mention a few. In these SSIs have resulted in failure to 
discharge the mandate of protecting national interests and state sovereignty resulting in these 
countries experiencing anarchic situations. I argue that democratisation of the military, if it 
means enhancing of institutional capacity to respect humanity while at the same time 
strengthening the need to protect, defend and safeguard the national interests and state 
sovereignty can then be regarded as plausible. However, some reformed militaries have nearly 
totally collapsed in the face of attacks by rebels, insurgents and terrorist groups as exemplified 
by Islamic State of Iraq,(ISI) in Iraq, Boko Haram in Nigeria, M23 in the DRC and Renamo in 
Mozambique thereby creating anarchic scenarios that have devastating effects on humanity.  
There is also the argument of gender equity through which the reformists want to see fifty-fifty 
women representation in the security sector. The debate on SSR that seeks to increase the women 
quota in African SSIs with no regards to their competencies seems to be advancing an unethical 
agenda that has the potential of weakening Africa’s SSIs. In this regard, my critique of SSR is 
based on that it is against the protection of the principles of the revolutionary struggle which 
demands a complementary role of the civil authorities and the military. This thesis concludes that 
the SSR concept is immoral in the sense that it seeks to disconnect and disorient the SSIs from 
effectively and efficiently safeguarding the continental peace and stability. My special argument 
therefore is that SSR concepts must be locally designed and the SSR process must be locally 
owned as well to create a complementary role between stakeholders such as the executive, 
military and CSOs resulting in the protection of the continent’s liberation principles and values 
thereby creating an enabling environment for inclusive socio-economic development. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) has come to mean different things to different countries in the 
world. Undoubtedly, the end of the Cold War brought with it new thinking or perspectives or 
concepts in spheres such as politics, economics and world security. 
Prior to the unipolar set up (where the US and the then Soviet Union were the sole superpowers 
in the international system) the security of the world was mainly seen in binary terms where the 
security sector (SS) within any particular region or country was mainly oriented towards the 
Warsaw Pact (Eastern bloc) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO - Western bloc). 
However, during this period, most of Third World countries identified themselves as non-aligned 
enabling them to accrue benefits from either of these blocs. The situation is getting even more 
complicated as China and Russia are emerging as global actors economically and politically. 
Most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa belonged to the non-aligned movement but in terms of 
national security they identified themselves with the Eastern bloc. It was mainly apartheid South 
Africa, the then South West Africa, and the then Rhodesia that openly identified with, and 
immensely benefited from relations with the NATO bloc. However, the revolutionary 
movements in the above countries, just like the other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, were more 
aligned to the Eastern bloc as they got economic, political and military assistance from countries 
within this bloc.  
It can therefore be argued that the armed struggle against colonialism in Southern Africa was 
successful owing to the assistance these military cadres got from Eastern countries which 
included Russia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and China. The end of the Cold war 
marked the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact or the once powerful Soviet Union leading 
scholars like Francis Fukuyama (1992) to write his ”End of History Thesis’’ were he argued that 
Western capitalism had triumphed over communism thereby ushering in a new political and 
economic dispensation in world politics.  
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(By this,) Fukuyama envisaged a situation where Western democracy would spread to all parts of 
the world as the only system that would bring about world peace, development and stability. 
However, critics like Samuel Huntington (1968) saw new forms of conflicts arising due to 
Western dominance of world politics. He termed this a ‘’Clash of Civilisations’’ where the 
powerful states would want to impose their culture on less powerful states leading to 
unprecedented conflicts.  
However, as Fukuyama had predicted, the new Western democratic dispensation called on east 
European countries, which were once part of the Soviet ‘empire’, to reform their security sectors, 
arguing that this would pave way for their political and economic development. The security 
sector reforms were a form of standardized or common approach to security, which these central 
and east European (CEE) countries were requested to undertake as a prerequisite to EU and 
NATO membership. Failure to comply with Western European models of SSR would result in 
non-membership of the EU and NATO as well as cuts in aid and bail outs Hanggi (2004), 
Edwards et al (2002). 
The aforesaid calls came from development theorists whose major argument was that security 
spending during the Cold War period had been a major drain on the budgets of many European 
countries. The Cold War period had witnessed an increase in defence spending owing to the 
massive recruitment of security sector personnel as well as the manufacture, importation and 
high demand for defence equipment, among other requirements. 
The period also escalated an arms race with more spending on new military technologies and 
hardware. When the Cold War came to an end in the early 1990s, development theorists called 
for a downsizing of European armies (especially those in CEE) as well as a reduction in military 
expenditure. They argued that defence budgets were to be scrutinized for transparency Sugden 
(2003). More resources were therefore to be allocated to health, education, service delivery and 
so on as to better serve the interests of the general populace Lala (2003).  
SSR has come to be “viewed as having been more successful in European post-communist states 
than in African states.” Hanggi (2004:7) attributes this success to “the influence which the EU 
and NATO had in encouraging SSR in East and central European countries. ”If Central and East 
European states (CEE) wanted to be members of these Western European institutions, and 
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subsequently enjoy the economic privileges of the more developed west European economies, 
they had to, “meet a number of requirements, some of them related to democratic governance of 
the security sector. ”Hendrickson and Karkoszka, (2002:176) contend that, “the prospect of 
integration into NATO and ‘the West’ provided a powerful, additional incentive for CEE states 
to reform their security sectors.” 
From the foregoing, it can be argued that CEE security reforms were primarily a vehicle by 
which Russian influence was ultimately being undermined. The Western European strategy, of 
reforming these eastern European security institutions, which were once perceived to be 
autocratic and hostile towards the Western bloc, bore fruit as evidenced by the current 
antagonisms these former Soviet states now have towards Russia, their former ally. For example, 
Poland has shown interest in hosting American patriot missiles on its territory, which Russians 
have viewed as a threat to their national security (World Socialist Website, 2013). 
Other former Soviet states now members of the EU and NATO family have increased their 
defence capabilities all in a bid to counter Russia, their former ally. According to CNBC 
International (11 July, 2016), European leaders defended the decision by NATO to station 
thousands of troops in Baltic nations and Eastern Europe amid a heightened perceived threat 
from Russia. Hence it could be surmised that all these strategies were aimed at isolating Russia 
from its former allies.  
The Western plan also succeeded in destroying old loyalties since the SSRs of CEE states, 
among other things, called for the retirement of some senior army officials who had served under 
the Warsaw Pact or Russian military authority (Edwards et al, 2002). These were viewed as 
harbouring hostile intentions towards the Western bloc and fears were that integrating them 
within the NATO security apparatus would weaken the institution in that their loyalty would 
more likely lean towards Russia than the Western bloc.  
Young men and women who had not been part of the security sector during the Cold War years, 
were recruited into the new CEE security sectors so as to white wash or obliterate the military’s 
past links with ‘autocratic’ communist chains of command.  
Edmunds (2003), for example, contends that the democratisation of the security sector was the 
best way of ridding it of partisan politics. He asserts that an unreformed SS could impede the 
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democratization process because of its influence on domestic politics. His argument was made in 
reference to former Soviet trained CEE armies which he strongly believed if left unreformed, 
“would end up supporting or being partisan to the political party in power” Edmunds (2003). 
Africa posed its own set of dilemmas regarding SSR, with formidable controversies emerging 
with regard to implementation and acceptability. 
It can be noted from arguments raised by security sector reformists as well as their critics that a 
common terminology of the concept of SSR still has to be found despite various attempts by the 
OECD, DFID, UN and other organizations which have vested interests in SSRs(CNBC 
International; 2016).  
SSR therefore lacks a multilateral, holistic, integrated, coordinated, and comprehensive approach 
and its tenets have been attacked by its critics as being Eurocentric (Williams; 2000). This 
Eurocentric view has created suspicion and apprehension among Africans as to desirability of 
SSRs as advanced by Europeans. 
Some African states, especially those to the south of the equator, have seen calls for SSR as a 
way of weakening rather than democratizing the security sector. Arguments raised by SSR critics 
have been that the European SSR model presupposes that it is mandatory for countries in Africa 
to willingly accept the Western European model. This has the effect of prejudicing African 
values, ideals and norms, thus negating a crucial aspect of SSRs within the SS, (Hutchful et al; 
2005, Askin and Collins; 1993). 
Historically, SSR in sub-Sahara Africa evolved with the idea of post-conflict reconstruction. 
There was no doubt that the sub-Saharan African post-colonial situation was characterised by 
civil wars and coups which betrayed the ideals of sovereignty mainly in African countries to the 
north of the equator such as Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, Burkina Faso etc. 
Paradoxically, some of the coups were sponsored by some of the world’s great powers or at 
times instigated within the military rank and file. In some unusual instances, coups in countries 
like Mali resulted in country requesting assistance of the previous colonial master (France) to 
restore discipline within the ranks of the military Ouédraogo (2014). Such a situation directly 
undermines the viability of the idea of the sovereignty of African states. 
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The calls for SSR in North, Central and East Africa were mainly occasioned by conflicts that 
were due largely to patron-client relationships between the civilian leadership and those in the 
military. In this respect N’Diaye and Ebo (2008) and Born and N’Diaye (2011) note that SSR in 
West Africa has been driven by the need to professionalize the security sectors which have at 
times been known for their corrupt practices, gross violation of human rights and a total abuse of 
state resources. 
Looking at Southern Africa, calls for SSR among other things have been mainly dominated by a 
need to divorce the military from politics. The problem with this requirement has been that 
Southern African countries such as Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia 
have militaries which came predominantly from the background of liberation struggles. The need 
to protect the hard won independence against perceived hostile foreign countries has become 
integral to the SSR discourse. Williams (2000) argues that this is a fact that cannot be wished 
away or white washed. 
The military in particular, has thus been caught in a very difficult situation in which it either 
chooses between professional militarism - that is non-alignment with the civilian government or 
being aligned with the liberation parties in order to defend the African state from neo-
colonialism. With this in mind, it must be noted that the adoption of a SSR plan in the above 
countries must reflect several pertinent historical and political peculiarities which cannot be 
trivialized. These include the liberation background of the security institutions, the various 
political values which are core to national integrity and sovereignty, as well as the importance of 
creating viable security institutions which cannot be easily manipulated or used by great powers 
as is happening in the CEE countries (as referred to above).  
In consequence, any reform in Southern Africa which specifically focuses on reform as dictated 
by Western development planners and security NGOs with their heavy bias on “separating the 
Security Sector from political events as well as calling for the democratisation of the security 
forces without considering the politico-historical background of these security institutions will be 
irrelevant” Doro (2012), Parliament of Zimbabwe /RD/4.2.4/6RE). 
In conclusion, currently, where the SSR is taking place in Africa, one finds that the whole 
programme is sponsored by the former colonial powers under the pretext of bringing about 
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military professionalism and economic stability to the former colony. Whether these espoused 
objectives have been achieved in the externally driven SSR post-conflict reconstruction project 
in sub-Saharan Africa remains questionable in the sense that in most cases it is the donors who 
are driving the process. It is common knowledge that any donor driven process is usually 
presented with conditions that tend to weaken bargaining power, thus undermining the 
sovereignty of the recipient state. 
 
Sometimes the donor funded effort towards SSR is based on a uniformity approach or one-size-
fits-all (as happened in CEE countries) without taking into account various contextual 
differences. For this reason, the SSR is not a homogenous project that is applicable to all 
contexts.  
 
What this study will show is that experiences of conflicts and reasons that originally fuelled 
those conflicts differ from one country to the other. Further, it is argued that SSR that is 
externally driven is most likely to undermine the sovereignty of the post-colonial African state. 
Thus in this light Williams (2002) questions whether NGOs, civil society groups and 
development agencies have an in-depth knowledge as well as skills that reinforce security and 
defence of a state. These skills include military strategy, command and control and policy 
management (Williams, 2002).From the foregoing it is plausible to argue that SSR needs to be 
contextualized and understood according to the historical, political, social and economic context 
of a country.  
 
The greatest danger to Africa’s security would be to adopt, in its entirety, Western liberal 
prescriptions of SSR. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
The problem that this thesis seeks to investigate may be stated as follows: advocates of the SSR 
argue that for it to be successful, the SS has to be sufficiently distanced from the government 
thus undermining the key function of the SS which is to protect the incumbent government. Put 
differently, the thesis seeks to investigate the grounds on which the contradictory 
recommendation is made by advocates of SSR when they call for the SS to be distanced from the 
incumbent government.  
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1.3 Proposition 
In this thesis I propose the proposition that security sectors that are alienated from their states 
will fail to enforce the sovereignty of their states and, by extension, that of the Sub-Saharan 
African region. 
1.4 Definitions Relevant to the Study 
The debate on security sector reform (SSR), especially as it relates to Africa south of the Sahara, 
may only be understood in full against the background of bitter struggles that were encountered 
to achieve political independence from former white colonisers. Likewise, in this study, ethics 
must be read as cast in political undertones that underpin any partnering of efforts at advancing 
SSR. 
 
In a deeply polarised global environment, ethics is at the core of options and efforts that seek to 
capacitate the security sector of various nations. Calls for SSR by nations whose history is 
tattered in images of slavery, colonialism, racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerances are thus subject to scrutiny and interrogation by those that were at the receiving end 
of a multiplicity of vices. 
 
The vices enumerated above were prevalent in nations whose lands had been occupied by sheer 
force of arms by the stronger nations. With the end of colonialism in Africa, with South Africa 
being the last to gain independence in 1994, a plethora of concepts that sought to give a human 
face and dignity to mankind were hatched by the very western nations that had used the Berlin 
Conference of 1884/85 to partition Africa, colonise it, exploit its labour, plunder its resources, 
impose knowledge and belief systems of the west and condemn everything of value to the 
natives. 
 
In view of the above historical background, this study concerns itself with the sustainability of 
the concept of sovereignty against the potential danger of former colonisers resorting to the back 
door to foment seeds of anarchy under the guise of advancing SSR. In addition, impositions and 
conditionalities attached to SSR as advocated by the western world call for a critical ethical 
investigation based on the need to protect sovereignty, prevent anarchy, and retool security 
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sector institutions (SSIs) to provide adequate levels of both state security and human security 
against hostile elements both inside and outside the country.  
 
The ethical component of the study concerns itself with the sincerity or otherwise of those 
European countries that seek to see Africa south of the Sahara, undergo SSR. In addition, and by 
extension, the study also gives glimpses of African leaders that have used the security sector to 
oppress their own people, and, protect the interests of the former colonisers that continue to give 
shape and form to the security apparatus of their former colonies. 
 
Notwithstanding the armed struggles that were waged by a number of countries in sub Saharan 
Africa leading to their independence, it is interesting to note that the official language of the 
independent states continues to be that of the former colonisers. A heightened appreciation of the 
need to create a politically conscious sub regional environment is pertinent in the formulation 
and implementation of SSRs. The appetite by former colonisers to formulate SSR with no 
meaningful partnership with the host country must be resisted. It can therefore be argued that it is 
in the long term interest of the sub region to use their own resources in order to formulate and 
implement SSRs that create sustainable SSIs. 
 
The study thus seeks to proffer a contextualised appreciation of the SSR debate in post 
independent Africa south of the Sahara. 
 
Mills (1806-1873) cited in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2014)  defines ethics in terms 
of general happiness in that actions are right/ethical in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness; wrong/immoral as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness, (Brinks; 1992). With 
regard to SSR debate in Sub Saharan African, Mills’ definition of ethics seems to resonate well 
with Western prescriptions of SSRs which are more beneficial to the ones that formulate them 
and less beneficial to those that hosts them. One can thus argue that Mills’ characterisation of 
ethics seems to be applied to benefit reformists while the host nations experience negative 
results. 
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Phaneuf (2004) defines morality as ‘the ensemble of the rules governing our actions and values 
and which function as the norm in a society’, whereas ethics is ‘a critical examination of morals, 
questioning its rules and seeking orientations which are well thought out and correct’.  
 
1.4.1 Ethical Theories 
Three categories of ethical theories entail teleological, deontological, and divine command.  
Phaneuf (2004) defines moral as the ensemble of the rules governing actions and values which 
function as the norm in society and that the main objective of ethics is to place the human at the 
heart of our care and try to act for his greatest good. 
 
Kant (1795) stated that behaviour is only ethical when it would remain beneficial if performed 
universally by everyone, and argued that morality must ultimately be grounded in the concept of 
duty, or obligations that humans have to one another. He further argues that a genuinely moral 
system would never permit some humans to be treated as means to ends of others and that we 
thus have a duty to treat fellow humans as ends, noting that each individual, regardless of his or 
her wealth, intelligence, privilege or circumstance, has the same moral worth.  
 
Ross (1930) shares Kant’s views on ethics, including rejecting the theory of utilitarianism that 
appeals to the consequences of either actions or rules in determining whether a particular course 
of action  is morally acceptable, but posits that a process called ‘rational intuitism’ would 
improve on Kant’s theory.  However, the application of the aforesaid process has not been 
widely accepted by contemporary ethicists because of its shortcomings, thereby making it less 
attractive to that of Kant. 
 
 
1.4.1.1 Teleological /consequential ethical theories 
This theory surmises that all rational human actions are consequential in the sense that we reason 
about the means of achieving certain ends, clearly defining moral behaviour as goal directed. The 
goodness of an action is determined by its consequence, with the causal action only deemed 
ethical if the consequence is good. The ethical aspect of an action is judged in retrospect. So far 
SSR conducted in parts of Africa such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, 
among other countries, have not deterred internal upheavals or external aggression and as such 
the reforms are, in large measure, viewed as unethical and inappropriate. The 
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Teleological/Consequential theories are therefore going to be applied as tools upon which critical 
ethical investigation will be carried out in this study.  
 
1.4.1.2 Deontological ethical theories 
This set of theories state that morality consists in the fulfilment of moral obligations, or duties. 
Morality is based on whether acts conflict with moral rules or not, and the motivation behind 
those acts. An act is therefore good if and only if it was performed out of a desire to do one’s 
duty and obey a rule. Deontological theories stress individual actions within the context of the 
primacy of rules. Theorists such as Kant (1724-1804) and  Ross (1930) believe the notion of duty 
is the ultimate criterion for determining morality but the latter believes that more care be 
exercised in following certain prima facie or self-evident duties that must be followed to arrive at 
what he calls actual duty but contemporary ethicists argue that Kant’s model is more reliable. 
Deontological ethical theories will be used as tools upon which critical ethical investigation will 
be carried out in this thesis. 
 
1.4.1.3 Divine command theory 
This theory states that the moral goodness of an act is based on religious authority. The theorists 
argue that moral rules are universal because all human beings were created by the same 
omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent God (White, ). In a world where literally anything and 
everything is subjected to macroscopic scrutiny, the theory is of such nebulous scope as not to do 
justice to the debate on SSR. For that reason the Divine Command Theory was not found 
particularly suitable in making a critical ethical investigation based on the concepts of 
sovereignty and anarchy. The main handicap of this theory in as far as SSR is concerned is that 
there is no way of proving that claims of divine laws really came from the divine source. Belief 
alone cannot be the basis of judging the morality of actions and intentions around SSR in Africa 
or elsewhere for that matter. 
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1.4.2 Ethics and political philosophy 
For purposes of this study, reference shall be made to the teleological and deontological theories 
that are more appropriate and therefore more applicable to the sub region. The political 
philosophy of the region is steeped in conversations of liberation struggles that had the support 
and sympathy of the socialist eastern bloc countries that were engaged in confrontation with the 
capitalist western countries. The region has thus a socialist orientation that is not readily 
appreciated by the western world that espouses a capitalist ideology. 
 
Given the hold that western colonization continues to command, most economies in the sub 
region are mixed, and very much neo-colonial. It must be noted, however, that cultural values 
continue to have immense influence on the political philosophy of the region. For this reason, so-
called human rights that contravene highly respected cultural values of the African are resisted, 
with costs imposed on the sub region by the European proponents of those rights. For instance, 
opposition to concepts on human rights such as homosexuality has oftentimes led to withdrawal 
of aid and reduced support for social services, with some countries such as Malawi succumbing 
to pressures of that nature. 
The patronising attitude of the west towards Africa merely reinforces the need for Africa to come 
of age, industrialise its countries, formulate and implement their own security sector as they see 
fit. 
Of interest to the study is the role of ethics as political decisions are made that seek to examine, 
interrogate, scrutinize, adopt or reject SSR proposals by external partners. It is in this regard that 
the political philosophy of the sub region is measured against animated effort by the western 
nations to indict it and convict it. 
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Again, it can be argued that the sub region is being challenged, in this study, to maintain a 
political philosophy that is consistent with the ethics that define the African. The extent, to which 
contemporary reformists hail human security as integral to the socioeconomic wellbeing of a 
nation, while plausible, must not undermine the need for strong state security lest such calls 
weaken both human and state security, with anarchy emerging the winner and sovereignty 
suffering as the victim.   
Needless to add, that any war, is traced to an ambition to improve the economic status of the 
aggressor, with the aggressed fighting back to protect their economic interests. It can therefore be 
argued that SSR is closely linked to protecting and revamping the economic fortunes of any 
country. It can also be argued that the ethics and political philosophy of the sub region must 
continue to view anarchy as undesirable, sovereignty as ideal and sacred, and, economic 
development as the ultimate goal of a sustainable security sector institution. 
While partnerships are healthy and normal, lines must always be drawn to ensure that such 
partnerships do not diminish the importance of ethics and political philosophy of a nation and 
that the imposition of perspectives by one partner over the other must be discouraged and indeed 
resisted. There is no honour greater than self-identity and self-regulation, the very basis upon 
which life and limb were lost in the process of fighting for independence by the African nations. 
 
1.4.3 Sovereignty  
This theory perceives a state as the basic unit of world politics and as such, the state is believed 
to be a self-ruling or independent body that has the sole right to decide its own laws and 
governance structures (Chiwenga, 2015). According to Collins English Dictionary (2009: 728) 
the term sovereignty means “political power which a state wields in governing its territory”, 
secondly, it means “autonomy from outside rule or not being governed by another country.”  
Hence the term sovereignty means the quality of having independent authority over a geographic 
area, such as a territory. Sovereignty therefore entails an ability of a state to provide security for 
its citizens against both internal and external threats as well as ability to maintain peace and 
stability within its geographical space. In this thesis, a state that lacks military readiness to 
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protect its citizens from harm as well as one that lacks military preparedness in dealing with 
possible foreign aggression could possibly constitute a very weak sovereign. 
 
 
1.4.4 Anarchy 
Anarchy is defined in the oxford dictionary as disorder especially political or social. It is further 
described as lack of government in society. Hobbes (1958) defines anarchy as lack of order and 
prevalence of lawlessness, conflict, and chaos, and civil disorder, high rate of criminality, 
banditry, murder, and injustice. The foregoing vices bedevil a state. In light of the above 
definitions of anarchy, Morgenthau (1948) and Waltz (1979) posit that states existing in an 
anarchic international system which has no clear set rules must maximise on their security for 
survival.    In this regard, the definition by Hobbes (1958) and the assertion by Morgenthau 
(1948) and Waltz (1979) will form the basis of the meaning of anarchy in the discussion of SSR 
in this study. It must therefore be noted from the onset that whatever is referred to as anarchy in 
this study also refers to the definition of anarchy attributed to Hobbes and its characterisation as 
given by Morgenthau and Waltz.  
 
1.5 Preliminary Literature Review 
Security Sector Reforms remain a controversial subject in Sub-Saharan Africa. It must be noted 
right from the onset that over the years, SSR has gained much prominence in development and 
democratization discourse and it has won the approval of major donor organizations, NGOs, 
Inter governmental Organizations, Multilateral institutions, regional and sub-regional bodies as 
well as academics.  
As a result of optimism on the efficacy of ‘reforms’ within security institutions, the above 
organizations and groups thus view SSR as a panacea to peace, stability and economic 
development in African states recovering from conflict and years of authoritarian rule (Ebo, 
2007). In this regard, institutions such as the World Bank, USAID, DFID, and UNDP have 
immensely funded security sector reform programs in Africa as part of building reliable political 
institutions which are guided by democratic principles (Isima, 2010). 
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This thesis is therefore an attempt to identify and debate special consideration that must be given 
to SSR in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Two schools of thought have therefore arisen owing to the differences in the perception of SSR 
in Africa South of the Sahara. For the first school, which comprises of security sector reformists 
such as Ebo (2007) and Rupiya, (2009), the central argument is that the existing status quo 
within the African security institutions needs extensive change or a complete overhaul. This 
school believes that the main security threat originates from the state itself such as poor 
governance of security institutions. This leads to a situation where the whole society goes 
through traumatic disruption arising from security sector brutality.  
The other school, which comprises of security sector critics such as Doro (2012) and Williams 
(2002), asserts that the status quo within the African security institutions should be maintained, 
while enforcing minimal reforms where possible. Their major focus is on both internal and 
external threats posed by occurrences such as predatory states, terrorist organizations and 
insurgents and regional catastrophes and so on.  
The two schools of thought have led to irreconcilable differences as they impact the norms, rules, 
values, and procedures that should be deployed to guide the administration and functions of the 
SS. 
The first school (comprising of reformists/advocates) see SSR as a ‘magic bullet’ for Africa’s 
political, social and economic transition to stability. The argument is that SSR is paramount to 
bringing about stability in any political system. Such an argument emanates from an assumption 
that African security institutions have been at the helm of political, social and economic crises 
and there is thus an urgent need to depoliticize, re-professionalize the security sector and to 
demilitarize these institutions from political and economic interferences. In that regard, the 
reformists have also made several calls ranging from a complete overhaul of security institutions 
by retiring the old guard, formulating new national and defence policies, improving on 
parliamentary and civil society oversight roles of security institutions, inclusion of women in top 
security sector posts, redefining human security as well as a democratization of the whole gamut 
of the security sector institutions. This, they argue, will set a good pace for the development of 
African countries. 
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The first school of thought is backed by the works of various African and European reformist 
scholars/academics like Chitiyo (2009), Rupiya ((2009), Hendricks and Hutton (2010), Isima 
(2010), Ngoma (2006), Ebo (2007), Caparini (2004), Ball (2006), Mhanda (2011), Gatsheni-
Ndlovu (2002), Mwange (2009), Africa (2008), Modise (2007), N’Diaye and Africa(2008), and 
le Roux (2007). Indeed, all have concurred that SSR is a precondition for effective political 
reform and the democratization process. Generally, they are also agreed that in most African 
countries there is a security sector governance deficit which calls for radical reforms of the 
whole security sector edifice. 
The second school of thought has other ideas. Critics of security reforms such as Williams 
(2000), Chuter (2000), Doro (2012), Negonga (2003), Mehler (2009), and Smith (2001) question 
the reformists’ approach to SSR. They argue that the concept of SSR tends to be biased in favour 
of Western democratic principles which are at times incompatible with the norms, values, 
ideologies, and beliefs of African security institutions.  
To be noted is the fact that’ Reformists’ have, among other SSR demands, called for the 
recruitment and promotion of more women within the SS (developed in chapter 6) and they have 
also requested for democratic oversight of the security sector (developed in chapters 7 & 8). 
‘Critics’ argue that reformists’ obsession with democratic oversight is mainly to see that the 
legislators cut on defence budgets and also that civil society groups – especially the media reveal 
‘juicy’ stories within the military institutions (e.g. some information which should never be 
exposed to the public domain as it falls under state secrecy).  
Critics of reformists present the bold argument that the world over the military is an institution 
where males are dominant (Gill, 1997) and that young men are more likely to volunteer for 
military training than young women (Armor, 2013). SSR critics such as Mehler (2009) and 
Williams (2000) strongly argue that if any woman is to be promoted within the military ranks she 
should first demonstrate high skills and competencies as well as exceptional leadership qualities.  
Reformist propositions prompted scholars such as Doro (2012), Williams (2000), Chuter (2006) 
to call for SSR which addresses the security needs of the reforming African countries. Chapter 8 
seeks to discuss this matter in greater detail. 
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The African Security Sector Network (ASSN) which was created in 2003 with the major aim of 
increasing Africa’s voice in the SSR debate also notes, among other things, that “SSR debate 
mainly concerns itself with the perspectives and needs of donors” (DCAF:2004). 
In Chapter 8, Smith (2001) criticises a one size fits all’ type of SSR, arguing that each country 
has its own unique security sector setup which is totally different from other countries’ security 
institutions. He adds that the imposition of an externally driven blueprint for African security 
institutions greatly undermines indigenous security norms and ideals which are an integral part 
of any state’s security and sovereignty. 
(Guyatt, 2000).presents the strong argument that in Western countries, the military is well known 
for being a vital and influential actor in foreign policy making and at times it can prevent policy 
makers from coming up with certain policies which are unfavourable to the interests of the 
securocrats, who comprise the security personnel. 
1.6 Research Objectives 
 To assess the ethical implications of security sector reformists’ arguments with 
specific reference to the concept of sovereignty and anarchy. 
 To discuss various perspectives on the need for SSR in Africa South of the Sahara. 
 To examine whether it is ethically plausible to detach the SS from the governance of 
the state, that is to say the politics of the land. 
 
1.7 Research Questions 
 What is the importance of the concepts of ethics, sovereignty and anarchy in the SSR 
discourse of Africa south of the Sahara? 
 What ethical lessons can be drawn from the arguments presented by SS reformists in 
relation to the concepts of sovereignty and anarchy in the Sub- Saharan region? 
 What perspectives are driving the calls for SSR in Africa South of the Sahara? 
 Are there ethical grounds to advocate for the detachment of SSIs from governance issues 
given the historical inseparability of the gun and the politics that defined the liberation of 
Sub-Saharan Africa? 
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1.8 Principal Theories upon which the Research was constructed 
In this study, I shall apply three theories that I consider relevant to the study. These are the 
teleological and deontological theories. These theories have a direct implication to the discourse 
on SSR in that they judge the ethicality of actions on the basis of consequences and rules/duty 
respectively and therefore can be used to assess the central concepts of sovereignty and anarchy. 
The first theory is the theory of Nation-State Sovereignty. There are different schools of thought 
on the origins of the concept of sovereignty. One such school includes the primordialists who 
argue that the concept of sovereignty has its foundation in ancient writers such as Aristotle, 
Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Dionysius is referred to by Jean Bodin as having 
touched on all the principal points of sovereignty (Bodin 1992: 47).  
However, the concept of sovereignty is also found in the writings of Ulpian, Augustine, Dante, 
Ockham, Marsilius and Machiavelli.  
Modernists, on the other hand, believe that sovereignty is a modern phenomenon linked to the 
birth and growth of the nation state in the seventeenth century and was first theorized by Jean 
Bodin (1992) and Hobbes (1958).Particular attention will also be paid to the views of Immanuel 
Kant whose views on ethics have had great influence on contemporary Western thought. 
Kant’s theory is different from Hobbes and Bodin’s as will be analyzed below. 
1.8.1 Jean Bodin’s Conceptualisation of Sovereignty 
Bodin defines sovereignty as “the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth” (Bodin 
1992: 1). He distinguishes between the attributes and the characteristics of sovereign power. The 
most important attribute of Bodin’s notion of sovereignty is the power to give laws “without the 
consent of any other, whether greater, equal, or below him” (Ibid: 56). He elucidates that the 
other attributes of sovereignty such as the power to declare war and to make peace, the power to 
appoint magistrates and officers, the power to levy taxes and so on – are all consequences of the 
position of the sovereign as the legal head of state (Ibid: 48). In order for the sovereign to 
perform these tasks it must retain certain key characteristics. First, the sovereign power is 
described as absolute or unbound by the law. Bodin (Ibid: 12–13) further argues that sovereignty 
cannot be restricted by law because the sovereign is the source of the law: 
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[A] King cannot be subject to the laws . . . Thus at the end of edicts and ordinances we see the 
words, for such is our pleasure which serve to make it understood that the laws of a sovereign 
prince, even if founded on good and strong reasons, depend solely on his own free will. (Bodin). 
 
It can be observed that the conception of the laws of a sovereign prince depends solely on his 
own free will. This makes the Bodinian sovereign omnipotent. Without question the Bodinian 
ruler has overwhelming power over his subjects. He has the sole right to decide on issues of 
peace and war.  
 
In opposition to Bodin’s position Pattison (2010:2) argues that the problem with the Westphalian 
concept of sovereignty is that it rests on an absolute and exclusive right of the state to control 
everything within its own jurisdiction and, therefore, provides the ruler with a “free hand to 
violate its citizen’s human rights with impunity.” Evans and Sahnoun, (2002:99-103) further 
argue that this traditional conception of sovereignty as an “absolutist internal control” unduly 
emphasizes the state’s freedom from external interference.  
 
It can be argued that while the sovereign has the right to govern within its boundaries, it does not 
mean that the sovereign is entitled to abuse citizens’ human rights as this will be against the ethic 
of cultural relativism which maintains that morality is grounded in the approval of one’s society 
(Wellman 2003:20). 
With regard to Bodin’s claim that the sovereign prince depends solely on his own free will, 
security sector reformists are quick to see a state that abuses its own citizens as wanting in 
ethical values and therefore in dire need of SSR. 
Knights (2010:33) notes that, “there is a growing awareness that the problem of insecurity in 
transitional states in Africa has been compounded by some of the very institutions meant to 
mitigate them.”  He points out that due to absence of clearly defined ethical principles, policies 
and practices, national militaries and other security sector actors have on many occasions acted 
in support of autocratic rule that has sometimes precipitated civil wars. This aspect will be noted 
in chapter 5. 
Edmunds (2003) claims that to avoid autocratic rule (as Bodin indirectly implies in the above 
assertion) there is need to entrench the ethic of good governance within the security sector. He 
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posits that a key public good in every state is security. It enables people to live their lives and 
carry out normal economic activity without fear of conflict, violence and banditry. Because of 
this, the security sector can be both an enabling force for good governance, and a significant 
obstacle in its way. An ethically grounded security sector is thus considered a crucial element in 
tackling corruption or organised crime. Edmunds (2003) thus argues that ‘more widely; 
efficiency in the security sector is a central component of good governance.’ 
Rae (2008:124) on the other hand, seeks to examine the notion of sovereignty from an ethical 
point of view. He wonders whether sovereign states that systematically abuse the human rights 
of their citizens should continue to enjoy privileges of sovereignty in international law. This has 
stimulated debate on the rationale or ethical premise for humanitarian intervention and whether 
enough initiative is being expended to satisfy the requirements of international law. 
 
Today, scholars and states themselves engage in discourses as they reflect on different 
dimensions attributed to sovereignty over the period(see International Commission on 
Intervention and Sovereignty (ICISS):2001:15; Newman, 2009: 93; Evans, 2008: 56; Cuncliffe, 
2011: 1).  
 
Wheeler (2000: 39) contends that there is nothing natural about sovereignty as the limit of our 
ethical responsibilities. Hence, when the moral construction of sovereignty is challenged, it 
becomes legitimate and ethical for state leaders to risk the lives of their soldiers to prevent or 
curtail human rights abuses (Wheeler, 2000: 39).  
 
However, it is important to note that some powerful countries abuse the ethic of humanitarian 
intervention. They claim to be paragons of human rights when in fact their actions continue to 
cause harm to millions of people as exemplified by NATO’s involvement in Libya, Afghanistan, 
Iraq and many other countries in the guise of wanting to protect human rights and providing 
humanitarian assistance. It can therefore be argued that the actions of powerful nations are 
against the ethic of altruism. This is in contrast to Butler’s argument that we must have an 
inherent psychological capacity to show benevolence to others (Wellman 2003:21)  
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Bodin is comfortable that a second attribute of sovereignty is that it is unconditional: 
“sovereignty given to a prince subject to obligations and conditions is proper and should not be 
seen as absolute power” (Bodin [1576] 1992: 8). Bodin in a way implies that the President as the 
Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces should have the final say on issues to do with peace 
and war and also on how and when to deploy troops for combat.  
 
In the SADC region, especially in countries like Zimbabwe and South Africa, there have been 
heated debates and protests from civil society groups on the need for more transparency within 
the security sector institutions. My argument seeks to claim that internal sovereignty as a core 
component of the legitimate state should also be grounded in ethical practice. Central to the 
relationship between the sovereign power and its own subjects, is internal sovereignty’s 
reference to a state’s ability to exercise de facto political control over its territory (Heywood 
2004: 92). The importance of this form of sovereignty is unquestionable, it being viewed as the 
most fundamental requirement for statehood.  
 
Weber judged the legitimacy of states solely by their ability to “successfully hold a claim to the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force” (1947: 154). Here, Weber mentions ‘legitimate’ use of 
force, implying that though a state is capable of using force it must do so in an ethical or legal 
manner. 
 
Prominent theorists, such as Herz (1957: 474) and Tilly (1992: 1), differ from Weber as they 
ignore legitimacy in favour of raw force. They define a state as a coercive-wielding, autonomous 
territorial space. However, there is no proof that political sovereignty based entirely on the 
monopoly of coercive power and lacking moral or ethical restraints would last the test of time.  
 
Bodin’s third attribute of sovereignty is that it is unaccountable just as the king is not 
accountable to his subjects. This is in contrast to modern notions of sovereignty proposed by 
SSR advocates as they ask for a high ethical degree of accountability from those who are in 
political office.  
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Further, Bodin thinks that sovereignty is indivisible. Although he preferred monarchy to other 
forms of government, he believed that sovereignty can lie in a person or an assembly. For Bodin, 
the important point is that sovereignty cannot be divided between different agencies but must 
reside in one single place, whether it is a king, assembly, or populace.  
 
SSR advocates strongly believe that the sovereign should be accountable to citizens and that a 
code of ethics should enforce the separation of powers between the executive and other arms of 
government. The sovereign’s coercive apparatus (security sector institutions) should also be 
checked through parliamentary and civil society oversight roles. 
Finally, Bodinian sovereignty is humanly unlimited and irrevocable, and therefore perpetual: 
“Sovereignty is not limited either in power, or in function, or in length of time,” (Bodin [1576] 
1992: 3) and “the law is nothing but the command of a sovereign making use of his power” 
(Bodin [1576] 1992: 38). He comes up with a conclusion that “he is absolutely sovereign who 
recognizes nothing, after God that is greater than himself” (Bodin [1576] 1992: 4).  
Many contemporary studies have shown that while the territorial sovereign state has undergone 
many changes and challenges, its legitimate use of violence passes as ethical. It can be concluded 
that, in the modern day governance system, where ethics now dominate many facets of a political 
system, the sovereign is governed by a country’s constitution. Further, the constitution confers 
on the sovereign the duty to safeguard national interests and laxity in the exercise of this crucial 
function may result in the impeachment of the sovereign as enshrined in the constitution. 
 
1.8.2 Thomas Hobbes’ Theory of Sovereignty 
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), writing Leviathan
1
 after the turmoil of civil war and unsuccessful 
attempts at republicanism in England, held an even lower opinion of human nature. For Hobbes, 
“(i)f any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become 
enemies.” Hobbes, by moving the human being to the focal point of his theory and by 
scientifically approaching power relations, almost independent of theology, exposed himself to 
                                                          
1
Leviathan: work written by Thomas Hobbes centred on the idea that political society arose because the drive of self-preservation caused human 
beings to leave the perilous ‘state of nature’ that transfers their individual rights to a sovereign power that can protect the lives of all. See – Cohen 
M and Nicole F,(eds) Princeton Readings in Political Thought: Essential Texts since Plato, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996 
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sharp criticism by officials and fellow theorists (Skinner, 1964: 306; Oakeshott, 1946: 10-13; 
Barry, 1968: 128). Thus, in historical context, Hobbes is portrayed as a radical intellectual 
outcast and even atheist. Disgusted and angered by what he saw in the English civil war, and at 
times fearing for his own life, Hobbes realized that without order or peace there is little much 
else that can function in a society. 
He argued that individuals living in a state of nature were constantly at war, did not know right 
from wrong, lacked good ethics and lived lives that were miserable. As a result of his 
reductionist method, where he took societal analysis to the point of human nature, he concluded 
with a key realist assumption that where there is no sovereign or government, anarchy fills the 
vacuum. In such an anarchical state lacking ethical values, and where there is no coercive arm of 
government (comprising of the army, police and intelligence services) there is likely going to be 
lawlessness or anarchy which would lead each person to have a natural right to protect himself 
from harm or injury. It can be argued that a state that lacks ethical values and does not have a 
government and well established security sector experiences anarchical situations. 
In the view that all men are predisposed to violent action, and are naturally warlike, Hobbes 
believed that order must be imposed from above in order to prevent the destruction of man in an 
anarchic society. In a slightly more pessimistic way than Machiavelli, he saw that the only hope 
for society is to be ruled by a sovereign power. Hobbes argued that there is no predisposition 
towards order in man, so no assumptions can be made as to good will, and man is naturally at the 
lowest possible level of morality. In other words, man lacks ethical values; he is nothing more 
than a beast. He will kill in order not to be killed, and will suspect all others of trying to take his 
life. Ultimately, Hobbes believes that man inherently has no morality (Hampsher-Monk 
1992:27).Hobbes understood that in a civil war as much as in a state of nature, there is: 
[N]o place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the 
Earth; no Navigation . . . no commodious Building . . . no account of Time; no Arts; no letters; no 
Society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, 
solitary, poorer, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes [1651]1992:89). 
 
As to be observed in Chapter 5, coups undermine peace, security and economic development 
leaving the state vulnerable to foreign resource vultures whose interests are to plunder weaker 
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nations’ resources as happening in Eastern DRC, Libya, Iraq and many others. Anarchy will also 
prevail in such a state retarding any development initiatives and creating fear among the citizens. 
Hobbes believed that in the state of nature: “Nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and 
wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no 
law; where no law, no injustice”, (Hobbes, 1958: Ch.13, 108). To put it differently, any action 
that preserves one’s own life is justified and men are at liberty to do what they perceive as 
[ethical and] appropriate (Curran, 2002: 64).  
Natural law only comes into existence when men reach a point of agreement through rational 
calculation that this is in their own self-interest, as conditions in the state of nature are so bad 
that “every man has a right to everything, even to one another’s body” (Ibid: Ch. 14, 110). “But 
that right of all men to all things, is in effect no better than if no man had right to anything. For 
there is little use and benefit of the right a man hath, when another as strong, or stronger than 
himself, hath right to the same” (Hobbes, 2005: Ch. 14: 8, 61).  
Thus, Hobbes’ first law of nature is to seek peace and follow it (Hobbes, 1958: Ch. 14, 110). He 
defined a law of nature as a precept or general rule, found out by reason, “by which a man is 
forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life[moral values] or takes away the means of 
preserving the same[moral codes] and to omit that by which he thinks it may best be 
preserved[moral principles].” (Hobbes; 1958:110). 
In Leviathan, Hobbes wrote: “The End of the institution of Sovereignty [is] the peace of the 
subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common Enemy” (Hobbes [1651] 1992: 
150). Hobbes explained that sovereign power can be acquired by force, or created by institution 
but that the rights and consequences and ends of sovereignty are the same in both cases. Hobbes 
just like Bodin argued in favour of absolute, unlimited, irrevocable, humanly unaccountable, 
inalienable and indivisible sovereignty. It can be argued that, such type of sovereignty which 
lacks ethical values would only create a ‘beast’ like Hitler or Idi Amin. 
For the sake of security and peace, Hobbes recommended that the “Sovereign Power . . . is as 
great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it” (Hobbes [1651] 1992: 144). Hobbes 
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conceded that such a power could be dangerous but quite necessary in that men if left 
uncontrolled or unchecked can kill other men in order to acquire their properties. He argued that: 
And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the 
consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbour, are 
much worse (Hobbes [1651] 1992: 144–5) 
 
Hobbes maintained that no one is secure and impenetrable in an anarchic system and people seek 
a greater standard of living, so he believed that people will be willing to give up their rights to do 
whatever they wish in favour of a moral system. However, there is no guarantee that if a person 
behaves morally or ethically others will do the same. As a result, people who practise morality or 
are ethically upright, while others do not, in Hobbes’ opinion, will become easy prey. 
Hobbes argued against the belief that people will be forced by social convention to behave 
morally. He held that it can be to a person’s advantage to behave immorally or unethically while 
others act ethically. In the end, it cannot be expected of anyone to behave morally lest he falls 
prey to the unethical ones. In other words, no matter how ethically upright one may be, one is 
forced to act unethically in order to survive in an anarchical state. He concludes that the only 
way to make society act in an ethical manner is for a supreme government to exist, which can 
enforce morality through “terror of punishment”. While the word ‘terror of punishment’ might 
seem so far-fetched, it simply implies legitimate use of coercion. In such a system, one cannot 
get away with acting immorally. It therefore would be foolish for anyone to risk doing so.  
There are several insights from Hobbes that are important to this thesis.  
The first, is that if any two men desire the same thing, which never the less they cannot both 
enjoy, they become enemies. What is therefore needed, in order to avoid these two men from 
killing or harming each other, is a government supported by a strong security sector that helps to 
maintain law and order as well as avoid anarchy. 
The second one is that of absolute, unlimited, irrevocable, humanly unaccountable, inalienable 
and indivisible sovereignty. However, too much power in the hands of the sovereign can be 
subject to abuse. 
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The third one is where he concludes by saying that the only way to make society act in a moral 
manner is for a supreme government to exist, which can force morality through legitimate use of 
force or the terror of punishment. 
Building on the above insights, it can be argued that the sovereign through a well-established SS 
and a strong Constitution can therefore provide protection or security to all citizens as to curb 
lawlessness or anarchy by avoiding a nasty, short and brutish life as proposed by Hobbes.  
Following Hobbes, it can therefore be argued that the only way man can live peacefully with his 
fellow man is through a sovereign who can guarantee everyone’s rights by having a monopoly 
over use of coercion or force especially against those who want to disturb peace and create 
anarchy in the country. 
 
Obedience in a state can be safeguarded through punishment and use of force by the sovereign. 
 
The security sector therefore becomes the coercive arm of the state and seeks to stamp out 
anarchy by guaranteeing citizens peace and stability. Hobbes argued that a citizen only has the 
right to resist if the sovereign endangers his life (Hobbes [1651] 1991: 151). He attempted to 
offer a rational explanation for ascribing unlimited power to the sovereign by pointing out that, 
by nature, we have the right to use all available means for self-defence.  
 
In spite of this right, in a state of nature or during a civil war, our life is in constant danger. We 
enter the political state with a view of entrusting the sovereign with our defence and security. As 
the end of the sovereign power is the protection of our life and the preservation of peace, it 
would be irrational to impose restrictions on the sovereign as this would limit its ability to 
protect our survival.  
 
It can be argued that the African traditional governance system observes the concept of an 
unrestricted sovereign power where at family level the father makes the ultimate decisions and in 
a chief’s area of jurisdiction it is the chief who usually has the final say. However, this does not 
mean that both the father and chief are free to exercise unilateral decisions but they act in the 
spirit of collective conscience.  
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On the other hand, Marx's scientific or dialectical approach refutes that the state can have power 
that is independent of the social relations of production that produced it. Marxists claim that 
states represent class divisions on the basis of wealth and power. According to Marx (1969) the 
SS is used to safeguard the interests of those who are in power. The sovereign in Marx’s state 
therefore wields power not to protect citizens but basically to exploit their labour. 
 
It will be apparent in chapter 5 that different scholars noted that coups usually benefit the 
political elites as well as those in the security sector while the ordinary citizens languish in 
poverty. The security institutions in this case, are seen as objects of fear and distrust only serving 
the political elites in power something which SSR advocates would want to guard against 
through the implementation of various reforms. According to Marx, the state does not represent 
the interests of all people in society nor does it offer them any protection, but it stands to support 
the desires of an elite group.  
 
However, Hobbes’ sovereign is concerned with the protection of citizens from exposure to 
anarchical situations and he argues that a citizen only has the right to resist if the sovereign 
endangers his life. For Marx, man can only be free and well protected if they overthrow the 
exploitative sovereign through a proletariat revolution. It is only through the dictatorship of the 
proletariat that bourgeois society can be dismantled and the state will eventually wither away to 
enable the rise of communism. Communism represents the `end of history', given that classes 
have ceased to exist.  
 
However, it can be argued that there is no absolute egalitarianism in any form of governance no 
matter how conscious or unconscious the state maybe. Equality in this regard can best be 
maintained through sound economic, social and economic policies put into place by the 
sovereign. It can be further argued that the claim by Marx that the state does not represent the 
interests of all people is out of order in governance terms as it is not sustainable and maybe a 
recipe for disaster resulting in creating an anarchic security environment. 
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Marx’s call for a ‘stateless’ society without a sovereign or security apparatus is totally 
misplaced, utopian and liable to cause anarchy of immeasurable magnitude. 
 
Hobbes ascribes to the sovereign power all the attributes and characteristics listed by Bodin. 
Moreover, using a more forceful and unambiguous argument than Bodin, Hobbes spells out that 
the sovereign provides protection in society so that it does not degenerate into a state of anarchy; 
in exchange of obedience and that absolute protection requires absolute obedience to an absolute 
sovereign power.  
 
It is expressly clear that Hobbes and Bodin agree that the purpose or function of state sovereignty 
is to provide protection for citizens or subjects in exchange for obedience.  
 
For the sake of protection from internal and external enemies Hobbes ascribes absolute, 
indivisible, unlimited, inalienable, unaccountable, irrevocable power to the sovereign, be it 
located in a man (monarchy), in an assembly (aristocracy) or in the populace (democracy). The 
protection/obedience principle forms the foundation of the Hobbesian concept of the sovereign 
state. Indeed, for Hobbes, a state that cannot provide protection cannot command obedience and 
hence is not a state at all. Furthermore, regardless of any differences in size, wealth or power, all 
sovereign states rely on the protection/obedience principle as the formative identifier of 
statehood.  
 
1.8.3 Interrogating Immanuel Kant’s ‘Liberal’ Theory of Sovereignty 
Kant is regarded as one of the founding fathers of liberalism. First, as argued by Richard Tuck 
and Howard Williams, Kant attempted to combine the Hobbesian notion of sovereignty with a 
theory of limited constitutional government. Disagreeing with Hobbes, Kant argues that a 
sovereign state ought to protect basic human rights such as freedom, equality and independence 
of the individual (Kant 1795: 74). Additionally, Kant also challenges the Hobbesian claim that a 
state operating in an international system characterized by anarchy can adequately protect its 
citizens. While Kant accepts the Hobbesian principle that the function of the sovereign state is to 
provide protection in exchange for obedience, he expands the list of rights that the state is 
supposed to protect and argues that only a federation of republican states, and not a system of 
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totally independent states, can offer true protection, security and perpetual peace. It can be 
argued that in the current global political system Kant’s concept of protection of human rights 
has been engineered by powerful states under the responsibility to protect which has resulted in 
devastating human rights abuses by NATO.  
 
Kant saw in war a source and means of advancing evil and moral corruption. The frequency of 
war meant that the rights and freedoms of individuals were continually threatened by aggressive 
states. In Kant’s (1795) view, it was the duty of all individuals and states to bring about the 
abolition of war by embarking on a progressive goal towards perpetual peace. Small and Singer 
(1795:10) note that “the premise of Kant’s work is that peace is not a natural condition in world 
politics and that, through the application of republicanism and liberty, politics should exist to 
maintain a peaceful order of republican states established through civil constitutions and abiding 
by international laws.” 
 
Easley (2004:54) is of the view that liberal institutions encourage participation in free debate 
thus removing the capacity of leaders to follow ambitions outside public interest. This is 
completely different from Bodin and Hobbes’ view of an all-powerful sovereign who was only 
answerable to God and himself. Liberal scholars believe that citizens also have a right to decide 
on issues to do with peace and war. It is argued that this can easily be done through democratic 
oversight of the SSIs as will be further elaborated in Chapters 4, 7 and 8. 
 
Russet (1993:9) adds that “the decision to go to war taken within a liberal democracy must first 
pass through several constitutional institutions that place constraints on the ability to take quick, 
single-minded decisions” as will be highlighted in Chapters 7 and 8. Hence, liberal democracy is 
deemed rational and (in theory) allows the public to effectively control the decision to go to war. 
 
SSR advocates seek to advance liberal views as a way of avoiding unnecessary regional, 
international and local armed conflicts. Their belief is that SSIs which abide with democratic 
principles are less likely to engage in conflict, loot state resources or stage coups.  
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Owen (1994:17) is of the opinion that it is the institutions of representative government, which 
hold elected officials and decision-makers accountable to a wide electorate, that make war a 
largely unattractive option for both the government and its citizens.  
 
Ray (1998:45) in concurrence also adds that because the costs and risks of war directly affect 
large segments of the population, it is expected that the average voter will throw the incumbent 
leader/party out of office if they initiate a losing or unnecessary war, thus, providing a clear 
institutional incentive for democratic leaders to anticipate such an electoral response before 
deciding to go to war. 
 
1.8.4 Sovereignty in a Contemporary Context 
An assessment of the various writings of political scientists, sociologists and philosophers 
reveals that Nation-State sovereignty is equated to terms such as, absolutism; with unrestricted 
power and authority; monarchy; a form of government in which supreme authority is held by a 
single hereditary ruler; de jure; institutionally recognized right to exercise control over a territory 
independent, and free from the influence or control of others (e.g. Wendt 2004: 294; Krasner 
1999: 3; Herz 1957: 474; Tilly 1992: 1; Heywood 2004: 92). Waltz (1979) 
 
Wallerstein (1974:33-7),drawing from the above characterizations or terms from the various 
scholars, came to the conclusion that sovereignty can be equated to legitimate power, while Rae 
(2002:21-7) and Schmitt (1985:13) have linked sovereignty to absolute, indivisible, unlimited, 
inalienable, unaccountable and irrevocable power.  
 
It can be argued that Libya, in its current system of governance after the weakening of its 
military by NATO (in 2011) does not enjoy absolute and indivisible power. It needs adding that 
the current anarchic scenario is traced to foreign security interventions. 
 
It is thus fair to observe that in the modern day governance system, a sovereign nation-state may 
only fully exercise authority over a geographic area in circumstances where the military is fully 
prepared to defend it and the people from internal and external enemies. The military is thus core 
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in the making of strong and effective governance institutions. The essence of a sovereign state 
espouses the ability to self-govern and to do so independent of external control (Skinner, 1964). 
The proponents of the theory of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states put a 
price on its inviolable nature. 
 
Bull (1977) refers to the above as ‘external sovereignty’ where the state is regarded as 
independent of outside authorities. This implies that, “there is no authority that can tell a 
sovereign state what to do” (Russett and Starr, 2000). 
 
It therefore becomes intriguing as to what right some states or international organisations wield 
over other states in agitating for reform of their security sector apparatus.  
 
External interference in the internal affairs of other states is always considered unlawful under 
international law (Shaw, 2008; Harris, 1991).The United Nations General Assembly’s 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations stated that, “no 
entity or group of states has the right to intervene in affairs of any other state” (Chesterman, 
2001).This clearly implies that intervention of any form in a sovereign nation-state; be it 
economic, political, social, cultural and so on is in complete violation of international law. This 
principle has been reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice and also appears in a number 
of treaties between countries including among others the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
(Wood, 2007).  
 
Building on the above international laws, it can be argued that SSR that is externally driven 
becomes unethical because it is a violation of international law in that the 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law is totally opposed to any form of interference in the affairs of a 
state.  
 
In addition, the African Union Framework on SSR (2011:2), strongly and openly “prohibits all 
national, regional, continental or international entities from carrying out activities in Africa, in 
the name of SSR, which may undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence, domestic jurisdiction of a Member State, including the use of SSR to effect 
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regime change in a Member State, or its ability to fulfil its international obligations.” This ideally 
means there is no actor in the international system with the authority to tell a sovereign state 
what to do especially in terms of SSR.  
 
It is noted that only in cases where there is arbitrary abuse of civilians may the SS legal 
intervention from other states be deemed necessary.  
 
Nation-State sovereignty also entails that a state has the right to exercise force or maintain order 
within the territory it controls. Under international law, states have a legal monopoly on the use 
of force both internally and externally. This means that the state has a legitimate necessity for 
security forces to fulfil a number of national security requirements which include national 
defence, intelligence gathering and national policing (Williams, 2002).   
 
The primary role of the military is therefore to defend the sovereignty of a nation-state against 
foreign military aggression as well as internal insurrections and any other civil strife. 
 
The SS as alluded to by scholars like Williams (2000) and Nathan (2004) can only defend 
nation-state sovereignty when it is not interfered from without. Weber (1947) sees sovereignty as 
an ability of a state or sovereign to use coercive force in order to maintain peace and stability 
within a given territory.  
 
The idea of sovereignty being linked to power as supported by sociologists such as Mann (1988) 
and Giddens (1985) suggests that “societies are   manmade constructs bound by coercion” 
(Heywood 2004). This implies that if a state is not sovereign (does not have a coercive apparatus 
- strong army, police force, intelligence service and so on) then it is not an effective state. 
 
Herz (1957) noted that throughout history sovereign states have afforded protection and security 
to their citizens. This protection can best be provided when a sovereign nation-state relies on a 
well-trained and funded security sector.  
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However, while the above may be true, the end of the Cold War heralded a significant challenge 
to the hitherto inviolability of state sovereignty. What has been witnessed in today’s international 
system is that some powerful states acting unilaterally (e.g. Russia annexing Crimea from 
Ukraine in 2014; France militarily intervening in Ivory Coast to depose President Gbago from 
power) or within a coalition (USA and its NATO allies invading Libya in 2011 and Iraq in 2003) 
now have an illegal monopoly over the affairs of smaller or weaker states.  
Leaders who abuse their own citizens by committing crimes against humanity (Yeatman and 
Zolkos, 2010) leading to mass displacements of large populations or to genocide (e.g. Yugoslavia 
under Milosovich) can no longer get away with it as the UN under Article 39 gives the UN 
Security Council the ability to authorize military intervention in cases which it deems threaten 
international peace and security.  
Under the statute of Humanitarian Intervention or Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the UN can 
now authorize other states to intervene in the affairs of another state, usually to stop the abuses 
from continuing. However, critics have pointed out that the 2011 Libyan military intervention 
that finally deposed Gadhafi had more to do with Western national interests than the protection 
of ordinary citizens.  
Cohen (2008) questions the justifications other states have in intervening militarily in the affairs 
of another state. The burden of the claim to invade another state lies in the ability of the other 
state to prove that the invasion is not about serving its own interests. However, this proof has 
always been found to be quite faulty as evidenced in the NATO-Yugoslav war; American-Iraqi 
wars 1991 and 2003, American-Afghan war 2001; Russian-Georgia war 2006; NATO-Libyan 
war 2011.  
Evidence is abounding (Bellamy, 2010; Chomsky, 2007; Guyatt, 2000; WSWS, 2000 – 2011 
articles) that these military expeditions in other sovereign states were driven by self-interests. It 
can therefore be argued that states claiming to be acting out of humanitarian concern for the 
citizens in other countries are actually pursuing ‘post-imperialist’ agendas as opposed to 
legitimate humanitarian concerns. 
The need for sanity in safeguarding nation-state sovereignty is still observed.  
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Although nation-state sovereignty can be regarded to be fragile in some contexts or under certain 
circumstances, the theory of non-intervention in a sovereign state is still respected and honoured 
by other states as well as the United Nations (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which is against the 
use of force by states in their relations with other states. The inviolable nature of nation-state 
sovereignty is still largely respected.  
1.8.5 Contextualising the Theory of Anarchy 
The second theory guiding this study is the theory of anarchy.  
Anarchy in international relations is characterized by the absence of a world government to 
oversee and control international affairs. In this regard, realist scholars such as Morgenthau 
(1948) and Waltz (1979) assert that states existing in an anarchic international system or ‘world 
jungle’ - which has no clear set rules - should always maximize their security for self-survival. 
Stronger states, aware of the absence of a powerful sovereign to check on them, have at times 
invaded weaker states in order to exploit resources. However, other states have also at times 
acted collectively against the aggressor in order to restore order in the aggressed state. 
Instances of aggressed states include Kuwait where Iraq in the 1991 Gulf war undermined its 
sovereignty; the DRC crisis pitying three SADC countries namely Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia against the aggressor states namely Rwanda and Uganda.  
The second form of anarchy which concerns this study is that propounded by the English 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1958). He notes that if a state has no strong sovereign 
(government) this would lead to anarchy as there would be war of every man against every man 
(Hobbes 1958). In this regard, he means that in a state that lacks mechanisms to maintain law 
and order (security sector institutions) there would be anarchy or lawlessness in that every man 
would behave as he pleases. The stronger would then benefit at the expense of the weak.  
Hobbes’ theory of anarchy is based on lack of order, lawlessness, conflict, chaos, civil 
disobedience, high rates of criminality and banditry, murder, injustices and all sorts of vices. He 
concludes that life in such a lawless state would be “solitary, short, nasty and brutish”. It should 
be noted that International Relations students have used Hobbes’ analogy of anarchy (the state of 
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nature) to equate it to the international system that lacks a World Sovereign. In this regard, 
security implies the defence of the nation-state, borders and sovereignty (state security).  
On the other hand, Security Studies students have also used the same analogy to look at security 
from an internal perspective especially when there is an insurrection, violent demonstrations, and 
a state of emergency or use of martial law and so on in a given state. Their perspective of 
security is centred on the defence and protection of all citizens from all forms of violence and 
insecurity (human security).  
Building on the above points, a closer look at what Hobbes means about ‘security’ clearly shows 
that he is referring to both state and human security. In other words, Hobbes sees anarchy as both 
an internal and external phenomenon. It is therefore imperative that both state and human 
security should be safeguarded from both internal and external conditions that lead to anarchy. 
Internally the SSIs have a constitutional mandate to protect their citizens against any form of 
vice, and externally, the SSIs are also mandated by the constitution to defend the state from an 
aggressor.  
In some cases, there will arise some exceptional circumstances where a state will have to apply 
special powers as a way of bringing about stability in a certain area.  
A state’s constitution allows it to use force especially in the outbreak of war, chaos or any sort of 
threat or conflict that warrants the application of such a constitutional clause. In this regard, to 
avoid anarchy in a state there must be internal sovereignty which is regarded as a core 
component of the legitimate state. Centred on the relationship between the sovereign power and 
its own subjects, internal sovereignty refers to a state’s ability to exercise de facto political 
control over its territory (Heywood 2004: 92).  
The essence of the aforesaid form of sovereignty is beyond question, commonly viewed as the 
most fundamental requirement for statehood. This was explored by Weber (1947), who judged 
the legitimacy of states solely by their ability to “successfully hold a claim to the legal use of 
power”. Other prominent theorists, such as Herz (1957: 474) and Tilly (1992: 1), appear to 
define the state in a similar manner, reinforcing the importance of a coercion-wielding, 
autonomous territorial space as a way of avoiding anarchy from within and without. 
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1.8.6 Examining State Secrecy 
The third theory is that of state secrecy. 
State secrecy can simply be defined as the withholding of information by the sovereign nation-
state from the public (Ambinder and Grady, 2013).Of late, SS ‘reformists’ or advocates have 
demanded that parliamentarians and CSOs should play an oversight role over SS institutions in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Born and N’Diaye, 2011; Ebo, 2007; N’Diaye and Ebo, 2008).This implies 
that parliament should have access to information that states have always deemed to be private 
and confidential.  
SS reformists have remained undeterred and resilient in requesting that security institutions be 
more transparent as tax-payers (citizens) have a right to be informed on what their SS is up to. In 
the event that troops are deployed to another country to engage in conflict, SS reformists want 
the government to inform the citizens on the number of soldiers killed and wounded.  
However, many states are not willing to disclose some of the above information as they believe 
that doing so will jeopardize nation-state sovereignty and the integrity of security institutions. 
The world over, governments in the name of state secrecy have always covered up assassination 
plots, secret coups, illegal acts, arms sales, and any number of activities that embarrassed the 
nation when revealed (Ambinder and Grady, 2013:6).  
It then can be argued that revealing the number of casualties in a war usually demoralizes 
citizens or even leads to massive demonstrations as citizens will be requesting for the withdrawal 
of troops. This can be exemplified by the Vietnamese war, which incensed many Americans 
leading them to demonstrate against their Government while making calls for it to immediately 
withdraw from the East Asian country. The reason lay in the number of body-bags that were now 
coming back home every week and month. 
 The Zimbabwean Government kept a heavy lid on what was going on in the DRC conflict 
despite calls from CSOs and the opposition MDC party to make known to citizens the amount of 
money the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) were spending per week or month as well as the 
number of Zimbabwean casualties (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011).  
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In South Africa, CSOs and opposition political parties were successful in requesting the 
government to recall troops in the Central African Republic after Seleka rebels had killed some 
South African Defence Force members (Bauer, 2013). However, the state never clearly disclosed 
why the SADF was in the CAR in the first place.  
In Kenya, the Government refused to disclose the number of Kenyan Defence Force casualties 
after they were raided by Al-Shabab terrorists in Somalia (The Insider, June 23, 2016) 
SS advocates have in some instances requested that the government comes out in the open on its 
defence spending, including informing citizens on military hardware purchased or manufactured. 
In most cases, notwithstanding parliamentary oversight role of security institutions, once the 
defence budget is authorized, adopted, and endorsed into law, how that money is used is always 
shrouded in secrecy (Ambinder and Grady, 2013:5). This implies that the state will always be 
secretive on what defence money is used for. Releasing information on a state’s military 
hardware also increases the vulnerability of a state. Such information might allow enemy states 
to improve on their own military capabilities.  
Realist scholars like Morgenthau (1951) and Waltz (1979) assert that in pursuing their national 
interest, states come up with decisions that maximise their chances of survival. These decisions 
incorporate intelligence gathering on threats coming from other states. 
Divulgence of a state’s overall military spending as advocated by SS reformists not only gives an 
advantage to the state spying on the other state’s military capabilities but it also allows the 
enemy state to improve on its own defensive and offensive capabilities in the event that war 
escalates.  
SSR advocates tend to overlook the importance of state secrecy in safeguarding nation-state 
sovereignty. 
The valuing of state secrecy over the right of Parliamentarians to access information is not 
confined to African countries alone. 
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 In developed countries such as the United Kingdom, United States of America, France, and 
Germany just to mention a few, there is also conflict between state secrecy and the liberty of 
individuals within that nation. Articles published by the World Socialist Web Site in 2012-14 
show that, since the Wiki leaks disclosures individuals like Brad Manning have been convicted 
for a range of criminal offences including that of disclosing information which poses a danger to 
national security. 
Spencer (2013) points out that:  
Manning faces life in military prison under the Espionage Act. Prosecutors for the Obama 
administration argue that he is guilty of “aiding the enemy” for leaking information that was 
subsequently made available on the Internet to anyone, including enemies of the United States 
(WSWS.org: 19 January 2013).  
The US government also wants Julian Assange, the brains behind Wiki leaks, to stand trial over 
the leaking of information regarded as a threat to the US Government’s national security 
(Ambinder and Grady, 2013).  
This appears to suggest that the measures legitimized under the clause on national security (state 
secrecy) have undermined civil liberties such as the right to access information in such a way 
that it has resulted in the conviction of those who disclose or attempt to disclose information 
deemed by the state to be confidential. This in a way suggests that legislation on access to 
information does not have precedence over issues to do with national security.  
No state is immune from being heavy handed when it comes to the notion of state security. Bill 
Van Auken (2013) notes that: 
The Obama administration has gone to enormous lengths to keep documents relating to the drone 
killing program from the American public. Lawsuits brought by the New York Times and the 
American Civil Liberties Union under the Freedom of Information Act to force release of these 
documents were dismissed last month by a federal judge in Manhattan who complained in her 
ruling that laws and legal precedents dealing with national security and state secrets “effectively 
allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that 
seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for its 
conclusion a secret” (WSWS.org: 6 February 2013). 
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In developed as well as developing countries, SS reformists have been at the forefront in 
criticizing laws related to maintaining national security (state secrecy). The right of citizens to 
access information as supported by various pieces of human rights legislation will always be at 
risk in any state especially when the state feels that its core values or interests are under threat. 
 An analysis into various Conventions on Human rights clearly illustrate that there is tension in 
the international system between the protection of the right to access information and state 
secrecy. The definition of national security and state secrecy is different from one country to the 
next. The definition is so broad that the right of citizens to access information as supported by 
various pieces of human rights legislation is put at risk. 
The Open Society Justice Initiative (2012) points out that: 
What constitutes national security varies from state to state. In most countries, defence against 
external threats lies at the core of the concept. In some countries, the term refers to interests 
primarily defended by the intelligence services. In a few countries, the definition encompasses 
international relations concerning core national interests. 
It cannot be denied that access to information is a key part of the individual’s freedoms.  
However, basing on issues related to national security and state secrecy it may be argued that 
CSOs’ right to access security sector information is in conflict with the authorities’ need to 
maintain security of the state.  
While it is imperative that the public has a right to access information, many Human rights 
scholars have acknowledged that the state in a way also needs to withhold some information 
from public scrutiny. The Open Society Justice Initiative clearly states that national security, 
defence and international relations should be safeguarded and not disclosed to the public(Open 
Society Justice Initiative: National Security Principles and the Right to Information-2012 Draft 
Copy). 
Modise (2007:7) argues that, in South Africa “despite the existence of a constitutional 
framework for civilian oversight of the military evidence on the ground has shown that the 
Department of Defence (DOD) may bypass civilian oversight either deliberately or by default”. 
She however notes that, these bypasses do not in themselves threaten the new political system, 
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but they show some of the difficulties common in implementing SSR which may in years to 
come undermine civil–military relations in South Africa.     
Baregu (2005:36) also concurs as he points out that:  
Traditionally there is no area of public policy that is more sensitive than national security. It is one 
area which all states have shrouded in secrecy and whose instruments range from the overt to the 
covert and subversive. It is also an area in which public debate is conventionally restricted, 
information is sketchy and frequently severely restricted to a few, variously classed, ‘security 
cleared’ individuals and groups of people. In brief it is an area defined by confidentiality, 
disinformation, subterfuge and all manner of cloak and dagger activity, which renders 
parliamentary oversight a formidable task. 
It can be argued that, though parliamentary oversight is an important tool in security sector 
governance, it is fraught with many challenges. These are rooted in the conflict between the 
inherent natures of the two institutions, that is, parliament and CSOs as public institutions, being 
required to preside over the workings of the security sector which happens to be the machinery 
entrusted with safeguarding of nation-state secrets.  
Questions abound as to how institutions (parliament and CSOs) dedicated to free discussions and 
openness can at the same time be trusted with the responsibility of being custodians of the 
nation’s most sensitive national security issues. It would be further argued that CSOs’ security 
sector oversight role would in a way undoubtedly endanger the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the security sector especially the military and the intelligence services which need secrecy to 
carry out their mandate.   
It is therefore, important to delicately strike a balance between these competing needs; as Tapia-
Valdes (1982:13) points out that what is needed is to; “determine which values and interests 
should be protected first.” According to Bruneau and Boraz (2007), “to strike a balance between 
the efficacy of the Security Sector and the promotion of democratic principles within that sector 
is rather tricky even in the longest established democracies of the world.” 
At times, SS advocates do not dispute that certain secrets are necessary to defend nation-state 
sovereignty, but they also argue that others are not. The SS reformists argue that the line 
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separating the two has never been clearly defined. In fact, there is no real agreement as to who, 
exactly, gets to draw that line (Ambinder and Grady, 2013).  
However, evidence from various Acts of Parliament from both developed and developing 
countries clearly show that it is the state which has the final say in deciding which information is 
‘secret’ and which one is for ‘public consumption’.   
The executive (sovereign) in most states (as will be further analysed in chapter 7) wields a lot of 
power as it is allowed by various statutes within municipal law to do things citizens do not know 
so long it keeps the state secure by acting that way. The state will remain very protective and 
secretive with information it deems confidential in safeguarding national security despite 
persistent protests coming from advocates of SSR to release or divulge such information. 
1.9 Research Methodology 
Firstly, the research method adopted in this study is partly based on an insider’s perspective. As 
someone who has spent his entire career as a military trainer and had the opportunity to 
undertake military operations in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo, issues of 
SSR have been integral in my experience on SSR in the Southern African region.  
I have been privileged to take part in the SSR processes in three SADC countries such as the 
DRC, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.  
In my career as a military training and operations officer I had the opportunity to train with the 
United States of America and British Armies and I witnessed how their armies strengthen and 
carry out their SSR in defence of their national interests and ideological positionalities. 
Therefore, this study is based on two main assumptions.  
The major assumption of this study is that Western countries, African neo-liberal 
academics/scholars and those in CSOs cannot spearhead or impose their own models of SSR on 
the whole sub-Saharan continent without the participation of the concerned states and those who 
are in the SS institutions.  
The other assumption is that the SSR debate must focus on how the SSR should be capacitated to 
enhance combat effectiveness and how it should be shaped in order to protect, defend and 
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safeguard national interest and sovereignty thereby creating an ideal environment for inclusive 
socio-economic development.  
Secondly, this study takes on a historical dimension in that consideration will be given to a broad 
range of historical contexts as a way of understanding the SSR debate in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
First, emphasis will be given on the historical evolution of SSR in Africa. 
The term ‘SSR’ became dominant after the end of the cold War but it will be argued that a 
number of related terms also emerged in Africa which stressed on a particular type of security 
reform approach undertaken within a specific context.  
I thus seek to examine the different contexts African states ‘reformed’ their security sectors. 
Secondly I seek to focus on a historical background of SSR in Europe with the central goal of 
bringing out the major differences in approaches to SSR between the Europeans and Americans. 
Thirdly I will carry out a historical interrogation of coups that have happened in Africa. In 
particular, I place emphasis on coups where the elites or military take over power after foreign 
assistance.  
I will deliberately choose Zaire, Burkina Faso and Ghana as examples of countries where coups 
occurred.  
In this regard, I aim to find out whether calls for SSR in sub-Saharan Africa are really sincere or 
they are a hidden agenda for something more sinister as has happened during Western sponsored 
coups in West and Central Africa. 
Lastly, I seek to examine the historical role of African women in leading or commanding men 
into battle. My intention is to interrogate the efficacy of the reforms being called for to 
accommodate African women in SSIs. This is driven by the need to establish the dominant 
arguments and their ideological and historical orientation, particularly in view of the rigidity in 
most security institutions worldwide to consider women for gruelling combat tasks and 
demanding generalship posts in the security sector.  
Thirdly, through a critical evaluation of parliamentary and civil society oversight roles with 
regards to the security sector, it will be maintained that striking a balance between security sector 
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efficiency, effectiveness and democracy is a complex and often elusive endeavour for both 
African and non-African states. This is aggravated by the fact that executives will always 
override parliamentary and civil society oversight roles so long as they clash with states’ national 
interests.  
The application of Parliamentary oversight of the security sector will always be challenged by 
various factors such as national interest, military budgets, access to reliable information and 
skills and competence of Parliamentarians on security issues. Thus, in this critical examination it 
will be clearly shown that political parties with a majority in parliament will always undermine 
parliamentary oversight by being more loyal to their party when it comes to voting on pertinent 
issues concerning the SS.  
Fourthly, the study situates the SS discourse with reference to the concepts of sovereignty and 
anarchy. The major thrust of this thesis is to critically analyse the efficacy of SSR vis-à-vis the 
maintenance of law and order in a political system as well as the preservation of a state’s 
sovereignty. 
Arguments on ownership of SSR and whether the SS should be political or apolitical in 
discharging its duties in a sovereign state will also be interrogated. Thus it is argued that in order 
for SSR to be embraced holistically in most sub-Saharan African countries it must be 
contextualized and understood according to the historical, political, social and economic context 
of the very African countries it is to be implemented. 
SSR should also tackle ‘technical’ reform challenges within SSIs. 
The greatest danger to Africa’s security would be to religiously follow Western oriented 
blueprints of SSR.  
My literature review is based on books, journal articles, periodicals, newspapers and internet 
sources so consulted.  
1.10 Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY   
This chapter covered the background, statement of the problem, hypothesis, literature review, 
research objectives, research questions, theoretical framework, methodology, limitations and 
delimitations. 
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Chapter 2: CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF SECURITY 
This chapter concerns itself with the concept of security. It will be admitted from the very 
beginning that this concept means different things to different people depending on the context 
or situation the concept is interpreted. Two contrasting paradigms of realism and idealism will be 
selected, not that they are the best in explaining the broad area of security - but that they give 
some relevance to the arguments which will be raised in most of the chapters to follow.  
Chapter 3: THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY SECTOR DISCOURSE 
The main objective of this Chapter is to give an account of the historical background on the 
evolution of the concept of SSR aiming at giving the reader a conceptual understanding of how, 
when and where this debate on SSR started. This Chapter will also attempt to give an argument 
that the SSR emanated from the West seemingly propagated by economic development theorists.  
Chapter 4: THE SSR DEBATE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA IN 
THE USA AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 
This chapter is a consolidation of some of the issues raised in chapter 3 putting much emphasis 
on Western perspectives of SSR. It will attempt to give a detailed account of the historical 
background of the concept of SSR in Northern countries. The chapter will focus on European 
and American ideas of SSR. 
Chapter 5: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF SSR IN POST COLONIAL AFRICA SOUTH 
OF THE SAHARA 
The Chapter looks at the rationale behind the calls for SSR in Africa made by liberal thinkers. 
The chapter goes on to discuss African coups and how they have retarded economic growth with 
special reference to some selected African case studies.  
Chapter 6: DISAMBIGUATING THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE SECURITY 
SECTOR  
In this Chapter, liberal scholars continue with their calls for SSR in Africa by highlighting the 
leadership roles of women in the SS. The major argument will be on whether the women 
component of the SSR should be on quota system as argued by liberal scholars or that it should 
be based on merit, effectiveness and their ability to do the work efficiently without 
compromising the role of the SS as advanced by those who oppose the liberal school of thought.  
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Chapter 7: DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY SECTOR AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY IN SELECTED NON AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
This Chapter analyses democratic oversight of security sector institutions in general. It also 
draws comparisons of approaches to democratic oversight of the security sector in selected non-
African countries (USA, Russian Republic and China). The main idea of this chapter is to 
demonstrate how democratic oversight differs in application in these countries and also see 
whether these approaches are applied in tandem with the SSR principles of democratic oversight.  
 
Chapter 8: DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY SECTOR AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
This chapter covers the democratic oversight of security sector organisations in selected African 
countries namely South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe 
Chapter 9: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
This Chapter provides conclusions to the study. The conclusions provided are drawn from the 
conclusions that were made in each Chapter of this study. 
Chapter 10: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN AFRO-CENTRIC BASED SSR 
The major aim of this chapter is to give some recommendations on how Africa should reform its 
security sector. The major recommendation is that for SSR to be embraced holistically in most 
sub-Saharan African countries it must be contextualized and understood according to the 
historical, political, social and economic context of the very African countries it is to be 
implemented. It should also tackle ‘technical’ reform challenges within SSIs. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF SECURITY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In chapter one, all issues guiding the entire research were highlighted.  Chapter two concerns 
itself with the concept of security.  
 
It is admitted from the very beginning that this concept means different things to different people 
depending on the context or situation the concept is interpreted. Two contrasting paradigms of 
realism and idealism are therefore selected, not that they are the best in explaining the broad area 
of security - but that they give some relevance to the arguments which will be raised in most of 
the chapters to follow. These are alternative ideas that help to inform and frame questions about 
security policies.  
 
The two perspectives also clearly help in the further elaboration of the theories of anarchy, 
sovereignty and state secrecy vis-à-vis SSR in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, a detailed analysis 
of the three concepts (sovereignty, anarchy and state secrecy) have been made in chapter one. 
 Thus, to achieve the objectives of the chapter, this section develops by, first, defining and 
analysing the broad concept of ‘security’. Next, I move on to an interrogation of traditional 
security vis-a-vis realist perspectives of security. Finally, I give a detailed analysis of the 
‘modern’ idealist conception of security which focuses more on the security of the individual 
than the state. 
 
I conclude by noting major observations discussed in the whole Chapter. 
2.2 Conceptualising the Broad Definition of Security 
The term ‘security’ covers a range of goals and definitions which are so broad that divergent 
perspectives have come up on what it is or is not. The different views pertaining to security can 
best be categorized into two main schools of thought, that is, the realist and idealist paradigms. 
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These two approaches often lead to highly divergent and conflicting prescriptions in the sense 
that the realist approach sees a state with enough power to reach a dominating position as having 
acquired security as a result, for example, of carrying out SSR that makes the SS well capacitated 
and preponderant.  
On the other hand, the idealist approach sees a state that pursues moral values in order to attain 
lasting peace as also providing security for its citizens, for example, by carrying out democratic 
security sector reforms as well as cutting on military budgets. 
According to Lippman (1943), a nation or state is only secure if it is not in any danger to 
sacrifice its core values (national interest), if it wishes to avoid war (defensive or deterrent 
capabilities) and is capable, if threatened or attacked by another state or insurgent group, to 
maintain its interests by victory in such a war (e.g. security emanating from an efficient, well-
resourced and equipped military/army which is capable of repelling any predatory or aggressive 
state).  
While the issue of establishing a well-resourced and equipped SSR may be critiqued by some 
scholars, its relevance can be exemplified by the USA’s ability to fight two wars on a massive 
scale at any given time Guyatt (2000). This shows a high degree of preparedness to confront any 
given number of aggressors at one time. Lasswell (1950) further defines security as freedom 
from foreign dictation while Bellamy (2010) defines it “as freedom from war accompanied by 
high expectations that defeat will not occur in the event that war breaks out.”Luciani cited in 
Morgan (2007) perceives it as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad; and Rose cited in 
Morgan (2007) sees it as the relative freedom from harmful threats.  
From these traditional definitions, security mainly focuses on the military offensive and 
defensive capabilities of a state. Much of this thinking concentrates on the building of large 
armies (three to four million troops on standby in China, two million troops on standby in North 
Korea) and the use of force defending a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Traditionalists see security in terms of national power.  
The traditional conception of security relates not only to the ultimate desire that the state 
survives, but also to the desire that it should live without serious external threats to its interests or 
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values that are regarded as important or vital. This traditional conceptualization of security 
largely focuses on the threat of or use of force. This largely military conception of security 
focuses on the state as a primary referent object of security. States have always retained a (near) 
monopoly on the use of coercive force in the global system. 
The traditional definition of a ‘secure’ state is quite relevant and appropriate to this study in that 
it explicitly brings out a basic argument raised in a number of chapters in this research work- that 
SSR should not undermine the security capabilities of a state in repelling or deterring any 
predatory or aggressive state and neither should it erode the ability of a state to contain any 
insurgent group within the state’s borders. 
Contemporary examples that can be cited are the Islamic State of Iraqi and Syria controlling 
huge swathes of Iraqi and Syrian territory after they easily defeated a US trained and ‘reformed’ 
Iraqi army World Socialist Website (2015). The DRC army also failed to contain March 23 
(M23) rebels. However, this was despite having gone through the SSR exercise which was 
funded by a number of international actors, including the UN Organization Mission in DRC 
(MONUC), other UN agencies, the European Union (EU) and other bilateral donors (Isima, 
2010).  
From the above two examples, it is therefore open to debate whether a country which is 
vulnerable to both internal and external predators can be regarded as being secure and sovereign. 
Such a state does not fit into Lippman (1943), Lasswell (1950), Luciani (2007) and Rose’s 
definitions of a secure state. Of interest is that both Iraqi and the DRC went through various SSR 
but they still lack the capabilities to repel insurgents or rebels within their territories. Iraqi has 
also relied on the goodwill of the USA and its NATO allies in fighting against ISIS (Reuters, 
2016). 
Modern critics of the traditional approach to security have taken a new dimension, which 
maintains not only that state/national security should take precedence over the security of 
citizens, but also that security needs to be ‘human-centric’ Kerr (2007) meaning that attention on 
security issues should now focus on the security of an individual with the aim of ensuring one’s 
freedoms.  
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By definition, “human security” directs attention away from the traditional “security” institutions 
of the state – military, police and intelligence – and towards those that most directly promote 
human development, opportunity and wellbeing of local communities and individual citizens 
Ferreira and Henk (2005:2). In this regard, non-state actors such as SSR advocates, human rights 
activists, development practitioners and other CSOs take precedence over the state on issues that 
deal with the advancement of human rights and economic development.  
On the other hand, the African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reforms (2011:5) 
gives a multi-dimensional definition of security which encompasses both the traditional state-
centric notion of the survival of the state and its protection from external aggression by military 
means, as well as the non-military notion of human security based on political, economic, social 
and environmental imperatives in addition to human rights. 
By implication, this implies that the AU has noted that traditional security is equally if not 
‘more’ important than human security. A good example is the South African White Paper on 
Defence (1996)which clearly stated that the new South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) would be a “balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military 
force” and that its primary role [would] be to defend South Africa against external military 
aggression Ferreira and Henk(2005:17). 
It can be observed that states still value national security despite calls by SSR advocates to 
prioritize the issue of human security. While arguments can be raised against states prioritising 
human security over state security, the idea that a threat to security of a sovereign country also 
threatens human security may not be ethically opposed. It can be further argued that no state in 
the contemporary international system brushes aside or ignores the utility of state security as any 
threat to the security of a sovereign nation-state also means a threat to human security. 
From the forgoing arguments, it can be asserted that what ‘security’ stands for remains a 
contested terrain with one group emphasizing on security being ‘state-centric’ implying that 
security should be restricted to safeguarding the interests of state while another group maintains 
that security should be ‘human-centric’, meaning that the major focus of security should now 
shift from the state to humans or individuals.  
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Two broad contrasting theories of realism (state-centrism) and idealism (human-centrism) can 
best help in explaining the fundamental issues guiding the concept of security. The chapter 
therefore analyses the concept of ‘security’ with respect to the divergent views of realists 
(conservatives/pragmatists) and idealists (liberals) perspectives. The chapter explicitly contends 
that the two perspectives in relation to issues of both state and human security are equally 
relevant and informative; each epitomizes the subject of security from a certain theoretical 
perspective; and together they provide an interesting and well balanced assessment of the SSR 
debate vis-à-vis pertinent issues of what ‘security’ entails.  
2.3 Traditional Conceptualization of Security – A Realist Perspective of ‘Security’ 
Realism can be traced from the writings of scholars such as the Greek historian Thucydides and 
his account of the Peloponnesian wars between Athens and Sparta (431-404 BC), and also the 
sixteenth-century political thought of the Italian theorist Niccolo Machiavelli as well as the 17
th
 
century English historian, Thomas Hobbes. Hans Morgenthau, a renowned political science 
scholar is also well known as the father of contemporary realism. A brief background of these 
realist scholars is therefore necessary in order to highlight their major contribution to the broad 
field of realism. 
Thucydides (1983) in the famous Melian Dialogue observed that the strong do what they will; 
the weak do what they must. He illustrated the position that morality in and of itself is not 
sufficient against power. In other words, powerful states will always prey on weak states despite 
there being international legal statutes that forbid such unwarranted military interventions. The 
strong will always do what they want and the weak will always comply.  
Machiavelli (1983) in his book titled ‘The Prince’ addresses various issues on how a ruler could 
maintain his/her power and stability in a state. He has been accused by some scholars as being 
ruthless in the way he gives advice to the Prince. Realist scholars have found his work quite 
handy in that he advises that self-interest should be the prince’s main goal, and that nothing, 
particularly morality, should stand in his way.  
The 17th-century philosopher Hobbes (1588–1679) asserted in his book Leviathan that “the 
condition of man...is a condition of war of every one against everyone.” Hobbes (1958) pointed 
out that when there is a war of all against all there is no room for commerce, for the generation 
of knowledge, or for culture. Hobbes’s solution to this anarchical set up, characterized by 
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unprecedented insecurity, was for individuals to surrender some independence to their state and 
thereby gain the protection that only a social existence could provide. Hobbes (1958) gave the 
sovereign overriding power over the citizens provided he/she would guarantee their security.  
Morgenthau (1951) consistently argued that international politics is conflict-based and subject to 
the competitive nature of humankind. He defined international politics in terms of power, 
undermining idealism in the process, and arguing for the primacy of realpolitik over morality in 
affairs of the state.  
Realists therefore rely on the various tenets which will be linked and applied to the SSR debate. 
Realists’ concern with the state is born out of the need for security and power. It is argued that 
states are the only entities that can organize military power on any significant scale. The 
organization of the security sector becomes the sole preserve of the state (under a President.  
King, Queen or Prime Minister) as no other actor (civil society organizations) has the legitimate 
right to raise armed forces and use them, as well as other security institutions to maintain or 
impose order internally. Externally, the security sector can be used to threaten other states as 
well as to defend the state’s sovereignty in an orderly and efficient way no civil society group 
can ever achieve.  
Realists believe that states pursue power in order both in the sense to get powerful positions at 
the expense of rivals and as well as to defending themselves against the encroachment of these 
rivals. The security institutions are thus necessary within any given society in order to provide 
order and stability, including security from either internal or external aggression.  
Realists note with regret that the international system is still without a world government and 
there seems little reason to suppose that one will soon or will ever appear in the distant future. 
Thus, the major argument is that, the world we live in is anarchical and the state remains the 
dominant actor in the international system. Security should therefore be seen in terms of 
preserving state or national security. Once state security is preserved then citizens are assured of 
security. 
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2.3.1 Pursuance of National Interests by States to Improve on State Security 
The term ‘national interest’ has been used by statesmen and scholars since the founding of nation 
states to describe the aspirations and goals of sovereign entities in the international system.  
Morgenthau (1951) defines ‘national interest’ as the interest of a nation as a whole held to be an 
independent entity separate from the interests of subordinate areas or groups and also of other 
nations or supranational groups. 
Nuechtelein (1976:246) adds that:    
It is assumed that the leaders of all nation-states act rationally in the pursuit of state objectives, i.e. 
that states adopt policies that leaders believe will advance the well-being of their societies, 
whatever the constitutional system. One is not asked to assess whether the action of states is cost 
effective, wise or moral under the circumstances in which they were made; it is assumed only that 
decisions are made with some degree of reasoning.   
There is a tendency to oppose military expenditure in peace time, citing lack of danger to the 
country’s security. However, security consciousness requires that the army is strengthened in 
peace time in readiness for any aggression that might occur in future. Interestingly there is 
support for security support that is intended to safeguard the nation’s resources, the national 
interests and the general citizenry. It requires higher understanding of the need to have a strong 
army at all times to guarantee the security of both the state and the citizens. 
It is for this reason that Rice (2000) had to point out that for American foreign policy to be 
effective it should refocus the United States on the national interest and the pursuit of key 
priorities. These tasks were to ensure that America's military could deter war, project power, and 
fight in defence of its interests … and to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and 
hostile powers, which were increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the 
development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).Rice’s concerns are based on the 
improvement in American military capability in order for the state to be able to provide security 
for its citizens in case of any external attack from ‘hostile’ nations. 
America has often been accused of military adventurism and its behaviour condemned as 
unethical and rogue, but most Americans are encouraged by such behaviour as they consider it 
appropriate in defending American interests both at home and abroad. America values its 
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sovereignty and military expenditure merely consolidates America’s unassailable position in 
economic, political and military exploits, with the security sector hailed as significant generator 
of employment opportunities for the American citizenry. 
Morgenthau cited in Pham (2008:258) argues that national interest is at the heart of all politics 
and thus on the international stage states pursue their national interests, generally defined as 
power. For Morgenthau, ’interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally 
valid,” and, as such, power serves to determine what true interest is and should be (ibid: 254).  
2.3.2 Morality, Power and National Interest 
The major reason for the above assertion is that in international politics there are no permanent 
friends or enemies but permanent interests. According to this realist view, states are more 
interested in pursuing their own interests at the expense of other states’ interests.  
 
Hans Morgenthau (1957:967) argues that in a world where a number of sovereign nations 
compete with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all nations must 
necessarily refer to their survival (state security) as their minimum requirements.  
 
Thus, all nations do what they cannot help but do; to protect their physical, political, and cultural 
identity against encroachments by other nations. In this regard, African governments should 
question in whose interests SSR are to be implanted. Reforms must not be geared towards 
strengthening or weakening African governments for future ‘Western’ orchestrated coups?  
 
Security sector advocates/reformists may wish to be moral through the implementation of SSR 
which cuts on defence budgets and not pursue the tough minded traditional security-based 
policies. They may wish to be peaceful and that the executive pursues peaceful diplomatic 
initiatives towards other states.   
However, realists stress that cutting defence budgets to do so however, will be self-defeating in 
that such states will be dominated by another state that has a high defence budget and tens of 
thousands of well-trained men within its defence ranks and with less peaceful motives. Realists 
do not deny that there are other forms of cooperation and peaceful co-existence endeavours 
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between and among states, but this is only as much as these are of benefit to the state and also if 
they do not threaten the hierarchy of interests in which state security remains a dominant feature 
on the list of state priorities. 
Realists strongly believe that when states follow the dictates of reason or morality, it is not 
usually beneficial because the international system is made up of powerful states which will not 
obey the dictates of morality as they will simply militarily intervene into a weaker state to take 
what they want.  
Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Colonel Gadhafi of Libya suffered ‘’what they must’’ (Thucydides; 
1983) owing to the huge oil resources found in their countries.  
Realists assert that to be weak in the international system courts disaster from predatory states. 
Those who have power will always use it for their own interests. This can be seen on events 
leading to the second Iraq war (Miller; 2003) as well as the 2011 Libyan war (WSWS, 2011). 
The US Government went ahead to attack Iraq despite pleas of innocence coming from Saddam 
Hussein. Gadhafi also met the same fate in 2011 despite calls by the AU to use soft instead of 
hard power. 
In politics, realists seek to distinguish between truth and opinion; between what is objectively 
true and rational and what is only a subjective interpretation or judgment that is divorced from 
the facts as they are. Realists refuse to be guided by prejudice and wishful thinking.  
Those calling for SSR rely more on normative assumptions which see reforms in the security 
sector as bringing about internal stability. However, a reality check on SSR so far carried out in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and the DRC actually shows that these states’ militaries are failing to contain 
Taliban insurgents, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ‘terrorists’ and M 23 rebels respectively. 
Realists believe in SSR that will make the security sector more efficient, reliable and extremely 
capable of defending the state and all its citizens.  
According to realists, the security sector needs to be capacitated through various technological 
advances in warfare. Calls being made by some liberal advocates of SSR to retire some colonels 
and generals within the security sectors of Sub-Saharan Africa are seen by most realists as being 
rather mischievous and misplaced.  
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Sun Tzu cited in Krause (1995), the great Chinese strategist, once remarked that a state is as 
strong as its generals. Von Clausewitz cited in Vasquez (1983) also asserted that generalship is 
more about experience, than bookish knowledge. In this regard, realists would view with 
suspicion and skeptism SSR that calls for the retirement of army generals. Such a move would 
not only weaken the military establishment but would also make the whole state apparatus 
vulnerable to predatory states, thus also weakening and threatening state sovereignty. 
2.3.3 Is Conflict Unavoidable or Inevitable in the International System? 
Realists argue that, conflict is both an inevitable and a continual feature of international relations. 
In the Sub-Saharan African context this can be exemplified by conflicts that occur from time to 
time. 
 
The 1996 Rwandan ethnic genocide was orchestrated by the majority Hutus against the minority 
Tutsis. It is estimated that between 800 000 to a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus lost their 
lives. 
 
The1998 DRC war was dubbed by some political analysts as “Africa’s Third World War” as the 
conflict involved many African state actors. These included Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the 
DRC Government in defence of the DRC, while Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC rebels were on 
the offensive with the intention of overthrowing the Kabila Government. 
 
Then in 2014, M23 rebels caused mayhem in the eastern parts of the DRC. The same year also 
saw South Sudanese conflict involving the two major ethnic groups. In2011 NATO led the 
Libyan war which resulted in the death of Muammar Gadhafi. Then there was the deposition of 
Ivorian President Gbagbo from power;  the African Union force comprised mostly of Kenyans 
and Ugandans helping to contain the conflict between the Somali Government and the Al Shabab 
terrorist group; the Shehu Shagari led Boko Haram terrorist group causing the death of hundreds 
of Nigerians and also the destruction of infrastructure in the north eastern parts of Nigeria 
Ouédraogo(2014); the insurrection of the Mozambican Resistance Movement (RENAMO) 
causing instability in Tete, Sofala and Zambezia provinces in Mozambique Frey(2016).  
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It can be assumed from the above arguments that the scarcity of resources, ethnic conflicts and 
religious wars are some of the major reasons that make conflict to be unavoidable or inevitable in 
the international system. One can therefore argue that the anarchy caused by these conflicts make 
it imperative for any state to ensure that its SS is well-trained and capacitated in readiness for 
any kind of conflict. 
Realists, aware of the above inevitability of conflicts have therefore called on for states to come 
up with strong security institutions that can help maintain stability in the case a state experiences 
rebellious groups as is happening in Somalia, Nigeria, DRC and Mozambique. The irony of it all 
is that at one point in time, countries like Nigeria Ebo (2009), DRC Ouédraogo (2014) and 
Mozambique Lala (2004)went through various stages of SSR but the major argument one can 
raise is these SSR exercises were only meant to help ‘democratize’ the security institutions 
without actually improving on their defensive and offensive capabilities.   
 
A well-equipped, reformed and trained security apparatus can easily contain any situation as 
exemplified by the American Army which is highly trained and can fight two wars at the same 
time. 
 
African armies lack that high level of preparedness leading to insecurity and instability within 
their borders. The insecurity which continues to characterise the lives of thousands of people in 
Nigeria, Somalia, DRC, South Sudan and Mozambique compel realists to suggest that only the 
significant reforms at capacitating the military will stabilise these countries. A military with 
technological knowhow, well trained, efficient, dependable and highly motivated to carry out its 
moral obligation will be able to safeguard the state’s sovereignty and protect citizens from both 
internal and external threats. 
 
 
2.3.4 States Seekingto Maximize Security through the Accumulation of Power 
The Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (March, 2013:10) clearly states that 
securing the US homeland is the Nation’s first priority. The US homeland has been packaged as 
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prone to attack by hostile states such as North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China, including groups 
and individuals such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda.  
The Nation of America must be vigilant and guard against a multiplicity of perceived threats. 
The defence of the homeland (national security) is the American Department of Defence’s 
(DOD) highest priority with the goal to identify and defeat threats as far away from the 
homeland as possible (e.g. elimination of Bin Laden in Pakistan; and the 2002 Iraqi military 
invasion to depose the Saddam Hussein regime which was accused of harbouring intentions to 
attack the USA using weapons of mass destruction).   
Deterring its adversaries is the USA’s major goal.  
Winning any war has remained the major reason why the USA maintains a capable and credible 
military force in the event that deterrence fails.  In defending national interests it requires that the 
US be able to prevail in conflict through taking preventive measures to deter potential 
adversaries (presumably Russia, China and North Korea) who could threaten the vital interests of 
the USA or its partners.  
African countries still lag behind in terms of military capabilities as compared to other countries 
in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia. SSR in Africa mainly focuses on cutting 
defence budgets and retiring security personnel than reorganizing security force structures to 
counter identified threats and increasing defence budgets, thereby enhancing the relevance, 
operational capacity, and prestige of Africa’s militaries.  
These realist assumptions about the nature of the international system can be justified by the 
behaviour of North Korea vis-à-vis its relations with South Korea, Japan and the USA. The 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or North Korea has gone to the extent of 
manufacturing a lethal hydrogen bomb (Reuters, 2016) despite being also in possession of 
nuclear weapons as a defensive mechanism or deterrent against the thousands of American 
troops based in South Korea and Japan.  
 
Mbanje and Mahuku (2012) assert that the DPRK believes that its nuclear weapons (and now 
hydrogen bomb) are useful in providing a deterrent to Washington. This has seen the DPRK 
demonstrating its new nuclear capabilities by testing its nuclear arsenals as from 2006 onwards.  
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The realists firmly believe in traditional state security and advocate for a militarily strong state to 
counter those states that at times pounce on another state to grab what they want by force. 
Realists perceive humans as war like and that conflicts are inevitable as demonstration of power 
by those who are stronger than others. 
In such a turbulent situation, only state power (military capabilities) can ensure state survival. 
Vasquez (1983) notes that to be without power (a preponderant military apparatus) in the 
international system is to court disaster, as the Congolese, Iraqis and Libyans did in 1998, 2002 
and 2011 respectively. Given that this has always been a probability, state or national security 
has to be the dominant goal of all states, even during peaceful times.  
 
Realists argue that in times of peace, states should always prepare for war. A secure state is one 
which is able to provide both internal and external protection to its citizens. Security, as earlier 
on defined by Lippman (1943), entails a degree of protection of values previously acquired. 
 
However, sub-Saharan Africa’s militaries lack the military capabilities to counter or fight against 
a formidable, conventional attack by a sophisticated enemy on their borders, and a few like SA 
and Egypt can partially afford a military that can deal with the full range of conceivable threats.   
 
Kegley and Wittkopf (2002:485) argue that most nations are reluctant to engage in arms 
limitations in an atmosphere in which trust of their adversaries is lacking, and such trust is 
unlikely to be fostered as long as those adversaries remain armed.  
Mbanje and Mahuku (2012:33) point out that the 2011 NATO attack on Libya actually set a bad 
precedence in the international system as weaker states now see the importance of military 
preponderance including the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.   
It is argued, with good reason that the most effective method of avoiding a war is to prepare for 
one.  
Waltz (1979:75) contends that states co-exist in a condition of anarchy. Self-help is the rule in an 
anarchic order, and the most important way in which states must help themselves is by providing 
their own security. 
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The executive and parliament in countries with high defence budgets are in agreement on 
reforms based on capacitation of their security sectors. They are in conformity on the need of a 
robust and deterrent security apparatus which serves the interests of the state. America’s National 
Security Strategy (NSS) has been endorsed by many in Congress and so have the Russian 
Federation’s National Security Concept and Military Doctrine Arbatov (2000:3) which have also 
been overwhelmingly endorsed by members of the State Duma.  
Rice (2000:4) argues that the next American president (in reference to Bush Jr who came after 
Bill Clinton) would have to procure new weapons “in order to enable the military to carry out 
operations in various missions”. She further asserted that “US technological advantages should 
help create a military that would be more lethal, more mobile and agile, and capable of firing 
accurately from long distances,” Rice (2000). 
It is noted that a high level of military preparedness has always been a central theme in US 
defence planning. 
According to Stratfor (April, 2013), over the past decade, Beijing (China) has progressed in 
modernizing its military. Beijing has been particularly successful in updating military equipment 
and making considerable advances in military doctrine. It has improved military training 
substantially by focusing on less scripted and more realistic exercises and manoeuvres.  
Reuters (2014) highlights that Chinese military spending exceeded $145 billion in 2013 as it 
advanced a programme modernizing an arsenal of drones, warships, jets, missiles and cyber 
weapons offering a far higher figure than Beijing's official tally. China's military investments 
provide it with a growing ability to project power at increasingly longer range.  
Farmer (2014) further argues that China’s planned spending (in 2014) on its armed forces will 
for the first time eclipse the combined budgets of Britain, France and Germany. Beijing has set 
aside £90 billion ($148 billion) for its military, up more than six per cent on last year, continuing 
its long-running trend of growing defence spending. 
However, in contrast, African countries have failed to undertake concerted defence policies in 
order to improve their military organization for combat as well as to achieve self-sufficiency in 
production of military hardware. No African country up to date (with the exception of SA at a 
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very minimal level) has a perfected massive arms industry (military industrial complex) that 
helps to bring up new generations of indigenously designed weapons, especially those providing 
greater firepower, armoured protection and mobility.  
The majority of African countries buy military hardware from the USA, Russia, China, and 
France and so on. From a realist perspective, African countries need to increase their defence 
budgets as well as coming up with indigenous military weapons in order to counter any future 
aggressor in the anarchic international system.  
SSR advocates would rather cut defence budgets by almost three-quarters since they believe that 
the money can be better used for development purposes. However, such arguments while 
plausible are also a bit short-sighted in that military industrial complexes in America, Russia, and 
China have managed to create employment for hundreds of thousands and if not millions of 
citizens living in these countries.  
Another simple fact reformists fail to grasp is that the security of the state (through a robust 
defence policy/budget) also safeguards the security of individuals living within its territorial 
jurisdiction from both internal and external aggression. 
It is to be noted that both individual and international security is dependent upon national 
security. 
2.4 Modern Conceptualization of Security – An Idealist View of ‘Security’ 
World War 1 initiated a new way of thinking in the study of peace and conflict.  
Emerging as a dominant perspective after WWI was a theory which came to be regarded as 
idealism.  
The supporters of the theory of idealism were inspired by their interest in ideals (i.e. what ought 
to be) and were also referred to as liberalists. At the core of idealism is an emphasis on the 
impact ideas have on human behaviour; the equality, dignity and liberty of the individual and the 
need to protect people from excessive state control especially through its security sector 
apparatus.  
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Idealism views the individual as the centre of moral values and goodness and emphasizes that 
human beings should be treated as ends rather than means. It stresses on ethical standards over 
power struggles; and institutions (e.g. UN, AU, EU, Africa etc) over military capabilities (e.g. 
large armies, military preponderance) as forces shaping relations between and among states. 
Idealists define politics as a struggle for consensus than a struggle for power or prestige. 
However, one can argue that, in an anarchical international system that lacks a world 
government, war will always be an inevitable event. This argument is exemplified by the US’s 
actions in Iraq and NATO’s actions in Libya. In both situations the wars caused horrendous 
suffering to citizens of the affected countries. 
Idealism/Liberalism can be traced from the writings of scholars such as John Locke, John Stuart 
Mill, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Jefferson, Adam Smith, Woodrow Wilson and many others.  
I identify with and choose the works of Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson as more 
appropriate in backing arguments to be raised in this study. 
A brief background of the two idealist scholars is therefore necessary in order to underline some 
of their major contributions to the broad field of idealism. 
Kant (1795) in his essay titled ‘Perpetual Peace’ helped to define modern liberal /idealist theory 
by advocating for global (and not state) citizenship, free trade and a federation of democracies as 
a means to peace. He thought a world government impossible and instead favoured a world 
federation of states in which governments agreed to set aside differences and to abide by a 
common set of moral principles Battersby (2009:48). A detailed analysis of Immanuel Kant has 
been dealt with in Chapter 1 when I examined some of his views on sovereignty.  
Wilson cited in Vasquez (1983) placed the blame for war on power politics (realist pursuit for 
power) and the sinister interests of undemocratic leaders (dictators/autocratic leaders). He 
believed that war was fundamentally irrational and as such most conflicts could be resolved 
through the use of reason. He supported the formation of the League of Nations and other 
institutions of international law hoping to build a system of collective security in order to inhibit 
aggression and peacefully resolve conflicts Vasquez (1983), Russett and Starr (2000). 
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The tenets of idealism can be briefly summarized as follows: man is rational and peace loving; 
most important actors in the international system are states, and other organizations including 
individuals; the international system is a global community made up of various actors; faith in 
collective security where an act of aggression by any state will be met by a collective response 
from the rest; belief in international law; the interdependence of states in the international 
system; trust in liberal democracy; preservation of human rights and freedoms; human security 
and so on Goldstein (2004). 
For the purpose of this study, I now discuss the idealist tenet of human security vis-à-vis SSR. 
2.4.1 A Brief Working Definition of Human Security 
For the purpose of this study I will rely more on the 1993 United Nations Development 
Program’s (UNDP) Annual Human Development Report that brought the issue of ‘human 
security’ to the limelight.  
 
The UNDP Document highlighted that: 
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external 
aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a 
nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people . . .Forgotten were the 
legitimate concerns of ordinary people. . .For many of them, security symbolised “protection from the 
threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental 
hazards”(Human Development Report, 1994:22). 
 
The above document was in a way questioning the realist thinking of security while at the same 
time calling for a new paradigm shift from state centred security to a broad definition of the 
concept that would encompass various threats (to be analysed below) that were undermining the 
security of an individuals. 
 
This new concept was therefore to be defined as ‘human security’ as it looked at an individual’s 
“freedom from fear and freedom from want.” 
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In other words, security was to be viewed in terms of threats like hunger, disease and political 
repression as well as “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” 
(Human Development Report, 1994:22-4).  
 
The threats to individuals were thus grouped as follows:  
 Economic security, that assured every individual a minimum requisite income  
 Food security, that guaranteed “physical and economic access to basic food” 
 Health security, that guaranteed a minimum protection from disease and unhealthy lifestyles  
 Environmental security, that protected people from ravages of nature  
 Personal security, that protected people from physical violence, or even from the individual 
himself/herself (as in protection from suicide)  
 Community security, that protected people from ethnic violence  
 Political security that assured people could “. . . live in a society that honours their basic human 
rights” (Human Development Report, 1994:24-33). 
 
The above threats could best be addressed by both non-state actors and the state. The state would 
not have dominance over these pertinent security issues but would work in collaboration with 
other non-state actors in order to address these threats. In other words, this would require the 
purposive efforts of individuals, CSOs, local communities, international and local organizations 
as well as other institutions.  
SSR advocates concurred with the above UNDP Document as they also called upon the state to 
involve a plethora of non-state actors when dealing with security issues. While this sounds 
morally plausible the weakness is that the UN itself has failed to cope with desperate human 
security challenges that occur, as exemplified in the Rwandan genocide where thousands of 
people were killed, with little action coming from any non-state actor or the UN. 
2.5 Human Security and SSR 
In the preceding section on realism it was noted that security threats were said to come mainly 
from external sources and were thus seen as threats to a state’s national security. This meant the 
protection of the state, its borders, citizens and interests from external aggression. The security 
policies of states focused on maintaining and sustaining core values which were sovereignty and 
territoriality.  
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The military was considered to be the central actor in safeguarding the security of states 
MacFarlane and Khong (2006).The state-centric definition of security which emphasized much 
on the security and sovereignty of a nation-state rather than the security of individuals or society 
at large came under fierce criticism and immense scrutiny by various organizations (UN, World 
Bank, DFID, UNDP and so on) as well as idealist scholars such as MacFarlane and Khong 
(2006) and Buzan et al (1993). 
The UN Human Development Report 1994 presented a holistic approach to human security 
which was linked to human development and it set the centre stage for an in-depth analysis of 
this concept by development theorists, economists, political scientists, and security studies 
analysts.  
As a result, institutions or organizations such as the UN, World Bank, USAID, Dfid, UNDP went 
to the extent of funding SSR projects, plans, programmes and policies in developing countries  in 
a bid to build ‘credible’ and ‘democratic’ security sector institutions. Notwithstanding the fact 
that state/national security ensured the safety of citizens as argued by realists; idealists on the 
other hand argued that state security was not sufficient to protect individuals and the community 
from human insecurity that was fuelled by conflict, coups, authoritarian rule, military brutality 
and lack of human rights.  
Human security was therefore a concept framed in opposition to traditional or realist notions of 
state-centric security.  
It is thus noted that the growth in civil wars and military brutality in sub-Saharan Africa and 
other developing countries increased the attention of various scholars and organizations to call 
for SSR specifically to safeguard the security concerns (human security) of individuals, groups 
and communities. 
In this regard, human security needs would be met through reforms within SSIs.  
 
The envisaged reforms would include the introduction of democratic principles such as respect 
for human rights in the SSIs (to be further interrogated in Chapter 4); a transformation of the 
SSIs in order to meet human security needs ;a professionalization of the army and mainly among 
other things to avoid unnecessary coups (as will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5);the 
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introduction of new recruitment and training policies which among other things would increase 
the number of women within SSIs (which will be extensively examined in Chapter 6), and the 
reduction of the size of the military through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
exercises (Doro, 2012). 
 
The discussion of ‘security’ thus expanded beyond national security (military) issues to also take 
into consideration other areas such as the economy, the environment, health, gender, and culture 
MacFarlane and Khong (2006), as they also had a negative impact on human security.  
 
Basing on the above assertions, major arguments on the need for a paradigm shift from ‘state-
centrism’ (state security) to ‘human-centrism’ (human security) can best be explained by giving 
reference to observations raised by MacFarlane and Khong (2006).These two scholars are of the 
view that human security is based on the idea that human beings are the main focal point when 
one discusses security. They note that other referents such as “the group, the community, the 
state, the region, and the globe are secondary issues since they all derive from the sovereignty of 
the human individual and the individual’s right to dignity in her or his life” MacFarlane and 
Khong(2006:2). 
 
The major argument of the aforesaid two authorities is that though the above entities might have 
security claims, these are subordinate to the security of the individual in that the very needs of 
the above entities actually address the needs and aspirations of the individuals who make up 
these bodies. What this means is that the “security needs of the individuals go beyond the 
physical survival of the state” when it faces aggression or violence in that people still need 
“access to the basic necessities of life and to the establishment of the basic rights that allow them 
to live normal lives in dignity ”MacFarlane and Khong (2006:2). 
 
The two scholars’ argument implies that the “sovereignty of individuals” is equally important as 
the sovereignty of the state since what is more important to any state’s national security is the 
life of those who live within those states. This means, national security - as its first goal, should 
aim for the preservation of human life.  
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Consequent upon the foregoing thinking, SSR advocates believe that discourse on security issues 
should be readjusted and redrafted in such a way as to focus towards individual human beings 
and their communities rather than on the state. SSR advocates also think that the policies of 
states should go beyond traditional/realist concerns by engaging broader issues which embrace 
the individual and his or her rights and security in the face of increasing conflicts and organized 
violence. 
 
The concept of human security therefore seeks to address political and socioeconomic concerns 
of individuals and societies that emanate from persistent threats to their lives, livelihoods and 
dignity. It encompasses the idea of liberty, specifically in its two pillars “freedom from fear” - 
basic human rights and “freedom from want” Kumssa et al (2011: xi). 
 
Notwithstanding, the above arguments raised in support of ‘human security’ or a human-centric 
approach to security; –states all over the world have tended to rely more on the realist approach 
to human security in which state security remains at the apex. This means the traditional or 
realist conception of security which focuses on the defence of nation-states and their territories 
from external and internal aggression through the use of force (if necessary) to protect the 
territorial integrity, autonomy, and the domestic political order of a nation-state from other states 
still remains the primary concern of most states in the international system.  
A good example that can be cited is the South African Defence Review (1998) which contrasted 
the previous South African White Paper on Defence (1996) by paying more attention “to the 
outlines of a conventional military establishment and its supporting infrastructure and distinctly 
less to the implications of broad new definitions of security ”Ferreira and Henk (2005:18). What 
this means is that states will always be primarily preoccupied with issues that relate to state 
security while giving secondary concern to human security issues.  
It can be further argued that democracy cannot be practiced or human rights cannot be observed 
if a state has weak security institutions or is under attack from another state.  
Human rights have been violated in conflict situations as exemplified in Iraqi, Syria, Nigeria, 
DRC, Mozambique, Libya, and South Sudan.  
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The best way to safeguard the rights and freedoms of individuals, groups, communities and 
societies (human security) can be through the defence of nation-states and their territories from 
external and internal aggression (state security). The African Union Policy Framework on 
Security Sector Reforms (2011) which gives a multi-dimensional definition of security 
encompassing both the traditional state-centric notion of the survival of the state and the notion 
of human security which implies the protection of individual rights and freedoms is more 
applicable than the SSR advocates’ ‘myopic’ belief in undermining state security.  
One can therefore argue that both realism (state security) and idealism (human security) should 
complement each other if they are to be effective paradigms in analysing the concept of security. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed two theories of realism and idealism in an effort to bring a balanced 
conceptualization of the term ‘security’ which remains a very broad area/subject with varying 
interpretations.  
The two paradigms on security have different approaches to what security means, with realists 
advocating for state security which tends to focus more on military capabilities in order to 
safeguard the state from both internal and external threats, and idealists supporting security that 
concerns itself with protecting the individual from various forms of threats which can be grouped 
under economic, social, political, environmental, food, health and personal (individual) security. 
All these concerns about human welfare fall under human security. 
 
This chapter sought to argue that states still exist in a world which is characterized by both 
internal and external threats to the state’s survival. This has therefore forced most states to rely 
on their military (state security) in order to survive in an anarchical international system. On the 
other hand, idealists who include SSR advocates actually see the state as the greatest danger to 
its citizens and argue it should undergo ‘democratic’ SSR in order to make the SSIs more 
answerable to citizens so as to safeguard their freedoms and rights. 
 
It has also been argued in this chapter that the importance of security institutions (defence) to the 
livelihood of a nation-state cannot be underestimated. This is regardless of whether the state is 
democratic or authoritarian. An efficient and effective security sector is vital to any government 
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for economic, defence, domestic stability and foreign policy decisions. In discharging some of 
these duties the security sector is at times authorized to use force. 
 
However, the dominant observation made in this chapter relates to the complementarities of state 
and human security. 
 
The next chapter will look at the evolution of the security sector discourse in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM DISCOURSE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed literature on the conceptual definition of security. Two 
paradigms of realism and idealism were used to interrogate the concept of ‘security’ from both a 
‘state-centric’ and ‘human-centric’ perspective. It was seen that both paradigms were relevant in 
giving a fair analysis on how security is perceived by both schools with one group 
(realists/pragmatists) advocating for the pre-eminence of state/national security and the other 
group (idealists/liberals) calling on the state to give primacy to human security which may be a 
victim of both man-made and natural calamities. 
 
It was noted that the African Union in its Framework on Security Sector Reform in the definition 
of ‘security’ uses both the state-centric and human-centric approaches. The major argument is 
that this African Inter-Governmental Organization (IGO) values both the security of the state as 
well as that of the individuals living within that state. Another observation was that human 
security could best be achieved if the state itself was secure from both internal and external 
threats. Human security cannot exist in a vacuum; it needs some sort of stable environment 
(provided by the state) for it to be sustainable. 
 
Chapter Three analyses the evolution of the SSR Discourse in sub-Saharan Africa. In this chapter 
it is noted that the end of the Cold War created new perspectives about security. A new 
understanding of SSR saw Central and East European (CEE) countries being required to 
consider, among other things, reducing their armies, cutting on defence budgets, democratizing 
the SSIs, and retiring some long serving members.  
 
The reforms done in Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War were also taken to Africa. The 
difference was that the various forms of SSR that took place in Africa were not the initiative of 
Africa. Well documented reforms for Africa, as those targeted for Europe and mentioned above, 
were designed by European powers.  
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In the 1990s, the UK had a leading role in influencing and designing reforms for Africa. This 
chapter will give Sierra Leonean and Liberian case studies as illustrations. 
 
Many SSR advocates give reference to the European SSR model of the 1990sin presenting their 
arguments on how sub-Saharan Africa’s SSR should be adopted and operationalised. One can 
argue that a “one size fits all” type of SSR model that is being advocated for by both African and 
European security sector reformists tends to ignore the other forms of SSR which have taken 
place in Africa. 
 
I thus suggest that other models should also be considered in the discourse on SSR.  
 
In this Chapter as I trace the evolution of the discourse on SSR in sub-Saharan Africa I make a 
submission that suggests ‘reforms’ to mean and include ‘an upgrade’, ‘reorganization’, 
‘modernization’, ‘capacitation’,‘ remodel’, ‘restructuring’, ‘amendments’, ‘modifications’, 
‘transformations’, ‘improvements’, ‘adjustments’, ‘absorption’ and ‘changes’ within the SSIs 
 
This chapter looks at the various forms of SSR carried out within the sub-Saharan African region 
spanning the period of decolonisation to the present. In other words, my argument is that the 
evolution of SSR started way back prior to the much domesticated European concept of SSR 
which gained prominence from the 1990s onwards.  
 
Although the European concept of SSR has achieved hegemonic status within the global security 
sector discourse, it is significant to mention that Africa had already engaged in SSR as far back 
as the decolonization era. This chapter will thus also seek to elaborate on this very point, 
notwithstanding that the European model of the 1990s is now being perceived as the norm in 
SSR discourse, with its focus on ‘democratic’ principles accorded recognition as a ‘positive’ 
aspect. 
 
This Chapter seeks to analyse SSR from both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ perspectives. These 
‘reforms’ are examined with a view to understand intent to maintain the power of African elites 
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within the SSIs; advance Western neo-colonialism; capacitate the military for defensive and 
offensive purposes; uphold a specific ideology; restructure SSIs vis-à-vis foreign based training, 
and ‘democratize’ SSIs.  
 
To be noted is the fact that security reforms are actively pursued especially in the aftermath of a 
conflict.  
 
This Chapter analyses the evolution of the security sector discourse with special emphasis on 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
First, the Chapter elaborates on the decolonization process of Franco-Phone West African 
countries with special reference to ‘reforms’ that tended to perpetuate a neo-colonial agenda. 
Second, it concerns itself with the decolonization of Anglo-Phone West Africa and Belgian Zaire 
with special focus on ‘reforms’ carried out to maintain the interests of elites and promote state 
hegemony. Third, it examines Angola’s proxy war with special emphasis on the form of SSR 
that was intended to re-capacitate its SSIs’ defensive and offensive capabilities. Fourth,  it 
explores South Africa’s SSR whose model was more of ‘absorption’ rather than ‘integration’ of 
the SANDF. Fifth, it analyses Zimbabwe’s SSR at independence, whose model was more 
integrative yet maintaining a specific liberation ideological position. Finally, I evaluate Sierra 
Leone and Liberia’s SSR programmes with special focus on ‘reforms’ in line with the current 
European SSR model. In conclusion I note major observations discussed in the entire Chapter. 
3.2 SSR in Franco-phone West Africa: Perpetuating a neo-colonial agenda 
The study notes that while Britain was carrying out its decolonization process in some parts of 
Africa in the 1950s and 1960s; France was working to maintain very strong relations with its 
former African colonies. 
 
Chafer (2002) argues that France wanted to make its former African countries part of the 
mainland France. The ambitions alluded to can be seen in the following cases: Since 1895, 
France came up with the Federation of West African states which were composed of seven 
territories, namely: Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Dahomey (now Benin), French Sudan (now 
Mali), French Guinea, and Mauritania.  
71 
 
 
A French governor-general controlled the federation with his capital in Dakar (Senegal). He was 
assisted by “a secretary-general; a cabinet director; and a director of political, administrative, and 
social affairs. The governor-general was directly responsible for the governor of each territory, 
and these governors in turn ruled with the aid of a colonial council” Ginio (2006:4). 
 
The above structures clearly show the authoritarian nature of how France maintained its power 
and influence in driving the social, economic and political activities of the West African states. It 
can also be noted that, as a way of maintaining law and order in these colonies, French police 
and army officers used coercive force whenever necessary. In other words, the West African 
state was a creation of French colonialism which was coercive and by “its nature purely 
administrative and authoritarian” (Chafer, 2002).  
 
In the circumstances, it is fair to observe that France merely yielded and responded to 
international pressure in its view of wanting Africa to be de-colonised. While France’s move of 
granting its former colonies political independence maybe commendable, one cannot fail to 
argue that its continued control of the economic infrastructure of its former colonies remains 
ethically fragile and morally unpardonable. One can further argue that the creation of the 
Federation of West African States and establishment of France’s military bases in its former 
colonies is an indication that France is as insincere as it is not prepared to grant full sovereign 
independence to its former colonies. 
 
First and not surprisingly, on 25 June 1940, after signing the armistice with Germany, France’s 
new President, Philippe Pétain, made a national speech regarding French colonies, and in the 
state of nation address said; 
“I was no less concerned about our colonies than about metropolitan France. The armistice 
maintains the bonds that unite us with them. France has the right to rely upon their loyalty” Ginio 
(2006:1). 
 
The new French President further indicated that when signing the truce (with Germany), he had 
stood resolute in maintaining the bond between his country and its colonies. The Germans had 
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agreed to Pétain’s demands on condition that the French colonies would remain neutral during 
the war. Unlike France’s other colonies in Asia and other continents, the African colonies were 
closer to Europe and could supply it with the necessary raw materials and cheap labour.  
 
Second, the colonies would also help restore France’s lost pride (after its defeat) in providing it 
with a dignified status at the end of WW II. Petain’s interest with the African colonies (in the 
1940s) clearly shows the position twenty-first century France still holds to this day towards some 
West African countries. France achieves this by continuing to play a leading role in the domestic 
affairs of its former colonies where its military is involved in frontline combat activities in 
countries such as Mali and Ivory Coast in protection of its interests.  
While the military assistance given to former French colonies by France in situations of conflict 
such as in Mali maybe plausible, the question of France engaging in frontline military operations 
pretending to be giving a helping hand while protecting its interests may not be overruled. One 
can therefore argue that such a practice weakens the operational capacity of the host nation’s 
military. One can further argue on the morality and sincerity of SSR reformists calling for an 
SSR that seeks to further weaken SSIs in sub-Saharan Africa instead of a reform which 
capacitates the African SS. 
Third, President De Gaulle in the 1950s came up with the idea of a Franco-African community 
where France would still hold authority over foreign and security affairs. This constitution of 
1958 was an attempt by the French government to avoid giving complete independence to West 
African states but instead create a political agenda or structure that would help keep these 
African countries under France’s sphere of influence and control Ginio (2006). 
De Gaulle had close relations with key African political leaders and this has remained a part of 
French policy in the twenty-first century. It can be noted that during the last years of French 
colonial rule in West Africa, French leaders would see to it that a French-African policy was put 
in place in order to safeguard future French interests in the region. This policy prepared the 
ground for the maintenance of French influence in West Africa after independence.  
It can be further stressed that since the 1960s between half and two thirds of French aid has been 
distributed to West African countries. This political and economic effort has been supported by 
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the FRANC zone, through the maintenance of permanent French military bases and promotion of 
French language and culture through cultural co-operation within the West African states Chafer 
(2002). 
Chafer (2006:234) further argues that this relationship was consolidated through “a series of 
defence, military, technical and cultural assistance accords that, together with the maintenance of 
the Franc zone, were to keep sub-Saharan Africa firmly in the French sphere of influence after 
independence.” 
Noting Chafer’s (2002) argument above, one can therefore question the loyalty of West African 
states’ SSIs (especially after decolonization) given the level of assistance that came directly from 
France. It can be argued that France’s military assistance may not have been necessarily 
altruistic. It can be observed that Chafer’s (2002) argument is correct when he posits that it was a 
projection of national interests by France that played a significant role in the extent and direction 
of such support. The impact of such military backing would at times not correspond with the 
security aspirations of the national population but would merely serve the interests of France.  
Overall, French influence has remained deeply embedded in West African political, social, 
economic and security spheres.   
During the decolonization process some West African states actually carried out ‘reforms’ in line 
with France’s military thinking. These states (after independence), inherited as well as preserved 
security structures and the very methods of defence system management similar to those of 
colonial France which however created a danger of perpetuating French interests in the long run. 
This has remained the case in the twenty-first century. 
It can be argued that France’s security sector influence in the Franco- phone West Africa has 
been against Africanisation of the region. One can observe that the region experienced the largest 
number of coups in African political history. I argue that the French and the reformists’ call for 
Western SSR models in the region are meant to protect French interests and hegemonic French 
control.  
It can, therefore, be concluded that most African leaders from this region who advocated Pan-
Africanism were removed from power through French supported coups. A contemporary 
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example is where the French deployed French troops to protect French interests and hegemonic 
control of Ivory Coast (2012), Burkina Faso (2015) and Central Africa Republic (2016).  
It can indeed be argued that the origins of the Euro-centric SSR in Franco-phone West Africa 
dates back to the period of decolonisation when the French were making sure that their influence 
remained strong in their former colonies Ginio (2006). 
While it can be critically viewed that France’s overall offer of human security to its former 
colonies is intended to save lives, one can argue that France is morally motivated by the need to 
safeguard its national interests. It can further be argued that French military operations and 
establishment of military bases continue to threaten the sovereignty of sub-Saharan Africa.  
Basing on these observation one would then question the wisdom of SSR reformists to call for 
SSR that seeks to weaken the SSI in Africa making these institutions fail to protect the state and 
its citizens from predators. 
3.3 Decolonization of Anglo-phone West Africa and Belgian Zaire 
When Nigeria attained independence in 1960, the country followed a British model of 
governance.  
Nigeria first democratically elected government only administered the country from 
independence before the first coup of 1966. This meant that Nigeria enjoyed democratic civilian 
rule for only six years before a wave of coups began to take place until about the beginning of 
the 21
st
 century. 
Garba (2008)  notes that the West African country had a long period of military rule (after 1966) 
which was characterized by unprecedented political instability(anarchy) including the 1967 to 
1970 civil war. The state of anarchy that punctuated this period thrust the country into social and 
political turbulence. 
Reasons that can be attributed to indiscipline within the military, leading to coups, are rather 
varied as will be discussed in Chapter 5 but one major contributory factor that can be cited here 
is that identified by Onwumechili (1998) which relates to ethnic intolerance.  
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Another attribute relates to the type of SSIs which were inherited by the Nigerian government 
after independence in 1960. It can be observed right from its days of independence that the major 
political parties during Nigeria’s independence were ethnic based. These included the Action 
Group (AG) which had its roots among the Yoruba, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) 
which was based in the North and its main support coming from the Hausa/Fulani group and the 
National Convention for Nigeria Citizens (NCNC) which had its roots in Eastern Nigeria among 
the Igbo people (Garba, 2008).These political loyalties and strong ethnic groupings transcended 
the security sector of the country and have continued to define Nigerian politics in the twenty-
first century. 
Ghana, like Nigeria, also inherited a British system of governance including its SS structures. 
However, soon after independence in 1957 it experienced several forms of instability which 
included military coups beginning in 1966 when its first post-independence leader, Kwame 
Nkrumah, was overthrown. 
Other military coups took place in 1972, 1978, 1979, and 1981. The last one took place in 1981 
where for the second time Jerry Rawlings took over power Onwumechili (1998). The several 
Ghanaian coups had a very negative impact on the economy due to cases of rampant corruption 
and abuse of state resources by the incumbent military leaders and their cronies.  
In Belgian Zaire, decolonization created worse problems for this African state. The coup that 
ushered in Joseph Mobutu as the President of Zaire saw the SS drifting from its traditional role 
of providing national security to fostering strong ties with the political elites. Zairian citizens 
were purged by the SS and the majority lived in abject poverty owing to unprecedented levels of 
Kleptocracy.  
The independence of African countries in the 1950s and 1960s exposed the depth of the 
oppressive nature of the colonial states in that those countries which adopted similar SS 
structures as those of the former colonizers became a living ‘nightmare’ to their own citizens.  
Decolonization in Africa was actually accompanied by high expectations of increased economic 
growth to benefit all.  
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However, as noted in the above cases, democratically elected governments in Ghana, Nigeria and 
Zaire were replaced through coups. As such, military dictatorships or authoritarian one-party 
states run by powerful elites and dominated by ethnic groups retarded the development of these 
states Battersby (2009). 
Observations from the above three cases show that the ‘reforms’ carried out by Nigeria, Ghana 
and Zaire were not ‘transformational’ in nature.  
Williams (2003) views ‘transformation’ as the restructuring of the colonial system so as to best 
meet the needs of the anticipated decolonized state. This implies that these countries adopted 
colonial structures for their security sectors, without making major changes including ideological 
intensions.  
 
The ‘reforms’ were merely a removal of the former White office bearers and replacing them with 
Black officers. Yet the security apparatus of the former colonisers was mainly established to 
enhance colonial domination through a coercive and repressive means especially against the 
Black majority that was resisting White rule. 
 
Scholars relate the security problems faced by African countries after the decolonization 
processes in the 1950s and 1960s to the colonial SSIs that they inherited in totality. Arguments 
raised by Bendix and Stanley (2008) are that the colonial state never achieved meaningful 
societal penetration and support among the Africans as its interest only lay in serving the 
economic and political interests of the White colonizers. In this regard, the SSIs became a 
formidable coercive arm of the colonial state used to oppress and exploit indigenous Black 
people.  
 
In other words, the SSIs which came up after the attainment of African independence from the 
1950s onwards became near mirror reflections of the former colonial security institutions 
Williams (2000). 
 
The decolonized states adopted almost similar SS rank structures of the former colonizers. Little 
surprising, they also embraced the colonialists’ indiscriminate use of force or coercion on 
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civilians, a disregard for the rights of individuals, and a creation of a culture of fear among the 
populace. Instead of protecting citizens, the colonially inherited SSIs became repressive arms of 
the new African states furthering the interests of the African elites in power.  
 
The culture of silence and fear among the masses, even after Black independence, is traced to the 
adoption of practices of former colonial rulers by post-colonial rulers. 
 
A critical analysis of the above discussion reveals unprecedented outside pressure that seeks to 
impose SSR in sub-Saharan Africa. While SSIs seek to perform the ethical mandate that informs 
the protection of state sovereignty, national interests, human rights, freedoms and prevention of 
anarchy between state and human security as discussed elsewhere in chapter two, such SSR is 
unlikely to deliver the desired democracy when it is noted that western powers will not brook the 
imposition of SSR by outsiders. 
3.4 Proxy-war in Angola: Reforms on capacitation of the SSIs 
Portugal’s impromptu departure from Angola in 1975 (due to its own problems at home) created 
a power vacuum among three contending liberation movements namely; the Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) led by Agostinho Neto; National Front for the Liberation 
of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto; and National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi (Minter1994). 
Portugal hastily attempted to come up with a transitional government in Angola that would 
eventually led to a government of national unity.  
However, the transitional government collapsed in 1975 leading to immediate confrontation 
among the erstwhile liberation movements Minter (1994), George (2005). 
It is interesting to note that at its early stages fighting pitted the FNLA and UNITA against the 
MPLA.  
The US, South Africa and Zaire thus sided with the FNLA and UNITA in the fight against 
MPLA which was supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union making it a confrontation of the Cold 
War powers on African soil Ferreira and Henk (2005). 
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The FNLA – whose leader Roberto enjoyed close ties with Mobutu was assisted with several 
battalions of Zairian troops to strengthen his army’s advance on Luanda while UNITA on the 
other hand relied on Apartheid South African war machinery  to reinforce its military 
capabilities.  
In response to the above scenario, the MPLA resolved to seek assistance from Cuba and Russia 
to survive this military ‘Armageddon’ or onslaught George (2005). 
Angola’s weak army was then remodelled (reformed) along Cuban and Soviet lines.  
Re-equipping of the MPLA started in earnest in 1975 with some of the most sophisticated 
military technology ever provided to an African state George (2005). By late 1975, the Soviets 
were engaged in a massive airlift to supply the MPLA with advanced military hardware aided by 
Cuban ground and air forces Ferreira and Henk (2005). 
The military hardware acquired by the MPLA from the Soviets included “at least 120 T34/54 
tanks, twenty-one BM-21s, dozens of armed helicopters, hundreds of armoured cars, thousands 
of machine-guns and pistols, and the FAPLA’s first aircraft – a squadron of MiG-21 fighters 
which formed the nucleus of the Angolan Air Force” George (2005:122). 
The ‘modernized’ Angolan defence force which resulted from this military capacitating 
programme radically improved the MPLA’s ability to project military power within its territory, 
and also made it possible to repel South African and Zairian military aggression.   
In the case of Angola, reforms in the form of ‘capacitation’ of the SSIs helped in rebuilding the 
once weak Angolan army into a well-equipped, compact, efficient and hard-hitting Defence 
Force that helped to guarantee “some peace and security” for both rural and urban communities.  
During Angola’s proxy war, the Defence Force became a highly competent and effective 
coercive state apparatus that performed extraordinarily against its FNLA, UNITA, South African 
and Zairian opponents.  
Examples of the military prowess of the MPLA government include operation Carlota, the 
Battles of Cuito Cuanavale, Cabinda, Quifangondo and many others George (2005). 
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The capacitation of SSIs in Angola included the training of the defence forces in the use of 
highly developed military hardware as a way of improving on their defensive and offensive 
skills.  
It can be argued that, despite the resilience displayed by the South African army, which was also 
highly competent; the Angolans were able to safeguard their territory and sovereignty against 
such a militarily preponderant enemy.  
One can therefore argue that the Angolan security sector was able to withstand enemy attacks 
from Zairian soldiers, apartheid South African Defence Forces, including internal rebellion 
groups (UNITA and FNLA) mainly because it carried out security sector ‘reforms’ which 
boosted its military capabilities as propagated not only by realist thinkers but also their 
committed and historical allies. 
However, following the end of the cold war and the demise of Savimbi, this offered Angola the 
propitious moment it yearned to embark on an internally induced SSR which integrated 
combatants from UNITA, FNLA and MPLA. 
It can be argued that the Angolan SSR model, being internally designed, has been effective, with 
no resurgence of hostilities ever reported. 
The Angolan situation contrasts sharply with that of Mozambique, noting that the latter’s peace 
plan was externally driven Minter (1994). 
In the SSR discourse, most SSR advocates overlook the importance of undertaking reforms 
which involve the modernization, capacitation and incorporation of new strategies when 
engaging enemy. It is important to note that SSR is not merely about democratic oversight of 
security institutions, dismantling of existing SS structures, good governance, and civil-military 
relations and so on.  
The fight for the seat in Luanda Angola offers insight into what genuine SSR entails. 
SSR can be initiated to improve on a state’s military capabilities as evidenced in the case of the 
1975-6 Angolan proxy war. It can also be undertaken in reaction to deficiencies in combat skills 
with a view to counter or meet emergent threats. President Neto had to call on the Soviets and 
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Cubans to help in training his army (the FPLA) specifically to improve on their offensive 
capabilities. In other words, SSR also requires that the SSIs are technically competent and well 
skilled for combat duty. 
While idealists may argue in opposition to the acquisition of advanced military hardware by 
MPLA from Cuba and Russia, citing the devastating destruction of economic infrastructure and 
loss of human lives, the realists are quick to point to the long term ethical benefit that accrued in 
favour of both state and human security that subsist in Angola to this day. Indeed, it is fair to 
argue further that the advanced military hardware improved the effectiveness of Angola’s SSIs, 
thus enhancing state and human security spanning peace, security and economic development 
that Angola richly deserves. 
3.5 South African Independence: Reforms Based on ‘Absorption’ of a New SANDF 
 After gaining their Independence, Liberation movements in Southern Africa made some 
progress in ‘reforming’ their security sectors. The reforms consisted of an integration of the 
former colonial security apparatus with the armies of the liberation movements.  
Scholars such as Williams (2004) have suggested for the need of more scholarly work to be done 
with regards to the model that emerges when liberation movements form part of a post-conflict 
national army.  
The reconstruction of most post-conflict societies in Africa, especially in the Southern African 
region, witnessed the triumphant revolutionary parties e.g. (SWAPO, ZANU PF, FRELIMO, 
MPLA) playing a pivotal role in the command and re-organization of the new defence forces. 
When it comes to South Africa, scholars have differed on whether the South African integration 
process was holistically driven by liberation movement or it was absorption of MK into an 
already existing settler SADF structure Cawthra (1997), Williams (2003). 
Some scholars have argued that the whole ‘reform’ process in South Africa was politically 
fraught Ferreira and Henk (2005). 
In consequence, I present, below, the rather controversial South African SS integration or 
absorption process. 
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South Africa’s integration process involved seven major armed opponents, made up as follows:  
Apartheid South African Defence Forces (SADF) and the armed forces of the Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) homelands, and the two liberation movements of 
the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC), and their respective 
military wings; UmkhontoweSizwe (MK) and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA). It 
was clear that a cumbersome integration process would emerge Cawthra (1997), Ferreira and 
Henk (2005), Dzinesa (2006). 
Needless to add, that the number of opponents to an incoming ANC government was 
disproportionately higher than what was experienced in any integration process involving any of 
the Southern African countries. 
The integration of all these military forces in order to form a new SANDF remains heavily 
burdened with a multiplicity of political challenges.  
 
Cawthra (1997) notes that the Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC) of South Africa 
which was tasked with coming up with frameworks for the adoption of an integrated South 
African (SA) army agreed that the infrastructure of the SADF would be used for the whole 
integration process.  The reason given was that the SADF had the relevant facilities to undertake 
the whole integration process.  
 
The above notwithstanding, a worrying outcome raised by both Cawthra (1997) and Williams 
(2002) was that the integration process was heavily skewed in favour of the colonial SADF. The 
major reason for such an argument emanated from the fact that “the SADF training, doctrine, 
personnel procedures, structures and equipment formed the basis of the new SANDF and that 
integration largely occurred on the SADF's terms” Cawthra (1997:149).  
 
Not unnaturally, critiques rose to argue that the whole process was more of ‘absorption’ of the 
other six armies of blacks into the white apartheid SADF than genuine ‘integration’. The 
integration process was also problematic in that disputes also rose over the issue of numbers and 
ranks within the new SANDF.  
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In consequence, the MK's proposed ranks were reduced a notch or two by the SADF negotiators 
in the JMCC. This led the liberation movements to suspect, and with cause, that the ex-SADF 
members were trying to stifle MK and APLA’s chances of getting top ranks within the new 
SANDF army, thus resulting in reserving high ranks for SADF members Williams (2003). 
 
The behaviour by the White settlers in the serving SADF can be justified especially considering 
that from a realist perspective they were operating from a position that gave them an advantage 
over opponents. They were all settlers and anyone in their situation would have acted likewise.  
 
Not to be overlooked is the fact that this group of white colonial servicemen might have come up 
with such a strategy as a way of guaranteeing their survival under a future Black government.  
 
At independence, mistrust and suspicion were rife between both Whites and Blacks. The White 
Afrikaners were very much suspicious and fearful of the ANC and PAC cadres whose political 
and ideological orientation had been socialist.  
 
As was noted elsewhere in this chapter with regard to Angola, the SADF intervened militarily in 
1975 since it was totally opposed to a communist encroachment within the Southern African 
region, especially in its former South West African colony (Namibia). Given the SADF’s 
devoutly anti-Communist ideology through its ‘Total National Strategy’ which was against any 
Southern African country inclined towards Marxism and supportive of African liberation and the 
ANC party Dzinesa (2006), they had to form alliances with Savimbi and Roberto in an attempt to 
topple the Neto ‘communist’ oriented government George (2005). 
 
All forces being equal, the SANDF might have had an upper hand in the whole integration 
process owing to the fact that during the anti-apartheid era, there were very few military 
skirmishes in South Africa between the well militarily advanced SADF and the guerrilla fighters.  
 
In the case of Zimbabwe, to be later discussed, the integration process was not the same as that 
of South Africa. ZANU (PF) and (PF) ZAPU had an upper hand since they had directly and 
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indirectly engaged the White Rhodesian army. Their military structures were also quite formal 
and well established unlike those of the MK and APLA at independence.  
 
It stands to reason that the South African liberation movements bargained from a weaker position 
owing to lack of military command structure and an ability of carrying out conventional or 
guerrilla war against the apartheid government as happened in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and 
Mozambique. 
 
It could be argued that the SSR in South Africa, barring the notion of an uneven playing field, 
was successful as evidenced by a subsisting political dispensation steeped in relative peace and 
stability. When it is observed that the SSR in South Africa warranted radical reform in order to 
redress the apartheid modus operandi, it is also appreciated that any radical positionality by 
relatively weak liberation movements would not have been appropriate in a potentially 
inflammable political and security situation that informs South Africa. One can safely argue that 
the SSI in South Africa is efficient to the extent that whatever SSRs were instituted did not 
infringe upon the new political dispensation under a black government. Everything considered, it 
is fair to argue that the SSR process in South Africa needed to be carried out in a gradual, 
responsible and careful manner. 
3.6 The Zimbabwean SSR: The Case of Maintaining a Specific Liberation Ideology? 
Zimbabwe’s independence just “like that of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa, 
can be traced to the armed struggles of the 1960s and 1970s (Tirivangana, 2000).”These various 
struggles helped to bring about Black rule after the end of white minority colonial rule. Among 
the newly independent Southern African countries, there were some which to a degree 
maintained their liberation ideologies within their newly integrated armies (e.g. South Africa 
discussed in the above section), while others completely embraced the liberation ideologies 
within their SSIs (Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia).  
The end of the liberation war in Zimbabwe was marked by the signing of the Lancaster House 
Agreement in November 1979. The agreement called for a general election in 1980 which was 
resoundingly won by ZANU (PF), with 57 seats, under the leadership of Robert Gabriel Mugabe.  
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Ian Smith’s (the former Prime Minister of colonial Rhodesia) party the Rhodesian Front won all 
20 seats which had been constitutionally reserved for the white electorate. Despite winning an 
overall majority in parliament, the ZANU (PF) party also gave cabinet positions to some ZAPU 
members who were led by Joshua Nkomo, Manungo (2007) and had garnered some 20 seats. 
The task that now lay ahead was to come up with an integrated SS that would represent the 
above three parties whose armies had fiercely fought against each other during the liberation 
war. 
A policy of national reconciliation initiated by the Robert Mugabe ZANU (PF) government 
created a political environment that would later dispel white fears of revenge or retribution from 
Black Zimbabweans who had endured years of white segregation.  
The new Zimbabwean government came up with a policy of integration of the three SSIs. This 
approach sought to allay fears of retribution especially to the fearful whites who had served in 
the previous Rhodesian army. The approach further advanced the notion that the newly 
independent ZANU (PF) Government would be more inclusive than the colonial government of 
Ian Smith.  
In can therefore be argued that‘ SSR’ took place in the formative years of Zimbabwe’ s 
independence when one looks at the ‘integration’ process which led to the formation of an all-
inclusive new Army, Air Force, Police and Intelligence Services in 1980. At independence, the 
pressing moral obligation was to integrate all the security formations into a common security 
vision of a newly sovereign Zimbabwean State. 
Building on the above paragraph, it can be noted that Zimbabwe’s ZANU (PF) government - as 
the victorious party after the 1980 elections – entrenched its revolutionary doctrine within the 
SSIs as a way of safeguarding its own ethos and ideology born out of the liberation struggle 
Tendi (2016) and Yates (1980). This has remained so, up to this day. The relationship between 
the revolutionary civilian leadership and the SS is deeply ingrained within Zimbabwean body 
politic.  
Manungo (2007) asserts that: 
Zimbabwe has a National Security Council (NSC) that is composed of the president, all cabinet 
ministers, the secretary to the president and cabinet, the commander of the defence forces, the 
director-general of the Central Intelligence Organisation, the commissioner of police, and the 
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commissioner of prisons. The president chairs the council. Under it is the Defence Council (DC). 
The president also chairs this, as it is a committee of the NSC. The other members of the DC are 
the ministers of foreign affairs, defence, state and national security, finance, home affairs, 
information and publicity, justice, and parliamentary affairs; the commanders of the defence forces, 
the ZNA, and the Air Force; the Secretary of Defence; and the Secretary to the President and 
cabinet. Then there is a Defence Committee, made up of the minister of defence (in the chair), the 
commanders of the defence forces, the commissioners of police and prisons, the secretary for 
defence, and the deputy secretary for policy in the MoD. The NSC and the DC drive security policy 
in Zimbabwe; there is no input from civil society as such. Manungo (2007: 228). 
From the above quote, it can be noted that in Zimbabwe, there exists a symbiotic relationship 
between the President, Cabinet Ministers and the SSIs. This can be clearly spelt out in the above 
structures that make up the National Security Council (NSC), Defence Council (DC) and the 
Defence Committee. The council and committee members are made up of men and women 
directly appointed by the President to these cabinet and defence posts.  
 
These men and women referred to above are ZANU (PF) loyalists who subscribe to the party’s 
liberation ideology and ethos. A number of those with high ranks in the SSIs have been former 
guerrilla fighters. Some Cabinet Ministers also share the same background. Former guerrilla 
fighters have continued their military careers as senior command and staff personnel within the 
structure of the new defence forces and other ministries.  
 
It therefore becomes unrealistic, as evidenced in the Zimbabwean case, to clearly separate those 
in the security sector from politics.  
 
The ZANU (PF) government came out of a liberation war where the political processes were 
then guided by that revolutionary history. Those who command the security institutions fought in 
the liberation war and so regard themselves as veterans who are guided by a liberation 
ideological persuasion Tendi (2016). 
 
Zimbabwe’s national army (ZNA) and other security institutions are products of a revolutionary 
history and according to Doro (2012), the power relations between the civilian leadership and the 
SS have greatly influenced the current security arrangement in Zimbabwe.  
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A perusal of Manungo’s (2007) structures of the Zimbabwe NSC, clearly defines the nature of 
the relationship between the ZANU (PF) politicians and the SS which has become an 
arrangement that lies at the centre of national identity, ideological orientation, ethos and destiny. 
Doro (2012:8) argues that this arrangement “is inextricably wound up in the fabric of national 
historical consciousness.” One can therefore argue that such a symbiotic arrangement becomes 
nearly impossible to separate the military from politics as has already been explored in detail in 
Chapter one. 
 
It is argued, and rightly so, that the SSIs in Zimbabwe, like those obtaining in most other African 
countries, lack  originality and have maintained a colonial legacy of not only retaining security 
and rank structures but also adopting uniforms and preserving language of instruction that do not 
resonate with a new political dispensation. 
 
Africa’s main cry revolves around funding ability and even more, lack of it. It is argued in some 
circles that costs relating to change in service uniform and change in teaching material is 
prohibitively high and not worth it. Indeed, even the judiciary in Zimbabwe is donned in colonial 
gear. How valid such arguments are at the expense of identity, pride and dignity is a matter 
outside the scope of this study.  
 
A counter argument suggests that the continued upholding of liberation principles and values is 
far more important than mere symbols of a hollow self-admiration. It is further argued that the 
nature, context, content and intent of their service requirements  has produced SSRs that 
capacitate and enhance their operational efficiency as demonstrated in their successful missions 
in Mozambique in 1986, the DRC in 1998, and various extremely successful peacekeeping 
missions at regional, continental and international level.  
 
Indeed ability and capacity at protecting the national interests have also been cited as indicative 
of prevailing internal peace and capacity to contain aggression, matters attributed to a resilient 
liberation ethos. It can be argued that the  
87 
 
3.7 Sierra Leone and Liberia: Reforms in Line with Current European Models of SSR 
The twenty-first century has witnessed a number of African countries carrying out SSRs after a 
major conflict. These reforms have been undertaken at the behest of Western countries (e.g. 
USA, UK, France, Sweden and so on) and various organizations e.g. (UNDP, UN, EU, WB, 
DFID, USAID and so on) as a way of reforming the SSIs with an objective of improving 
efficiency and democratic control Sugden (2006). 
African countries which have carried out such reforms include Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and many others.  
Scholars such as Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) argue that various donor agencies have seen 
sub-Saharan Africa as the testing ground for European SSR models. However, two case studies 
are highlighted which mirror how SSR has been carried out in other African countries in the 
twenty-first century.  
With a generally agreed weakness of African militaries, I seek to focus mainly on the funding of 
SSR programmes in Africa. 
3.7.1 SSR in Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone’s state security infrastructure had become totally dysfunctional at the end of the 
civil war in2002. The security sector’s control of Sierra Leonean territorial space became 
increasingly questionable especially during the civil war. The absence of a well-functioning 
government meant that ordinary citizens had to rely on security provided by local civil defence 
forces, rebel groups and secret societies.  
To be noted is the fact that security provided by the above quasi-security groups was both an 
advantage and disadvantage to some communities. For some, their security was well guaranteed 
while for others, it was a cause of concern as it resulted in insecurity (e.g. torture, rape, looting 
and unjustified deaths) Conteh (2007). 
Because of the prevalent anarchical situation in Sierra Leone; the UN set up the UN Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999 in order to assist in the implementation of the Lomé Peace 
Accord (1999) as well as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan of various 
armed groups on the loose. 
UNAMSIL, with troops numbering 17 000, completed its mandate in 2005 Conteh (2007). 
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During the peace process, the UK’s DFID: 
earmarked 20 million pounds to carry out SSR from 1999 to 2002. At the same time, the UK signed 
a 10-year collaboration plan with Sierra Leone for reconstruction and poverty alleviation. The SSR 
programme, mainly funded and managed by DFID, had the following objectives: the creation of 
effective, affordable and democratically accountable security institutions; effective reconciliation, 
justice and reintegration of ex-combatants; and the reduction of regional threats to Sierra Leone 
Bendix and Stanley (2008:20). 
What is evident is that, in the above case of Sierra Leone its people were denied the free hand of 
determining their own future by shaping the outlook of important national institutions. Instead, 
the former colonial power sought to influence the outlook of these institutions ostensibly not to 
favour or advance authentic Sierra Leonean causes. 
In the above case, the ownership of the SSR programme was somehow skewed in favour of the 
British government which provided most of the funds. In other words, the British were 
particularly interested in maintaining a stable democratic government by restoring all its 
functional machinery and social institutions. The thrust in the various sectors was as follows: 
 The Ministry of Defence – to help ensure that the army remains accountable to the 
democratically elected government 
 The police – to help create and sustain a civilian controlled peace countrywide 
 The intelligence service – to ensure that it is accountable to the government and that its work is 
coordinated through the Office of National Security (ONS) 
 The judiciary – to underpin increased police effectiveness, provide access to justice for all and 
to give teeth to the anti-corruption measures Gbla (2007:19). 
Basing on the above UK-SSR commitments, it can be viewed that London had a defining impact 
on the whole process. One can argue that under such arrangements there is a possibility that 
Sierra Leone’s security requirements were settled in favour of the British who funded the 
exercise.  
3.7.2 SSR in Liberia 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Accra in August 2003 marked the end of 
the 14 year old Liberian civil war and created the framework for reform in the transitional period 
between 2003 and 2005 Ebo (2007). 
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Part Four of the CPA agreement was devoted to security sector reform. According to Bendix and 
Stanley (2008), personalization of power became common in the decades preceding the civil war 
after Samuel Doe, who came to power in 1980 through a military coup. Doe tried to replace 
Americo-Liberian settler domination by privileging his own tribe the Krahns, especially within 
the army and civil service. The ensuing civil war destroyed the society,  
the economy and what state structures were in existence before the outbreak of armed conflict. 
Reform of the security sector needed to address several issues, including disbanding the several 
non-state armed groups; restructuring the state military forces; depoliticizing and demilitarizing the 
police; and putting an end to impunity, corruption and political interference in the judiciary. 
 Furthermore, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); 
with 15000 UN soldiers, the world’s second-largest UN peace operation after Sierra Leone was 
primarily responsible for upholding the fragile peace Ebo (2007:79-81). Liberia’s SSR agenda was 
outlined in the CPA of 2003. The CPA gave powers to the international community and 
specifically requested the USA to play a leading role. The responsibility for the implementation and 
funding of SSR in Liberia was shared among various UN agencies, the US government and the 
Liberian government Bendix and Stanley (2008). 
SSR ownership in this case was totally under American control. The ethical danger of such a set-
up is that the security sector might end up serving the interests of the donors funding that SSR 
programme. 
Arguments emanating from the above two case studies which can be raised against the current 
European model of SSR are that though the reforms are heralded as being nationally owned, 
there may be an inherent danger that the sponsoring donor country could have put themselves in 
the driving seat of reform Ebo (2007) leading to a general lack of transparency Bendix and 
Stanley (2008), thus undermining the state’s sovereignty Ball (2002) as the donor country 
dominates the process in defining the reform programme (Fayemi, 2004).  
The above approach is done at the expense of locals who are supposed to benefit from the whole 
SSR process Nathan (2007). In essence, SSR has been designed to remould African SSIs in line 
with the Northern countries’ liberal perspectives on the governance of SSIs.  
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You will find that in Chapter eight a thorough critique of the Eurocentric model of SSR is 
proffered, and in which I recommend that any SSR programme in sub-Saharan Africa should 
address local African experiences, traditions, ideologies, institutions and heritages.  
3.8 Conclusion 
As a way of concluding, it was noted that many African countries were engaged in some form of 
SSR activities long before the end of the Cold War - when the concept gained full international 
recognition.  
During Africa’s decolonization process, and after the end of liberation wars, the pressing issues 
were mainly on the merging of all the security formations into a single army. Reforms were 
aimed at achieving inclusiveness within the security sector.  
Various terms were used in this chapter in reference to SSR, and included; ‘an upgrade’, 
‘reorganization’, ‘modernization’, ‘capacitation’, ‘restructuring’, ‘amendments’, ‘modifications’, 
‘transformations’, ‘improvements’, adjustments’ and ‘changes’ which all point to the need to 
enhance SSR. The various cases analysed in this chapter aimed to identify the type of security 
‘reform’ each country carried out. It was also clear that reforms answered to the prevailing 
situation and circumstances of each country, with ability or lack of it to fund such reforms 
determining and shaping the nature of the reform. 
It was observed that in the 1950s and 1960s West African countries tended to adopt a 
transformational model of SSRs where emphasis was put on integrating the existing structures 
and systems of government. This invariably, also tended to promote the interest of the elitesat the 
expense of the ordinary citizens. The exercise was very much cosmetic, resulting in the 
replacement of a few old guards, on the basis of personality, with a few new ones, leaving the 
security institutions very much intact. 
Reforms in Angola were directed towards a rebuilding of its SSIs in order to improve on their 
offensive and defensive capabilities. In South Africa some scholars argued that the form of SSR 
was more of absorption than an integration process. In Zimbabwe, it was observed that the 
‘reforms’ were more of an integration process that maintained a specific liberation ethos. 
This Chapter also observed that a significant number of reforms that now come under the 
umbrella of SSR had taken place or were already under way in some African countries. Some of 
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these, as in the case of Mozambique, were externally directed while others occurred as a result of 
a country’s own initiatives as in the case of Angola and Zimbabwe, and to some extent in the 
case of South Africa also. The Sierra Leonean and Liberian cases were dominated by donors and 
tended to be externally driven, and it was observed that both countries followed a European 
model of SSR.  
It was also observed that while there are various forms of SSR that took place in Africa as 
indicated above, the most talked about and well documented form of SSR is the one that 
emerged in Europe, particularly in the UK, in the 1990s.  
 
It has also been observed that many reformists use the 1990 SSR model in arguing out their cases 
regarding how Africa’s SSR should be adopted and operationalised. One can thus argue that 
advancing or advocating African countries to only focus on the 1990s Euro-centric model of SSR 
lacks merit as it is academically subjective since such characterisation or contextualisation of 
SSR ignores other equally relevant and more effective forms of SSR. Indeed African countries 
had their kind of reforms prior to the ones advanced by Europe, and as discussed in this Chapter. 
 
The SSR model of the 1990s and fronted by the UK was given prominence for its developmental 
thrust. Matters of the economy and democratic principles were regarded as central to achieving 
both state and human security. This thesis will seize itself with the rationale or otherwise of 
pursuing such a model and the ensuing chapters will be guided by arguments surrounding this 
thrust.  
 
 
The ensuing Chapter 4 examines the SSR debate in the context of the post-Cold War era in the 
USA and European institutions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SSR DEBATE IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-COLD WAR ERA IN EUROPEAN 
AND USA INSTITUTIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is composed of four sections.  
The first section is an overview of the genesis of security sector reform (SSR) starting with a 
historical background on how the term gained prominence in the post-Cold War era through the 
various speeches of Short first Minister for International Development in the British Labour 
government. This section also reviews the varied definitions of SSR as given by various scholars 
of SSR and Development studies. It also looks at the state-centred definition of SSR given by the 
UN.  
The second section deals with the rationale behind the SSR in the light of the Post-Cold War 
European development. The section starts by looking at the major reasons for carrying out SSR. 
It then goes on to look at the way SSR programmes were carried out during the reunification of 
East and West Germany. Germany’s SSR programme was a precursor to later SSR programmes 
in Eastern Europe. The section acknowledges that the security sectors of many Western 
European countries can be described as meeting criteria in which SSR practitioners aim at 
civilian controlled, accountable and government monopoly on the use of force.  
The third section looks at selective European demands for SSR in some targeted African 
countries. It also looks at the arbitrary way the European SSR model is being pushed as a 
blueprint that countries in the South should follow. The section highlights that developing 
countries have been cautious about embracing European security sector reforms.  
The fourth section raises concerns about the way the US has placed renewed priority on 
“traditional” security concerns, undermining the human centred approach to security following 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The USA’s approach to SSR is based more on 
patronage and pursuit of its national interest.   
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I conclude the chapter by summarising the main points and introducing the next chapter.. 
4.2 General Historical SSR synopsis 
The Labour government came to power in Britain in 1997. It created the Department for 
International Development (DFID 2000), whose main task was to look into matters of the 
security sector.   
 
The SSR concept was first introduced to the general public in a speech by Short (1998), first 
Minister for International Development.  
 
Brzoska (2003:3), Williams (2000:3), Hendrickson (1999:9-10), and Law (2011:2) note that; 
“the need for comprehensive reform of the ‘security sector’ had been identified earlier, but it was 
the speeches by Short (1998, 1999), and the policy statements by her department (UK DFID 
2000) that made ‘security sector reform’ prominent as a term and as a concept”.  
 
Short, “the UK development minister identified five key areas of SSR that DFID intended to 
promote and these were: 
 Establishing civilian structures over the control of the military; 
 training of the military in international humanitarian and human rights law; 
 coming up with parliamentary oversight of the security sector institutions; 
 involving civilians in the oversight of the security sector; 
 support of demobilization and reintegration programmes of ex-combatants” (Bellamy, 2010) 
 
It was after the Cold War in the late 1990s that most European state armies were downsized, 
military expenditure declined and the role of the military was reduced and defence expenditures 
were placed under increasing scrutiny for transparency Sugden (2003:7). 
 
The argument was that the allocation of these resources to the social sector, namely the areas of 
health and education would better serve the interests of the people Lala (2003:7).Some scholars 
view the end of the Cold War as the genesis of SSR Ball (2004) and Hendrickson (2002). This 
was precipitated by a growing recognition by various scholars of the “development” and “aid” 
community that security and development were intertwined Bellamy (2010). 
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SSR as a concept “came to be used, first by the authors from the development economics school. 
They were concerned about the negative effects of the unreformed security sector to the 
development of the economies in the developing and less developed countries. The implicit 
assumption of the development paradigms has been that the promotion of social development 
and economic growth automatically enhances peace and stability” Yusufi (2004:2). 
 
Duffield (2001:16) observes that, “there has been a noticeable convergence between security and 
development to the extent that they are now seen as interdependent.” SSR has, in the past, been 
conventionally addressed by development departments Fitz-Gerald (2003:1). 
 
For some time, the UK has seen security as a major part of its development focus and as a major 
threat to human security Jackson (2011:1803). Egnell and Halden (2009:28) point out that SSR is 
a concept that was “coined in development policy circles and has received growing attention in 
wider political and policy-oriented circles over a number of years.  
 
SSR is an important concept as it provides an amalgamation of the previously separated fields of 
security and development studies.” 
 
Lilly et al (2002:1) argues that; 
There has been increasing recognition by the donor community including the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank (WB), the UN and the 
European Union (EU) that, in the absence of security, key development objectives and structural 
stability cannot be achieved. Thus, the reform of the security sector is now increasingly seen as a 
means of promoting sustainable peace and development. 
The growing literature on SSR has over the years embodied many themes which are broad and 
diverse. The literature of the origins of SSR can be traced to some of the following works: 
Bendix and Stanley (2008), Law (2007) Ball (2004) and Lilly et al(2002).There is also a diverse 
range of SSR themes which include conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict 
resolution, peace building, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration[DDR] 
Greene(2003), Ebo(2005), Luethold(2002), Rubin(2006), Call and Cousens(2008); development 
and poverty alleviation Abrahamsen and Williams (2006:2), Bendix and Stanley (2008:8-9), 
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Smith(2006), van Veen(2007) and democratization and good governance 
Ebo(2005:3),Ball(2005), Knight(2009) and Hernandez(2005). 
Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002:4) hold that “despite the fact that security sector reform is 
moving up on the international agenda, it remains a new area of activity. There is still no 
consensus on how to define the concept of security sector reform or on what the objectives and 
the priorities for international assistance should be. This is highlighted by the various definitions 
and aims of SSR coming from academics, epistemic communities (think tanks), and security and 
development practitioners.  
According to Greene (2011:2), SSR ranges from relatively modest reforms in one or more 
security sector agency (army, border guards, etc) or its governance (ministry of defence, 
financial oversight, etc) to the thorough transformation of much of the security sector and its 
relationship to government and society.  
Belloncle (2006:2) is of the view that “SSR aims to address a double deficit, that of security and 
democracy”. The concept aims to “transform the security institutions so that they play an 
effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal 
security for their citizens.” 
Omotola (2006:3) in concurrence with Belloncle also points out that “the whole idea of SSR is to 
reposition the security sector in such a way as to adequately equip it to provide security to the 
state and society in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic 
civilian control. In other words SSR is to allow for a good governance of the security sector 
predicated upon the ideals of efficiency, equity and accountability.  
The Department for International Aid (DFID) sees SSR as dealing with various activities ranging 
from governance issues to technical assistance with the aim of improving accountability of SSIs 
(DFID, 2002). For the OECD, SSR is a transformation of the Security Sector in line with 
democratic principles Mcfate (2008). Horn et al (2006:109) argue that reforms of the security 
sector are based on the premise that a professional and accountable security apparatus is a pre-
condition for the stable development of state and society.  
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Other definitions of SSR can be found in the works of Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002), Wulf 
(2004), Fayemi (2004), Brzoska (2003) and Law (2011). 
4.2.1 UN Definition of SSR 
In January 2008, the UN secretary-general (Kofi Anan) released a report on the role of the UN in 
supporting SSR. The report was significant in that it was the UN’s first clear articulation of a 
definition of the security sector and the objectives of security sector reform Mcfate (2008). The 
preparation of the report was done after broad consultation with member states, regional 
organizations, research centres, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN field missions, and 
other stakeholder groups.  
The UN report sees SSR as a process of enhancing democracy within the SSIs. It is therefore 
guided by national decisions or a Security Council mandate, or a General Assembly resolution. 
National ownership should also take precedence and the whole approach should be tailored to a 
country’s specific context Mcfate (2008). 
It must be noted that the UN has made some progress in advancing SSR programmes but much 
more remains to be done. The UN conceptualization of SSR resonates quite well with that put 
forward by the African Union as will be analysed in the coming chapters.  
4.3 The Rationale Behind SSR In Light Of the Post-Cold War European Development 
First, in the event that the security sector becomes dysfunctional or has collapsed altogether and 
thereby highly incapacitated to provide security to the state and its people in an effective and 
efficient way, and equally deficient in its governance, then there is a strong and inevitable need 
for the reform and reconstruction of the security sector Omotola (2006:3). 
 
Second, after-conflict amalgamation of former conflicting parties into the military, police, 
prisons and other security sector institutions there is need for SSR.  
 
The above type of SSR is celebrated in the integration of the Zimbabwe National Liberation 
Army(ZANLA), the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and Rhodesian Army 
Rhodesia Front (RF) into the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) in 1980; the integration of two 
liberation movements, four homelands forces and the apartheid security forces into the South 
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African National Defence Force in 1994 and the integration of RENAMO and FRELIMO 
military personnel into the new Mozambican Defence Force in 1992 Lala (2003:5-
7),Williams(2004:4) and Nathan(2004:5). 
 
The recruitment procedure should also aim to integrate minority ethnic groups into the security 
forces or improve the gender representation among personnel Lily et al (2002:7).  
 
Third, SSR may include enhancing the efficiency or effectiveness of the security sector to meet 
the needs of national security or policing policies and adapting the security sector to changes in 
national security needs and policies Greene (2011:2). 
 
Fourth, raison d’être for SSR is the observance of good governance and democratic oversights. 
Good governance in the security sector implies that the sector is guided by the principles of 
democratic governance and takes a peace building approach to security Ball (2004:509). 
 
Fifth, justification for SSR concerns post-conflict reform. Since 1993, the security sector has 
required development or reform as part of the post conflict reconstruction effort, and conflict 
prevention programmes, following coalition intervention, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
In the above named countries, the Western powers intervened to ‘stabilize’ and to help rebuild 
the infrastructure and institutions, to varying degrees, to allow the rule of law, accountability in 
government and economic growth to proceed Fuery(2005:2) and Mackay et al(2011).  
 
Sixth, the basis for SSR is linked to state building. SSR is a fundamental element of state 
building (the designing of a state’s political institutions) since the provision of security and 
justice sit at the very centre of what states are Jackson(2011:1803),Marquette and Beswick 
(2011)Menocal (2010). 
 
Sedra (2010) has noted that security sector first emerged in the international security and 
development policy arena in the late 1990s. It has now been widely accepted in many countries 
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as a pre-condition for stability and sustainable development in countries recovering from conflict 
or making transitions from authoritarianism, fragility or collapse Sedra (2010:6) and Edmunds 
(2003). According to Ball (2010:29) the Development Assistance Community (DAC) that had 
avoided addressing issues of security in the post 1945 period now champion the SSR concept 
As pointed out from the outset, the SSR concept was advocated for by the United Kingdom 
Secretary of State for Development, Short(2010), Albretch, Stepputat and Andersen (2010). 
Albretch (2010:74) observed that the conception of the SSR took root during the time when there 
was a seismic shift in international thinking on the role that could be played by development 
agencies on issues of defence and security. In line with this, four donor meetings took place in 
The Hague, Tokyo, Berlin and Paris where it was decided that limits could be imposed on the 
military spending of developing countries. 
It was later popularized in different policy statements and papers of DAC and the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with emphasis being placed on democratic 
governance of the security sector. Noteworthy in the 1980s military led or supported 
authoritarianism began to give way to more participatory forms of government, there was an 
increase in publications that scrutinized the role of the military in governance processes and 
security sector development. Academics and practitioners grappled with notions of preventing 
inter-group conflict, intra-state violence and post-conflict reconciliation all of which provided 
valuable input into the concept of security sector reform as it developed in the 1990s Ball 
(1988),Germann and Edmunds(2003),Abrahamsen and Williams(2006). 
Sedra (2010) posits that the strategic primacies of major powers began to change with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the move towards political liberalization in Eastern Europe. 
This created space for issues of governance, poverty reduction and conflict prevention to enter 
the development and security assistance agendas of OECD countries, development donors begun 
to discuss the possible linkages between security and development. It was in this context that the 
appropriate role of development assistance to bolster security in developing and transition 
countries was also interrogated. This saw to the beginning of dialogue between development and 
security donors. 
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The above discussion offered the opportunity to observe that there is pressure on developing 
nations to focus more on developmental issues (human security) rather than state security. There 
was emphasis on the need to reduce poverty and avoid conflicts that are bedevilling developing 
nations, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. However, despite the involvement of donor 
communities and developed Western countries in funding and managing SSR and development 
projects, conflict is still prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa.  One can therefore argue that there are 
deficiencies in the manner in which SSR processes are being structured and funded by donors 
and the West. It can further be argued that as long as the local content of the host nation is not 
included in the SSR process the exercise is bound to fail. 
The moral considerations that spice the need for SSR to take on board human security concerns 
as in reducing poverty and increasing development are highly plausible. The devil in the detail 
surfaces when weaker nations are coerced into undertaking reforms in accordance with the 
dictates of the western purse holder. When SSRs fail to deliver and a country remains a soft 
target of both internal and external threats as revealed in the case of the DRC, among other 
African countries, the ethical aspect of imposing SSRs becomes questionable to the point of 
announcing itself as unethical. 
This study therefore concerns itself seriously with the ethical imperatives of SSRs and findings 
so far expose the insincerity of donors in pushing for security reforms which weaken both state 
security and human security and allow for plunder of national resources and derailment of the 
economic development of the recipient country. It can therefore be argued that the rationale of 
SSRs done at the instigation and discretion of countries with stronger economies also becomes 
questionable and therefore as unacceptable from an ethical point of view.  
 
4.3.1 Security Sector Reform: The Unification of West and East German Armies 
Germany was governed by the occupying powers that had emerged victorious in the 2
nd
 World 
War. Two Germany states emerged, the West became known as the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) and the East German state became known as the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR). 
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The FRG developed into a stable and mature democracy discarding the traditionally held notion 
of German militarism. Fattas (2009:2) observed that the FRG‘s military forces were put under 
the control of parliament or the Bundeswehr The military was under the Inspector-general who 
was in-turn accountable to the minister of defence. This measure of putting the military, police 
and other security forces of the FRG under the control of parliament proved sustainable, 
effective and supportive of the rule of law. This resulted in successful and democratic security 
sector development in a post-conflict country. 
After the collapse of the GDR, after the end of the Cold War, its people chose not to reform their 
state but to liquidate it. They chose to merge their territory into the FRG. At first this was 
problematic but the restructuring exercise was a success. Hundreds of thousands of East 
Germany soldiers, police officers and spies were demobilized and many of them were inducted 
into the security forces of the FRG. Though it was a difficult process that met stiff resistance 
from various quarters, the FRG and the evolution of its security sector has been a success. 
Germany has at times been criticized for its antimilitarism but its armed forces and police are 
praised for their professionalism and their human rights record.  
According to Duffield (2001:74) following the end of the Cold War, security of the individual 
rather than the state became a priority for the international community rather than the particular 
state’s priority. This was mainly because war and conflict had become topical in the 
development discourse. This led to the ‘securitisation of development,’ in the sense that lack of 
development is perceived to be a result of insecurity. This idea was first mooted in the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID). This was because the UK through DFID was 
key in shaping SSR related thinking in Sierra Leone and Uganda. From then on the idea has 
become multilateral, first within the framework of Development Assistance Committee of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) and then within the 
multilateral framework of the European Union and the United Nations.  
It must be pointed out that by 2010 there was no coherent SSR concept in Europe. Denmark and 
other European countries did not have an SSR policy position, even though there is a particular 
European approach that has emerged. In Europe SSR is ‘holistic,’ in scope and ‘politically 
sensitive’ in approach Albrecht et.al (2010: 74). They posit that SSR must be developmental and 
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focus must be on the governability of a country’s internal and external security institutions and 
democratic accountability.  
However Ball, Goodfellows and Putzel (2008) observed that many development agencies across 
Europe are still reluctant to engage in implementing security related activities that would involve 
interfacing with armed forces and intelligence services. At an OECD DAC plebiscite held in 
Ottawa in 1997, emphasis was put on strengthening budgetary decision making processes in 
recipient countries.  
According to Omitoogun and Hutchful (2008) the ‘developmental approaches’ to military 
expenditure and performance was further advanced at a DFID meeting in which it emerged that 
policy formulation, budgeting and implementation in the defence sector should be handled in the 
same manner as in other areas of public sector. This entailed that there must be transparency, 
accountability and comprehensiveness on issues to do with the security sector. This new 
approach was dubbed the ‘process’ or ‘governance’ approach in which sound good governance 
practices and sound financial principles with security issues would be fused in the security 
sector.  
Brzoska (2003: 7) observed that:  
The role of the security forces directly impact on opportunities for sustainable development, since 
basic security is a precondition of economic development….reducing expenditure on security 
forces frees resources for social investment and poverty reduction….greater participation in 
security policy and access to security is expected to make policies more responsive to the concerns 
of the poor as well as strengthening democracy by guaranteeing transparency and accountability in 
this (and closed) area of policy.   
Wulf (2004) noted that in the Netherlands SSR became a vehicle for furthering civil-military 
cooperation. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and German advocated for the merging of 
the security and developmental domains from which the SSR concept was emerging in the 
European context. Discussions by the EU and UN were focused on stopping conflict and 
preventing their occurrence. They agreed that the weaknesses of government control in the 
global South is a direct threat to the security of Western states hence state building had to be a 
central aspect of SSR.  
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According to the OECD, “this type of engagement should maintain a tight focus on improving 
governance and capacity in the most basic security, justice, economic and social service delivery 
functions.” (OECD 2005a:1)  European countries are of the view that SSR has to occupy an 
increasingly central and crucial position in crisis management and fragile state policy. Gross 
(2008) 
The OECD’s positionality is that “the security sector in a given country must be able to meet the 
security needs of both the state and the people in a manner consistent with democratic norms, 
good governance and the rule of law.” (OECD: 2005 b). According to Andersen (2006), the 
European view of SSR is that it must emphasize the necessity of approaching not any one 
security provider but security providers as a system of actors, in the process addressing the 
overlapping fields of security, law, enforcement and justice at the same time. This application of 
the ‘holistic approach’ and its focus on the governance aspect of all involved in the security 
nexus is a characteristic of the European SSR which one can argue is only applied in Western 
Europe. 
4.4 The European Impact on SSR 
Ball (2010) posits that the European involvement in funding the SSR to countries that went 
through the SSR process during the Cold War era impacted negatively on the peace and stability 
in Eastern Europe countries. The crux of the matter was that their financial bail-outs were viewed 
to have been intentionally given to foster strategic interactions with countries that supported their 
capitalist ideologies Ball (2010: 29). Most recipients of Western financial aid were authoritarian 
governments or governments that had come to power through military coups. 
Though the European concept of SSR is commendable, it raises a lot of questions that call for 
academic reflection. Among these are, the interest of Europe in wanting African security 
institutions to be democratic. What form of democracy is the West advocating for, given its 
horrendous interaction with Africa in the past, seen in the form of slavery and colonialism? What 
is also of concern is the fact that Europe and its cohorts are viewed as selective in their call for 
SSR in Africa. Europe has not called for SSR in the Ivory Coast, the Central African Republic 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo where it has been ‘fingered’ to be involved in the 
prevailing insecurity. Doro (2010) and Williams (2006) argue that Europe is fond of saying right 
and acting left.   
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The European security sector reform suffers from a lot of deficiencies as argued by Doro (2010). 
It can be argued that SSR in Africa is viewed as an externally driven concept that is being foisted 
on some African states. Arguably it does not respond to the needs of non-OECD countries.  
The European SSR model presupposes that it is mandatory for countries in the global South to 
willingly accept the security sector reforms that they are selling. They erroneously ignore or 
brush aside a very fundamental aspect of SSR; the principle of ownership. The principle of 
ownership is the ‘life-blood’ of any successful and commendable security sector reform because 
it is crucial and inviolable.  
Bendix and Stanely (2008) posit that “there is no consistent approach to SSR, and that in 
practice, the concept fails to live up to its innovative potential. For this potential to become 
reality, the SSR dialogue needs to take voices and experiences from the global South into 
account rather than merely reflect on donor perspectives.” Williams (2002) also echoed the same 
sentiments. He opined that an indigenisation of the concept is required if SSR is to be taken 
seriously by African governments. 
It will indeed be a plausible argument that the Eurocentric concept of SSR is aimed at weakening 
rather than democratizing the military in targeted African states. Sugden (2003 therefore 
questions for whom SSR is being designed as well as the criteria being used to carry out the 
reforms. On the other hand Sedra (2010: 16-18) also observed that stakeholders in SSR have 
encountered serious challenges in that they have failed to apply it programmatically to bridge the 
gap between policy and practice. Notably it is also highly ambitious hence the reason why it has 
become very difficult to implement.  
Sedra (2010) observed that: 
Donor states lack the necessary wherewithal, institutional framework and long term outlook to 
understand the type of transformative agenda entailed in SSR. To apply it successfully it requires a 
radical change in the modus operandi of donor states in how they provide assistance, something 
they have been unable or are unwilling to embrace. 
Basing on the discussion above, one can argue that the European concept of SSR could be 
viewed as deficient in that it does not critically address Africa’s SS concerns. It can be observed 
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and indeed argued that the failure to fully embrace African values and sensibilities appears wilful 
and therefore calculated to side-line the security interests of African countries.  
4.5 SSR and USA National Interests 
 It should be noted that the US government does not have a doctrine or common terminology on 
what constitutes SSR. This is primarily due to the inherent difficulty in implementing SSR 
programmes and the lack of a clear SSR policy within the US administration Mcfate (2008:11). 
Meharg et al (2010) point out that the US actually relies on more articulated European models of 
SSR. The United States’ SSR agenda is heavily aligned with the agendas of the UN, OECD, and 
the EU, which contributes to an overall cohesive SSR strategy within the international 
community (ibid: 18). 
Isima (2010:334) points out that: 
The UK, for instance, has a far richer understanding of SSR than the US and has made more 
progress in integrating this knowledge into its international development assistance. Instead of a 
holistic SSR model, the US has preferred traditional security (more military) assistance — usually 
the train-and-equip model — even though there are indications that this is likely to change in the 
future. 
 The US has always viewed SSR as training and equipping foreign forces which, in a way, is not 
comprehensive reform since SSR covers various aspects such as, “ensuring the safety of citizens 
as the primary goal of state security policy; greater emphasis to be placed on the role of civilian 
actors in formulating and managing security policy; and different means of achieving security 
objectives must be acknowledged” Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002:178). 
The US SSR model was largely developed for post-conflict as well as for post-authoritarian 
environments that would require assistance with carving out political conditions for appropriate 
SSR. 
Jackson (2009:47) notes that:  
This partly goes back to a difference in definition between the United States and other agents 
engaged in SSR activities, with the United States taking a very narrow view of SSR as training 
whereas much work on SSR elsewhere by NGOs like the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces or by the British government in Sierra Leone, has been concerned with civilian 
control over armed forces, that has incorporated, but not been limited to, military training and 
equipment. 
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The US National Security Strategy(2006) suggests that the goal of US statecraft is to contribute 
to a world of legitimate, effectively governed states that provide for the needs of their citizens 
and conduct activities responsibly within the international system Meharg et al (2010:18). 
In recent years, the US government has made important advances in SSR capabilities and 
capacities, but these advances are limited to separate SSR functions. US military forces have 
engaged in training and equipping foreign military forces in partner countries Mcfate (2008:13). 
The US’s SSR strategy grounded on military capacitating of African security sectors has had a 
number of implications. This approach has led to the support of unpopular, repressive regimes 
that are supportive of American strategic interests, as happened in Libya and Egypt.  
It can be argued that the USA’s approach to SSR is more based on patronage and pursuit of its 
national interest. The USA’s militarization of friendly African governments has seen a 
willingness of these states to use force in achieving their own domestic objectives.  
Rwanda and Uganda’s military support to DRC rebels bear testimony to how African states have 
abused US military aid to their advantage.  
Jackson (2009:46) observes that: 
The existing presence of the American military in Djibouti, for example, along with military 
intervention in support of the ‘War on Terror’ has undoubtedly given credence to the argument that 
the War on Terror is in fact a ‘War on Islam’. The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia and the 
subsequent American attempt at bombing the Islamic Front leadership led to the militarization of 
several Islamic groups (mainly Sufi) and an increase in conflict in the Horn. 
The US’s reliance on the military for the achievement of strategic aims effectively undermines 
some SSR goals and it also means that the relationship between security and development, which 
is clearly a critical one, becomes unbalanced.  
Sherman (2008:59) is of the view that “this security assistance has often undermined or 
contradicted principles of democratic governance, reinforcing repression and radicalisation.”  
The implication of this is clearly that alternative approaches to the long-term development and 
security of Africa are significantly weakened by the use of military force to achieve the strategic 
aims of the US.  
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Despite all these facts the USA believes that, the key principle in successful SSR is building host 
nation capacities and transitioning security sector power to the ownership of the host nation. The 
idea that they will eventually be taking over the reins of their interconnected sectors is viewed by 
the US as a key to successful reforms Meharg et al (2010:9). 
However, it can be argued that the above endeavours have produced the opposite effect, as the 
capacitated security sector (which is more like a model of the US security sector) ends up safe 
guarding American agendas at the expense of civilian security interests as evidenced in 
Afghanistan and Iraq Mcfate (2008:13). 
4.5.1 SSR and the Protection of American Interests 
The events of September 11, 2001, (the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington), led to a 
renewed interest in the African continent, prompting a shift in US Africa policy driven by its 
global war on terror Bah and Aning (2008:118). 
 
This shift was reflected in the 2002 National Security Strategy, which stated that  ‘The events of 
September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states . . . can pose as great danger to our national 
interests as strong states Fuery (2005:3). 
 
Since the attacks of 9/11, there has been a growing emphasis by the US on the linkages between 
under-development and insecurity. Fragile states are perceived as generating undesirable 
dynamics and problems not only at the domestic level, but also in terms of the spill-over effects 
associated with conflict, instability, terrorism, trafficking and organised violence, among others 
Menocal (2010:6).  
 
The African continent has increasingly come to be perceived by the US Administration as a 
source of conflict, international terrorism, bad-governance, authoritarianism, drug-trafficking, 
thus a direct threat to America’s security. US presidents Bush and his successor Barrack Obama 
fully embraced the US’s internal security concerns which aim at preventing ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ 
states in Africa from providing sanctuary to terrorist groups.  
 
The promotion of good governance in Africa is a key priority for the American government.  
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Washington’s approach to SSR requires an application of democratic principles on institutions 
responsible for the control and oversight of the security sector. However, Sherman (2008:60) is 
of the view that, “following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US and other 
governments placed renewed priority on traditional security concerns.” This, in a way, 
demonstrates that even in established democracies such as that of the US, the principles and 
values that are the basis for SSR are undermined when these states are faced with threats to 
national security.  
 
SSR in Africa has been associated with restructuring, downsizing, professionalizing and 
increasing the accountability of security actors.  
 
However, the US after 9/11 is a good example that SSR may be aimed at improving operational 
effectiveness to counter threats. This view is, however, rarely encouraged in Africa with the 
exception applicable only to those countries deemed friendly to the Americans. It is therefore 
unsurprising, that Djibouti, for example, received US$31 million for allowing the United States 
to establish a permanent base there.  
 
In 2002, US special operations forces supplied weapons, vehicles and military training to 
counter-terrorism teams in Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania. This permanent US task-force 
base, though not specifically for peace operations, means that US forces can be deployed at short 
notice to areas of concern Bah and Aning (2008:125). 
 
The US’s SSRs are thus geared more towards supporting friendly African governments and sub-
regional organizations than those deemed less friendly and this is done in order to actively 
pursue US strategic interests by establishing security and military links on the continent. 
 
Basing on the above discussion one can note that America supports friendly African states with 
finance and military hardware which one can say is used to protect American interests rather 
than African values and principles which guided the liberation of the continent from colonial 
rule. It can be argued that America’s practice leaves one to question the morality and sincerity of 
some African leaders in dealing with African sensibilities such as SSR. 
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The envisaged US Africa Command (AFRICOM) is another US defence policy that intends to 
further its security and military agendas on the African continent. Ford (2014:11) observes that 
in 2013 AFRICOM carried out activities in every country on the African continent except 
Western Sahara, Guinea Bissau, Eritrea, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Somalia. Consistent 
with new US strategic mandates, AFRICOM aims to help stabilise weak African states. The 
major objective of AFRICOM is to strengthen African countries’ security capabilities through 
security co-operation Mcfate (2008). 
However, Ndiaye and Africa (2008) argue that AFRICOM should support and complement, 
rather than weaken and undermine SSR in Africa. 
Jackson (2009:46) is quick to point out that: 
A mandate that supports states in order to carry out strategic aims based on oil, counterterrorism, 
and countering China is a pseudo-Cold War structure that involves supporting friendly rather than 
‘good’ states. Clearly the operational aims of AFRICOM, as articulated by its commander, require 
American support for strong states that are friendly to American strategic aims on the continent. 
Nathan (2009) casts a lot of doubt on the US Administration’s attempt to have a military 
command centre in Africa. He argues that the establishment of an American military command 
centre would increase US power, as well as divide and destabilise some African countries. This 
in a way would undermine state sovereignty as well as the status and influence of regional 
powers such as South Africa in southern Africa and Nigeria in West Africa.  
It can also be argued that the US military would have an advantage in over throwing African 
governments as well as attacking countries and organisations perceived to be threats to American 
interests. The claim by US officials that AFRICOM is primarily intended to further Africa’s 
security and development has no credibility in most African countries.  
Ford (2014:11) argues that: 
AFRICOM ensnares the militaries of the continent in dependence on the Pentagon, African 
sovereignty is greatly compromised. Many millions are at risk from the very presence of a military 
command whose reason-for-being is instability and war. AFRICOM’s mission is to lock the 
continent in a cage of steel, to imprison it in the imperial orbit, and to patrol the continental prison 
with dependent African armies. 
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Nathan (2009) asserts that America is mainly motivated by its own interests that include a stable 
supply of oil from Africa; hegemony over Africa’s resources; countering Chinese economic and 
political interests in Africa and also hunting down Islamic terrorists groups found in some 
Eastern, Western and Northern African countries. 
 
Basing on the arguments above, it can be argued that the US administration has the capabilities 
to pursue its national interests whilst at the same time undermining African interests. The 
conclusion can be that the US’s SSR unlike that of the EU has no firm commitment to 
democratisation as on several occasions the US has been seen to use force in the advancement of 
its national interests.  
 
Smith (2001) argues that countries such as the US take themselves as champions in the 
promotion of SSR initiatives yet they are also leaders in arms trade. It therefore becomes quite 
questionable when countries which purport to support SSR programmes also end up selling 
destructive military equipment to the very countries they seek to reform. 
 
Thus the response to 9/11 and the terror attacks that occurred in Europe and elsewhere, suggest 
that when faced with extreme and unexpected violence, the tenets of democratic governance, 
morality, accountability and transparency are not absolute, even among the major proponents of 
democracy. What has been witnessed over the years is the willingness of a democratic state such 
as the US to make decisions that undermine and erode the guiding principles behind the call for 
SSR.  
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I started by noting that the concept of security sector reform was first put forward 
to a larger public in a speech by  Short in 1998. The Labour government that came to power in 
Britain in 1997 appointed Short as first Minister for International Development in the newly-
created Department for International Development (DFID). 
The need for comprehensive reform of the ‘security sector’ had been identified earlier, but it was 
the speeches by Short in 1998 and 1999, and the policy statements by her department UK DFID 
that made ‘security sector reform’ prominent as a term and as a concept.  
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The first observation was that various definitions of SSR were also given in this section 
including that of the UN which is mainly concerned with local ownership. A common 
terminology on the concept does not yet exist despite various attempts by the OECD, DFID, UN 
and many other organisations which have an interest in SSR. This clearly demonstrates the slow 
pace of progress since the 1990s, when the concept was first put forward. 
The second observation was that the European Union has quite a different perspective of SSR 
from their American counterparts.  
The European perspective of SSR is firmly rooted in the tradition of constructing liberal peace 
and, therefore, a liberal state as propounded by Kant (1795) in his ‘democratic peace’ thesis. 
Close analysis of the European conceptions of SSR show that they are more interested in a 
democratized security sector which is accountable to citizens.  
The Europeans’ idea of SSR is based on the new paradigm of human security.  
The security sectors of the West European countries, though democratic to a certain extent, are 
not similar at all in their set up, command structure or the ways in which they are administered. It 
is interesting to note that there were no calls or demands from civic groups or international 
organisations that propelled security forces to have a security sector which fulfils certain 
democratic principles. On the contrary, these institutions grew naturally in response to the 
demands of the circumstances and societies in which they were situated.  
The third observation was that the absence of a multilateral, holistic, integrated, coordinated, and 
comprehensive approach to SSR has produced one-sided Euro-centric models and programmes 
with limited and, at times, counterproductive impacts. The European view of SSR tends to 
undermine African initiatives of SSR. This has been seen by some African countries as a way of 
weakening rather than democratizing the security sector in targeted African countries. 
 
The fourth observation was that the US Administration sees SSR as a way of enhancing and 
capacitating the security sector to make it more efficient in discharging its duties. The American 
concept of SSR is grounded on the notion of traditional security. Empirical evidence suggests 
that the Americans have in many instances undermined human security for state (traditional) 
security. The military intervention in unjustified wars in some parts of Africa and the Middle 
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East is clear testimony to this. It has also been observed that the USA’s approach is more based 
on patronage and pursuit of its national interest.  
 
Evidence in the given literature shows that USA security assistance to its African and the Middle 
Eastern allies has led to the sustenance of repressive regimes that are supportive of American 
strategic interests as has happened in Bahrain, Egypt and Libya. Washington’s perspective of 
SSR has more to do with promoting its foreign policy goals as well as maintaining a foot-print 
on the African continent.   
 
This leaves one questioning the morality, sincerity and wisdom of those calling for SSR in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
It could be argued that teleological moral theories that locate moral goodness in consequences of 
behaviour and not the behaviour itself are applicable where the moral blameworthiness of US 
SSR seeks to advance the strategic interests of the US without regard for human security as it 
relates to economic development and democratisation of political space of recipient countries. 
Indeed it can be argued that the US pays lip service to the tenets of democracy, good governance, 
the rule of law, human rights, transparency and accountability when it props up dictatorships and 
military regimes that are prepared to be patronized by the US. 
 
The European model of SSR is not only a one-size fits all approach but is equally patronising as 
reforms are done as determined by the purse holder and not as informed by the needs, 
circumstances, cultures and moral values of the recipient country. It can be argued that African 
countries that are rich in resources are targeted for SSR only to weaken them and render them 
vulnerable to both internal and external threats as seen with the DRC, among others. 
 
AFRICOM, an American brainchild that purports to strengthen defensive and offensive 
capabilities of African states, ironically also sells advanced and lethal military hardware to 
African countries thereby creating fertile ground for the fomenting of hostilities among African 
states. It can be argued that the serious inroads by China into Africa is worrisome to the US with 
the real likelihood of some African states being used to fight proxy wars that are traced to the 
trade rivalry of the US and China. 
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AFRICOM in its present consummation is like putting a wall around the African continent for 
the exclusive purpose of protecting and advancing America’s sphere of influence as well as 
deepening the strategic interests of America. 
 
It is not unreasonable to imagine the continent of Africa being reduced to a soccer pitch were the 
only teams come from the ranks of the Americans, the Europeans and the Chinese. 
 
It can therefore be argued that for as long as Africa lacks the resources to device, design and 
define its security interests and accompanying SSRs, neither Europe nor America can bring 
peace and stability to the continent, thus rendering Africa vulnerable to destabilisation by both 
internal and external predators.  
 
It can thus be said that externally imposed SSRs tend to weaken the sovereignty of African 
states, with the result that anarchy will prevail in circumstances where the legitimate 
socioeconomic and political aspirations of citizens are not satisfied. When the sovereignty of a 
state is at stake and anarchy fills the vacuum, it can be argued that the means with which 
outsiders sought to advance security and human interests of African states were anchored on 
selfish and unethical premises. 
 
It is noted that Africa’s unenviable sad circumstances are not limited to a history of colonialism 
but also to a post-colonial era where African leaders have so far been grossly corrupt, 
unaccountable and thus lacking leadership. 
 
With functional African governments, led by responsible and accountable leaders, it can be 
argued that it will be possible for Africa to use its own resources to create its own SSRs that will 
guarantee Africa a certain measure of independence with which to protect its sovereignty and 
prevent anarchy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF SSR IN POST-COLONIALAFRICA SOUTH OF THE 
SAHARA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I reviewed previous research studies on the evolution of security sector 
reform discourse with particular focus on the post-cold-war era with a view to demonstrating the 
reasons for calls for security sector reform (SSR) in Europe. I also touched on the link between 
development and SSR and showed how development debates in Europe influenced calls for SSR.  
Building on the previous chapter, the present chapter reviews literature on reasons behind calls 
for SSR in sub-Saharan Africa. As already indicated in chapter two, one of the central concerns 
of this thesis is to examine the strong belief among some scholars that the SS in Africa has been 
primarily responsible for most of the coupe d’états that have bedevilled the continent, and that 
military rule has been responsible for the economic underdevelopment in many African states. 
This necessitates reviewing literature on coups as part of fulfilment of the goals of this study.  
This chapter gives a critical analysis on some factors that have led to the calls for SSR on the 
African continent. Section two looks at the general ethical implication of SSR on state 
sovereignty and anarchy. Section three discusses SSR vis-a-vis economic development. From 
there I proceed to raise concerns about military coups and corruption in Latin America, in 
general, and Africa in particular.  
In this chapter it is argued that in countries where the elites or military take-over state power 
through a coup, economic growth and development are greatly undermined. 
5.2 General Ethical Implications on State Sovereignty and Anarchy 
The origins of the term ‘sovereignty’ is assumed to have been coined by a 16
th
 century French 
philosopher, Jean Bodin in denoting the supremacy of the state’s authority over a defined 
territory and population, Bodin (1576: 27-40).He links the idea of sovereignty to the 1648 Treaty 
(or peace) of Westphalia. The treaty, consisted of other treaties, the most prominent of which 
were (Treaty of Muster and the Treaty of Osnabruck)signed between the Holy Emperor 
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Ferdinand III, the German Princes, Spain, France, Sweden and the Dutch Republic 
representatives in 1648 to end a long period of intermittent wars (the Thirty Year War and Eight 
Years) in Europe (new World Encyclopaedia). The Treaty is viewed to promote the ethic of 
state-centric security interests and preserve national interests, territoriality, human security and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of another state.  
These principles in the Treaty of Westphalia were later to inform the construct of the United 
Nations Charter. By their design, these Treaties sought to enhance the protection of peace and 
security especially at a time when Europe was emerging from long years of violent instability 
(anarchy). 
At the centre of this model lay the ethic of state-centric security with its distinct values on the 
need to preserve national sovereignty, territoriality, human security, non-interference in the 
internal affairs of another state.  
It is for these reasons that sovereignty can be understood within the context of supremacy and 
independence of authority in respect to internal matters and relationships with other powers, 
including the absence of non-consensual interference by other sovereign states leaving a state 
morally obligated to provide its own state and human security. 
In other instances a state would be regarded as lacking sovereignty if it fails to meet certain 
moral requirements such as effective control in the maintenance of law and order or if it is 
deemed as inhumanly treating its citizens to an extent that justifies military intervention.  
Holzgrefe, (2003) contends that if a state was to partially lose territorial control and still retain 
some limited domestic authority this would not necessarily be regarded as loss of sovereignty. 
However, he concludes that a state’s sovereignty maybe regarded as lost in situations where the 
protection of people’s human security diminishes. 
As discussed in Chapters one and two a state is regarded as sovereign when it can provide 
security within its borders (state security) and to its citizens (human security). However, if that 
fails, the state is viewed as having migrated into situations of anarchy thus creating ethical 
implications on sovereignty and anarchy. One can argue that a state is said to have failed to 
provide people with adequate security in situations where security apparatus such as the military 
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are weak and ineffective. In this regard, SSR that seeks to democratise or capacitates the SSIs 
becomes morally inevitable as discussed in Chapters one and two. 
5.3 African SSR from the Economic Development School of Thought 
When the Cold War came to an end, economic development theorists began to call for defence 
expenditures to be placed under parliamentary and civilian scrutiny for transparency. During the 
Cold War period, a lot of European states’ resources had been channelled towards defence and 
billions of dollars had been spent in maintaining and sustaining a strong security sector.  
Development experts within the European continent began to question whether it was ethical to 
channel most of the resources towards defence rather than to other sectors such as health, 
education, social welfare, and infrastructure development. Since then, security sector reform 
(SSR) has increasingly become an integral part of development policy in both developed and 
developing countries.  
This new development called for a broader definition of security with a major goal of moving 
away from the traditional notion of security which had mainly concerned itself with military 
defence and regime survival towards a more human-centred approach based on the well-being 
and freedom of people.  
Unlike in Europe, where calls for SSR had more to do with the reduction of the military and 
security expenditure, in Africa, inefficient, corrupt and brutal security forces were seen as an 
anti-thesis to development and fertile platform for fomenting anarchy. 
With the above in mind, Brzoska (2003) called for African security institutions to provide for 
better protection for individuals and society as a whole. However, this aspect is still problematic 
in most African countries as Jean (2005:251) notes that “over the past decade, sub-Saharan 
Africa has been plagued by conflicts (including coups), mostly of an internal nature, that have 
had a tremendous impact on the level of development of several countries of the region.” 
Sharing the same sentiments, Ebo (2007:27) states that “the record of (African) security sector 
institutions … justifies the conclusion that they often function more to threaten, rather than 
protect the basic human security needs of the population, which they ostensibly serve.” The 
relationship between the security sector and the ordinary people tends to be exploitative and 
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predatory, in which individuals and groups are more victims rather than beneficiaries of the 
state’s resources as in Zaire under Joseph Mobutu, Burkina Faso under Blaise Compaoré, 
Nigeria under Ibrahim Babangida, and Sierra Leone under Captain Valentine Strasser.  
The security sector, in situations highlighted above, becomes an albatross to development. In 
most cases, when the security sector becomes predatory as alluded to by Ebo (2007) citizens’ 
basic freedoms and rights are undermined thus breeding despondency within the state which 
might retard or inhibit social, political and economic development as exemplified by Zaire 
(DRC) 1960s-90s, Nigeria 1970s-early 1990s and Burkina Faso 1980s-2014. 
Ebo (2007) further notes that in such circumstances as described above, people’s lives and 
investments are constantly threatened and in the end this undermines economic development.  
From the foregoing, there appears to be some dimensions of commonality in the way an 
unreformed security sector can be an impediment to economic and political development. Ebo 
(2007) points out that development can never thrive in a state where the security sector is 
corrupt, unaccountable and is above the law as in Nigeria under the years of military rule.  
It would seem that, Ebo believes that a reformed security sector can be a means for conflict 
prevention and sustainable human development as seen within the South African National 
Defence Force.  
Development theorists have always argued that among the myriad factors that can lead to 
economic development of a state the notion of a professional security sector should not be 
ignored. This has led authors like Smith (2001), Nathan (2004), Wulf (2004) and Africa (2008) 
to laud the South African SSR exercise as a significant success story that paved way for peace 
and stability which are vital for economic development.   
Ball and Hendrickson (2006) also highlight that security of people is an essential aspect for 
sustainable development and democratization. To this end, one can applaud Ball and 
Hendrickson (2006:25) for arguing that“ a safe and secure environment for people, communities 
and states is an essential co-condition for sustainable economic, political and social development 
and conflict mitigation” These views are closely related to Hänggi’s (2004) observations that a 
poorly managed and governed security sector can act as a spoiler for development efforts as 
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evidenced in Liberia 1980 (Samuel Doe), Sierra Leone 1992 (Captain Strasser), and Gambia 
1994 (Yayah Jammeh).Poor leadership as a result of despotic tendencies created situations of 
anarchy in the countries mentioned above. 
In the security sector discourse there is therefore a growing appreciation that SSR is critical in 
achieving a safe and secure environment essential for economic development in Africa. Sadly, 
the African security sector (SS) has been considered an impediment to economic development. 
In this regard, military coups in some African countries have created military governments that 
have been not been accountable to anyone. 
Nordlinger (1977:197) contends that the performance of military regimes is “significantly and 
almost consistently poorer than that of civilian governments.” He maintains that military regimes 
have not succeeded in achieving any economic progress, neither on traditional lines in terms of 
G.N.P. growth, industrialization and agricultural output, nor in terms of the redistribution of 
industrial and landed wealth and the ,expansion of social services and welfare programmes 
Wiking(1983). 
It will therefore be highlighted in the subsequent chapters that, once the armed forces take 
control in a country, they are often confronted by the same sort of political, cultural, social and 
economic problems which may have beset the ousted government. Investors fail to have 
confidence in such self-imposed governments as looting of state coffers usually becomes the 
order of the day. This will be the main focus of the subsequent sections.  
5.4 Defining Coup d’états 
A coup d’état, can be defined as the unexpected overthrow and political exit of a government 
against the general will of the citizenry. It is a machination and capture of power by a small but 
well organised group that threatens, or uses force to replace those in power. According to Eliot 
Cohen a coup d’état is a breakdown of civilian control of the military. It may or may not be 
violent in nature, and it is different from a revolution, which is usually staged by a larger group 
and radically alters the political system Ikome (2000:7).  
However, it must be noted that, in most instances a coup involves the control of some active 
portion of the military, while counterweighing the remainder of the country’s armed forces. The 
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coup plotters capture or expel leaders, and take physical control of important government offices, 
strategic means of communication and the physical infrastructure.  
According to Edward Luttwak a coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of 
the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from its control Luttwak 
(1968:21). 
Coup d’états are also defined by Powell and Thyne (2011:252) as “illegal and overt attempts by 
the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive.” A coup can 
only become successful if its opponents fail to dislodge the plotters, allowing them to consolidate 
their position; the plotters obtain the surrender or consent of the population, the surviving armed 
forces, and the sitting government; and they claim legitimacy.  
The general trend in this review suggests that a coup is carried out by a small segment of the 
security sector and there is also a general agreement that coups are carried out in order to replace 
those who are in the reigns of governmental power, usually the executive.  
For purposes of this thesis the definition of coups by Powell and Thyne (2011) will be used.  
The above the two scholars have been credited with coming up with a clearer and extensive 
definition of what underlies a coup. They suggest that the target of a coup is most likely the chief 
executive (president or prime minister depending on the political set up). Powell and Thyne 
argue that the perpetrators of a coup come from elites who are part of the state apparatus and in 
most cases they are usually military officers. They also note that the tactics of a coup must be 
illegal, clearly differentiating it from a coup occasioned by political pressures that might force a 
leader to resign. 
Coups are therefore either bloody or bloodless.  
According to Ikome (2000), bloodless coups are those in which either the mere threat of violence 
suffices to force the incumbent government to relinquish power. Conversely, a bloody coup is 
one in which the incumbent ignores or is unaware of the threats of violence, and is forcefully 
dislodged from power, alive or dead, with other human and material casualties, the scale to 
which may differ depending on the force applied, and the level of resistance.  
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Coups may also be either internally stimulated or externally instigated, or may be a product or a 
combination of both.  
Huntington (1968:196-336), identified three major types of coups, namely: breakthrough, 
guardian, and veto coups.  
Breakthrough coups are those in which a revolutionary army takes over a traditional government 
and become the new ruling elite. These types of coups are usually led by non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs) or junior officers. Examples of such coups are the 1952 coup in Egypt, 1967 
coup in Greece and the 1980 coup in Liberia Ikome (2000:8).  
The guardian coups, also known as ‘musical chairs’, are those in which the reasons for ouster of 
regimes in power are to improve public order and efficiency, or to end corruption (corrective 
regimes). There are hardly any major changes in the organization of power, and the leaders of 
these types of coups depict their actions as a temporary but unfortunate inevitability. Nations that 
have experienced guardian coups usually undergo many changes between civilian and military 
governments.  
Veto coups occur when the army sanctions mass participation and social mobilisation. In these 
cases, the army must confront and suppress large scale and broad-based opposition, and these 
coups tend to be bloody. Examples include Chile in 1973 and Argentina in 1976, as well as the 
overthrow of president Fujimori of Peru in 2000 (Huntington, 1968:198-336). 
Veto and guardian coups are usually led by senior officers while breakthrough coups tend to be 
led by junior officers or NCOs. In instances where the coup is staged by junior officers or 
enlisted men, it is regarded as mutiny, usually with disturbing repercussions for the 
organisational structure of the military. 
5.5 Reasons behind the Occurrence of Coups 
Nowadays, the reasons behind the occurrence of coups are becoming more and more varied as 
evidenced by the fact that more studies in the humanities and social sciences are looking at the 
issue from a different point of view.  
Depending on their scope of study, various scholars have tended to look at the origins of coups 
from divergent perspectives.  
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Each coup d’état has been seen to have different origins, causes and effects. Initially it was 
thought that coups in Africa were mainly related to the weakness of civilian governments in 
Africa, but as some findings in this chapter will indicate, there are actually varied reasons behind 
the occurrence of coups, and they are not only limited to the above idea. Therefore, I have 
assigned this section to talk about the origin of coups as highlighted mostly by different scholars 
in the fields of security where this thesis is situated.  
Kieh and Agbese (2004) are of the view that coups are caused as a result of a strong urge by the 
military to restore democracy in an authoritarian state, while Thyne and Powell (2014) cite 
economic stagnation and poor living conditions as a breeding ground for coups.  
According to Johnson et al (1984), coups are caused by the role and organization of the African 
militaries, alternatively, as Powell (2012) notes, it is because of widespread discontent over 
governmental legitimacy which is expressed in the form of mass riots, protests, or strikes. Yet 
other scholars like Jackman (1978) see the presence of one dominant ethnic group as a 
destabilizing factor and a cause of coups.  
From the above perspectives, Kieh and Agbese (2004) believe that coup d’états can be a good 
way of removing authoritarian leaders from power replacing them with more democratic ones.  
Thyne and Powell (2014:18) suggest that “coups are a viable way of ousting highly repressive 
and long-standing dictators and if that fails to happen then coups should be condemned if they 
come against democratic regimes”. In other words, their major argument is that coups can open 
up a path towards democracy. To cite an example, on February 18, 2010, the democratically 
elected President of Niger, Mamadou Tanja, was overthrown in a military coup. This was a 
reaction to the President’s decision to revise the Constitution in order to extend by three years, 
his second five year term in office Barka and Ncube (2012:10).  
In other words the coup was instigated by a yearning for genuine democracy which the ousted 
President wanted to undermine by extending his term of office.  Kieh and Agbese (2004: 30) do 
agree with this assertion when they point out that “military officers and non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs) leading the coups usually depict themselves as responsible and altruistic patriots 
out to save the country and its constitution from the misrule of the ousted government”. In this 
121 
 
case, the military officers and their colleagues are merely carrying out a coup in order to bring 
sanity to a political system which has been misgoverned.  
To cite another example: on August 6, 2008, Mauritania’s first freely elected President, Sidi 
Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, was overthrown by a group of senior military officers who 
declared that their action was in response to the deteriorating social, economic, and security 
situation in the country Barka and Ncube(2012:10). The security sector wanted to right the mess 
that had been created by the ousted president. This means that as soon as the coup is over or a 
few months after the coup the military should return the country back to civilian rule. The 
military men will have to go back to their barracks paving way for a more democratic civilian 
government to take over. 
Decalo (1986:5) suggests that military coups can best be explained through the systemic 
deficiency theory which proposes that, the prime impetus for military upheavals is some 
structural (social, economic and political) stress or civilian leadership failing, which creates a 
power vacuum that sucks in the military. In other words, as ‘guardians’ of the people the military 
are supposed to intervene, clean up the mess and then guide the nation back to an ‘uncorrupted’ 
civilian government. 
Thyne and Powell (2014) base their opinion from the Malian coup of 1991 where economic 
hardships prompted a strike calling for the resignation of President Moussa Traoré. The President 
instead of addressing the grievances of the masses responded with heavy handedness which led 
to the death of 150 demonstrators. The Malian military led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Touré 
quickly responded by ousting the president from power. A week later, the military appointed 
Soumana Sacko, a senior official from the UN Development Program, as interim Prime Minister 
and announced a national conference to draw up a new constitution (Thyne and Powell, 2014: 6).  
This means that if a government fails to address economic issues this may lead to a coup as the 
Malian example shows.  
Continuous low levels of economic growth, associated with high levels of poverty and 
destitution are suggestive of the grievances that may lead to a coup in a country. A good example 
can be seen in the failed 1980 and 1990 Zambian coups where the military as well as some 
civilians had become disillusioned by the poverty in the country as well as the way President 
122 
 
Kaunda was handling the economy that they twice attempted to overthrow him in a coup 
Phiri(2003) and Perlez(1990).  
To consolidate the idea that economic issues cause coups Barka and Ncube (2012:13) give us the 
following examples: “in Guinea-Bissau, a successful military coup took place in 2003, a year 
after the country experienced a recession with a GDP rate of -7.1% in 2002. Similarly, in Chad, 
Mauritania, and Niger, military coups succeeded respectively in 2006, 2008, and 2010, following 
a year of declining GDP growth rate or very poor economic performance.” 
In agreement with Thyne and Powell (2014) and Barka and Ncube (2012) it can be argued that 
coups can be instigated by economic hardships as also exemplified in the 1980s coups in Ghana 
(1981), Burkina Faso (1983) and Nigeria (1983). Some of these coups will be analysed in the 
subsequent sections. 
Johnson et al (1984) observe that recruitment to the military also creates a sort of military caste 
which is distant from the ruling civilian elites and in the end the military becomes counter elite 
that at the slightest chance will topple the existing civilian government.  McBride (2004) agrees 
with Johnson et al (1984) when he states that the military may intervene in political affairs 
mainly for reasons of personal greed, being motivated by the “rents” they hope to extract once 
they gain power or control over the state. Shagari and Babangida (Nigeria), and Compaoré 
(Burkina Faso), have all been accused of furthering their own self-regarding interests once they 
got in power Baxter(2010), Barka and Ncube(2012 and Frere and Englebert(2015).    
Powell (2012) concerns himself with the issue of legitimacy were citizens will start challenging 
and questioning government authority. This usually leads to massive protests, demonstrations 
and street riots. Examples can be the 2011 massive street protests in Tunisia which led to 
President Zine el Abidine ben Ali and his family fleeing the country and also the Egyptian 
President, Hosni Mubarak stepping down Amin (2012). Another example is the 2014 Burkina 
Faso demonstrations against President Compaoré which made him to unceremoniously exit the 
country Frere and Englebert (2015).  
Powell (2012) therefore sees a coup as either a planned or spontaneous collective coercive action 
carried out by the masses to rid the country of a dictator or authoritarian ruler.  
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Jackman (1978) on the other hand, argues that cultural diversity could actually have some effects 
on the incidence of coups in Africa mainly due to the fact that ethnically fragmented societies are 
inherently unstable. The Liberian 1985 failed coup, is a good example, where Samuel Doe went 
on to slaughter up to 3,000 members of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups as a reprisal (Thyne and 
Powell, 2014:5). It can be argued that the 1985 coup plotters mainly from the Gio and Mano 
ethnic groups felt that they were being excluded from the political process.  
Coups are generally regarded as anarchic in nature regardless of whether they are bloody or 
bloodless. However, one can argue that notwithstanding the anarchic environs that guardian 
coups inflict on the population they tend to usher in long term morale benefits. Their occurrences 
normally result in improved public order and efficiency in governance matters as exemplified in 
the case of Nigeria when General Buhari took over power in a coup. 
Despite the above differences on the causes of coups, what is shown by the literature on the 
origins or causes of coups, is that coups share a common emphasis which is usually a grievance 
emanating as a ‘result of a complex mix of historical, political, personal, economic, military, 
social, ethnic, and cultural factors” Johnson et al(1984:623). 
Another commonality with coups has been the direct involvement of the security sector or elites 
in the consummation of coups.  
In the next section, I give a detailed analysis of coups which are occasioned by foreign influence 
or involvement or interference. 
5.6 Foreign Instigated Coups and Economic Development 
Despite the identified factors outlined in the above section as attributing to coups, one is 
persuaded to agree with Thyne (2010), Chomsky (2007) and Baxter (2010) that foreign influence 
has also played a part in fuelling conflicts and coups in Latin America and Africa.  
Endeavour will be made in the first part of this section to provide confirmation of foreign 
influence that fuels coups. I also seek to demonstrate, through literature, how most scholars have 
largely ignored the fact that Western engineered coups have retarded development prospects in 
developing countries.  
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Close analysis of how military coups occur will reveal that coups are mostly traced to foreign 
powers’ quest for geo-strategic influence in Latin America in general, and Africa in particular. 
The section starts by analysing the Chilean coup of 1973 which led to the death of President 
Allende. This is followed by a brief overview of how the US has agitated for coups in Latin 
America.  
On 3 November 1970 Chile’s Salvador Allende, a Marxist, became the first democratically 
elected head of state in the history of Latin America. The fear of a leadership leaning towards 
communism led President Nixon of the United States of America (USA), through Henry 
Kissinger, to lead a concentrated effort to oust Allende from power. It can be argued that in the 
case of President Allende, Western countries especially the US took fright at the possibility that 
Chile would take a contrary development path, which in their view, would be favourable to 
communist ideology.  
Chomsky (2007:111) notes that the American administration had to supply anti-government 
politicians and the media with huge funds while at the same time building alliances with military 
personnel. Chomsky (2007:111) also points out that extensive diplomatic pressure was applied 
on the Chile government while also denying it international financial assistance and that “the US 
President ordered covert operations” in order to cause chaos in Chile.  
It was after such extensive pressure, that Thyne (2010:449) says, “Allende’s government was 
overthrown in a coup in September 1973, bringing General Pinochet’s bloody dictatorship to 
power”. This view is also closely linked to Perkins (2005:158) version that Allende and many 
other people had their lives destroyed by the American government because they stood up to the 
corporatocracy.  
It is critical to observe that arguments raised by Chomsky (2007) and Thyne (2010) that there 
exist foreign interests in coups instigated by the US in Latin America have proper base. It can 
therefore be argued that America’s obsession with protecting its national interests in Latin 
America ignored the fundamental principles of the sovereignty of nations and their right to enjoy 
democratic governance. This lack of moral conscience on the part of America is reprehensible 
and fraught with intent to foment anarchy at the expense of peace. Indeed it does not have to be 
Latin America; it is simply unethical to remove a democratically elected regime in any part of 
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the world, for to do so is to deny the exercise of choices, values, and cultures of various nations 
of the world. 
From the foregoing discussion this means Allende had stood against American political and 
business interests.  
I now make an analysis of Allende’s replacement and, how General (Augusto) Pinochet’s 
government exposed the negative effects of coups on political and economic development. 
Analysing US incited coups in Latin America, Chomsky (2007:86) has observed that the US 
believes that it is entitled to use military force (including initiating coups) to ensure “uninhibited 
access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources”.  
As highlighted in chapter 2, the US also assumes that it has a mission to redeem the world by 
spreading its professed ideals (democracy) and the American way of life Meharg et al (2010), 
Ford (2014) and Nathan(2009).  
Thyne (2007) in support of the above assertion notes that the rise of radical leaders in Latin 
America such as the late Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Cristina Kirchener in Argentina and Evo 
Morales in Bolivia has reflected the same basis for the USA’s Cold War efforts to foment coups 
in the region.  
Chomsky (2007:136) argues that in 2002, the US supported a military coup to overthrow the 
elected government of Venezuela headed by Chavez but had to back down after overwhelming 
support for Chavez from the ordinary people as well as condemnation from other Latin American 
countries.  
It therefore can be argued that the USA has a tendency to embroil herself in matters of internal 
affairs of weaker nations with the view to change its leadership.  
Looking at Africa, the Togo coup will first be examined in order to illustrate foreign involvement 
in African coups. The section will further analyse the Ghana, Zaire and Burkina Faso coups with 
an aim of highlighting the development visions Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba and 
Thomas Sankara had, before they were unceremoniously overthrown in military coups. By 
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highlighting these leaders’ development visions, I intend to uncover the negative impacts of 
foreign orchestrated coups on African economic development.  
The Togo coup of 1963 which led to the death of President Sylvanus Olympio was 
masterminded by the French government. Baxter (2010) and Kopp (1994) consolidate this 
statement, pointing out that the coup–assassination was done as a covert French military 
operation, coordinated by French president General Charles de Gaulle, who was incensed by the 
fact that Togolese President Olympio had publicly defied him, and was no longer serving the 
interests of France.  
Christoff (2007) has made a fair observation that France, in reality, hasn’t granted independence 
to the former colonies due to the neo-colonial economic development framework that it 
continues to impose on them. France has been accused of manipulating African leaders in order 
to have easy access to valuable minerals and other resources (Charbonneau (2008), Chafer 
(2001), Moncrieff (2012) and Renou (2002).  
In other words, French economic interests can best be safeguarded by African leaders (puppets) 
who are put in power through foreign assisted coups. Examples of such leaders are Gnassingbé 
Eyadéma of Togo from 1963-2005 and Blaise Compaoré of Burkina-Faso from 1974-2014.  
Evidence from related literature suggests that some leaders such as those cited above, usually 
ignore the economic grievances and demands of their own population. I will analyse this aspect 
in detail in the next section.  
In former Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Patrice Lumumba was elected 
Prime Minister in 1960 after the country won independence from Belgium. A few months later 
Lumumba’s government was deposed in a coup during the Congo Crisis. He was then 
imprisoned and subsequently executed by firing squad on 17 January 1961. Studies by 
Nzongola-Ntalaja and Jacobs (2013) and Bustin (2002) have shown that the US government was 
indirectly involved with the Belgian government playing a major role in Lumumba’s 
assassination. 
Lumumba was clearly a victim of an assassination plot hatched by the CIA and carried out by the 
Belgians. The death of Lumumba served to stifle efforts towards the ideals of national unity and 
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economic independence of the Congolese people Tanner (1961). The demise of Lumumba was a 
terrible drawback to the aspirations for freedom and material prosperity of millions of Congolese 
people.  
It is conceded and indeed argued that Lumumba’s attempt to secure genuine independence from 
Belgium and to obtain effective control over the resources of Congo posed an unusual and 
serious threat to the security interests of Western nations as a whole, and America in particular. 
Under microscopic scrutiny, is the genuineness of advancing human security, as peddled in the 
1990s by the same American and European quarters, whose history is tattered with disrespect for 
the human dignity of weaker nations located in third world countries. 
In Ghana, on 25 February 1966, Kwame Nkrumah, the President of Ghana was deposed in a 
military putsch. According to Elliot-Cooper (2013) documentary evidence establishes that 
British and American governments through their secret services, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and the British Secret Service, conspired with the Ghanaian military in bringing Nkrumah 
down.  
At independence in 1957, Ghana took over a colonial army which had been trained and led by 
British officers. Many of the top-rank officials had had years of loyalty to the British colonial 
regime. They constituted a privileged middle class thus they strongly resented Nkrumah’s 
struggle to create social equality in the country Vallin (1966).  
Under Nkrumah, the masses enjoyed a higher standard of living than in the other African 
countries owing to its more developed economy. The Nkrumah government aimed for economic 
growth and structural change marked by infrastructural and human development Green (1988). 
The Nkrumah government also carried out many social reforms such as free education (the 
number of pupils in primary schools rose from 154,000 in 1951 to 1,480,000 in January 1966), 
free health service, state insurance, the extension of the piped water system, and nearly full 
employment (Vallin, 1966; Dodoo, 2012; Akosa, 2010). 
It can be observed that while Akosa (2010) praises Nkrumah there are some who criticised him 
for destroying Ghanaian economy. Scholars such as Chabal (1986), Chazan et al (1999) and 
Glickman (1987) have some reservations on some of Nkrumah’s political and economic policies. 
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Glickman (1987) raises an argument that while Nkrumah’s government came to play a large role 
in the economy, his party, the Convention People’s Party (CPP) had monopoly over resources 
and this was characterized by patronage and personal corruption. In other words, party members 
benefited immensely through a monopolization of major economic activities. Other scholars such 
as Ottaway (1987) add that Ghana had been a very rich country at independence and was 
bankrupt by the time Nkrumah was deposed in a coup. Nkrumah’s demise is said to have led to 
celebrations in the streets. Chazan et al (1999) attribute Nkrumah’s unpopularity to his 
establishment of a one party state in Ghana. Power was now heavily centralized and it became 
virtually impossible for opposition political parties to subsist in Ghana. This was also aggravated 
by the plunder of state resources by members of Nkrumah’s CPP. Critics of Nkrumah argue that 
his government was a failure and that his overthrow by the military was justified. These critics 
have supported their arguments by citing his harsh treatment of opponents; the outlawing of 
opposition movements and his declaration of life presidency; and some economic blunders he 
made which caused the economy to deteriorate. 
 
 It is acknowledged that the period preceding Nkrumah’s fall, Ghana’s main cash crop, cocoa, 
experienced a dramatic drop in price from 24 units of value per kilogram to only 3 units of value 
per kilogram and this created a massive drop in living standards of the people. It is 
understandable that people became disgruntled with a lowering of expectations and this made it 
easy for the army to prey on people’s misery and overthrow Nkrumah. 
While it can be argued that Nkrumah failed to the extent that people’s hopes were dashed to the 
ground because of the cocoa situation, it is fair to analyse the underlying cause in the drop of the 
prices of cocoa. 
To this day, Africa and other countries in the third world can neither determine prices of their 
goods for export nor determine the prices of goods they import because of a skewed world 
economic order that favours the western nations in the running of international markets. 
Least debated and least confessed is the fact that Nkrumah was victim to a predatory 
international economic system that conspired to deliberately bring down Nkrumah by bringing 
down the price of cocoa. 
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Not to be forgotten is the fact that Nkrumah, just like Lumumba, was inclined not only towards 
the eastern bloc feared by the west for its communist ideology, but was also the father of pan 
Africanism that sought to raise awareness of the oneness of the African people. Nkrumah’s 
ideological thrust was thus viewed as an unusual and serious threat to the foreign policies of 
western nations. 
Given the overall picture, it can be argued that Nkrumah offered the best he could to his people, 
and Ghana’s economy was interfered with by external forces to the extent that only the ignorant 
will blame Nkrumah for his country’s economic decline.  
However sound or misplaced the arguments of Nkrumah’s critics, it is unethical for foreign 
powers to instigate coups to remove a democratically elected leader. Such interference in the 
domestic affairs of a sovereign nation constitutes the anti-thesis of democracy, noting that citizen 
rights are being usurped by those that are not citizens. Such interference is thus condemnable in 
the strongest of terms as it sows seeds of anarchy that incite social and political unrest. It is thus 
argued that the moral obligation to remove any democratically elected government must, and, be 
seen to rest with its citizens and not foreigners. 
Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso met the same fate as Lumumba. Sankara was opposed to the 
idea of economic development based on a conception of charity (donor aid) which was seen by 
Northern countries as a solution to gross social inequities between them and the South. He did 
not ask for charity; but demanded social justice, calling for self-determination rooted in a 
completely different social and economic vision to the charity model offered up to this day by 
developed countries.  
Sankara’s vision for Burkina Faso was to establish a model of self-reliant development in respect 
of food, education and healthcare Martin (1987).Accordingly, there was a serious attempt to 
ensure that the peasantry would have the correct amount of food crop to supply the national 
population with nutrition, prior to considering the possibility of exporting to the international 
market.  
Sankara also appealed for the full cancellation of foreign national debts across the continent 
(Baxter, 2010).  
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Africa to this day has remained indebted to Western countries and this has in a way retarded its 
economic development. Cavanagh et al (1994:135) also argue that debt has been used by 
Northern elites to gain a stronghold over the economic and financial destinies of the Global 
South. For these reasons, Sankara’s government became unpopular with the governments of 
Europe and North America Skinner (1988). 
As soon as Sankara died, the strong position on insisting that the people of Burkina Faso play the 
central role in defining national development or the implementation economic assistance was 
reversed Baxter (2010). 
Allende, Sankara, Nkrumah and Lumumba’s fate, along with those of other leaders who had or 
have sound economic visions for their countries and shared or share beliefs on what genuine 
independence stood for or stands for, have been targets of Western initiated coups since they 
have been seen or are seen as threats to foreign interests.  
Today, Africa is in dire need of coming up with an indigenous development strategy which 
follows on, from Sankara, Lumumba and Nkrumah had advocated. It can therefore be argued 
that, in stabilizing favoured leaders and destabilizing unfavoured ones, foreign powers have 
contributed immensely in retarding Africa’s development projection. In support of this notion, it 
can be hypothesised that, had the economic visions of the leaders who were murdered or 
overthrown in coups been realized, these countries would have made much progress in terms of 
economic development.  
It can be assumed that, had Sankara lived, he would have sought to rid his country of corruption, 
bureaucratic nepotism and tribalism. Basing on his economic policies it can also be presupposed 
that he would have tried to present a radically different concept of development to the aid model 
common today, strongly promoted by international institutions like the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB).  
Sankara’s advocacy for home made products would have boosted employment at home. In other 
words, he was in fact the pioneer of black economic empowerment through his attempts to 
indigenize Burkina Faso’s economy. Nkrumah’s calls for social reforms would have benefitted 
most Ghanaians and Lumumba’s support for overall control over resources would have improved 
the living standards of poor Africans. However, these are only mere assumptions or 
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presumptions since other scholars have also raised concerns on whether these radical policies 
were feasible for sustaining economic growth. Studies by scholars such as Matyszak (2011) have 
shown that at times, indigenization policies which are not well defined can scare away foreign 
investors. Second, an over emphasis on social reforms without balancing with other economic 
activities, can also be a burden on a country’s national budget as resources which were intended 
for infrastructural development may be diverted towards social amenities such as health and 
education. Third, it has been noted that overall control over resources in some African countries 
has led to situations where only a few well connected elites benefit at the expense of the general 
populace (Askin and Collins, 1993; Bratton and Masunungure, 2011; Frere and Englebert, 2015). 
 
Notwithstanding the above concerns, I further come up with an assumption that China might not 
have been the economic giant it is today, had it not followed the vision of Mao and the other 
leaders who followed after him. Had Mao been deposed or killed in a Western orchestrated coup, 
China would have followed a different economic trajectory which might have led it to a 
completely different economic situation than it finds itself in today in the 21
st
 Century.  
In the subsequent section I seek to examine the negative impacts of foreign orchestrated coups 
on selected economies of Latin American and African countries.  
5.6.1 Coup Imposed Leaders and the Economy 
Research findings by scholars such as Baxter (2010), Wedeman (1997), Frere and Englebert 
(2015) have shown that elites who acquire power after a foreign orchestrated coup have 
committed a plethora of economic, political and social vices in their countries.  
This section seeks to highlight some of the shortcomings of leaders who get into power through 
foreign instigated coups and how their leadership negatively impacts the economic performance 
of their countries. 
Attention will be given to Pinochet of Chile, Eyadéma of Togo, Mobutu of Zaire and finally 
Compaoré of Burkina Faso. 
This section seeks to argue that the best strategy to reduce the incidences of foreign induced 
coups in Africa and to prevent future coups is to institute democratic reforms within the security 
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sector whole hallmark is to effectively manage the challenges facing Africa’s diverse security 
institutions. 
I thus seek to argue that the above hallmark can be attained if ethnic groups within the security 
sector feel adequately represented within the security institutions by way of providing equal 
opportunities to everyone. 
The moment security personnel become disgruntled with non-transparent administrative issues, 
the higher their chances of being manipulated by foreigners (in deposing legitimate leaders) and 
also by greedy elites (in looting state resources/ carrying out coups) as will be analysed in the 
following paragraphs.  
When General Augusto Pinochet took over power from President Allende he devoted a greater 
part of his rule in purging those who criticized him. Chomsky (2007) notes that as high as 50 000 
deaths were recorded during Pinochet’s reign, and in addition more than 700,000 were tortured. 
Pinochet, together with other Latin American dictators came up with ‘Operation Condor’ where 
they would instigate a plague of terror throughout the Latin American continent, killing and 
torturing mercilessly all those who opposed them (Chomsky, 2007).  
However, regarding economic growth under General Pinochet, two contending perspectives have 
emerged: one is that Pinochet greatly improved the Chilean economy while the other contends 
that he did not. Silva (1991:387) is of the view that positive economic growth was witnessed 
through radical and ambitious neoliberal reforms implemented by the military government.  
Basing on studies by Odutayo (2015), Hutchful et al (2005) Konadu-Agyemang (2001) Elbadawi 
(1992) Elbadawi, Ghura and Uwujaren (1992), neo-liberal policies have mainly benefitted 
multinational corporations and international financial institutions at the expense of indigenous 
people. This argument is also consolidated by Rahnema et al (1997:207-213) when they note that 
the Third World, including Africa, develops the industrialized Western countries “by incurring 
high total debt burdens exemplified by Third World debt payment of $1.3 trillion between 1982 
and 1990.” 
Chomsky  (2007) and Munoz and Myers  (2015) reject the view that Pinochet’s regime improved 
the economy on the grounds that besides the atrocities which led to the deaths and torture of 
133 
 
thousands of civilians, resource allocation was also highly in favour of his cronies. Poverty, 
unemployment, and socio-economic disparities did not disappear during the Pinochet era, and 
were even worsened due to his autocratic rule. 
In an autocracy, as varied studies by Frere and Englebert(2015), Askin and Collins(1993) and 
Ogbeidi(2012) indicate, there is always an element of uninhibited plundering which usually 
involves the organized theft of public funds and a state’s resources by those who are closely 
connected to those in power. In the case of Chile, Pinochet’s military junta and other elites 
derived huge benefits as a result of this flaw. 
In Togo, Baxter (2010) observes that when Gnassingbé Eyadéma toppled President Sylvanus 
Olympio in a coup he ruled Togo with an iron fist stained with blood and corruption until his 
death in 2005 Baxter (2010).The French also built him a huge military airport and base in the 
north (a drain on the country’s fiscus), near his native village of Pya, where he constructed a 
palace for himself.  
Togo thus ended up with a wealthy elite closely connected to the president while the huge 
majority with no political connections, had no benefits or money to speak of. In this regard, it 
can be noted that Eyadéma’s corruption was tolerated owing to the fact that some in the security 
sector had become part of Togo’s elite. The same situation can be seen in the preceding Ghana 
coup where the military, as a privileged group, took part in the coup in order to safeguard their 
own interests which they felt Nkrumah was undermining.  
Wedeman (1997:452) has noted that “high levels of corruption are associated with high-, 
medium-, and low-growth rates and situations like these usually bleed the economy, 
impoverishing the masses in the process as the Togo case reveals”. 
Basing on various studies as commissioned by Frere and Englebert (2015), Ogbeidic (2012) 
Evans (1989) and Zack-Williams and Riley (1993) it is argued that for as long as the masses 
remain excluded from any meaningful participation in political and economic activities of the 
country,such countries will always experience low economic growth rates. It is noted and further 
argued that this unhealthy situation occurs as a result of an environment that gives ample room to 
bureaucratic elites, political lobbyists and the hangers on to advance their selfish interests at the 
expense of the legitimate aspirations and deserving needs of ordinary people. 
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It was five years after Lumumba’s assassination that Joseph Mobutu Sésé Seko became the 
president of Zaire (now DRC), and he wielded power as the authoritarian Head of State for 30 
years.  
Elliot-Cooper (2012) suggests that Mobutu was on a CIA payroll even before the US supported 
his rise to power five years after the dethronement of Lumumba in a coup. Mobutu is said to 
have devoted a greater part of his reign serving foreign interests at the expense of his people. 
Little, if any, infrastructure development took place during his thirty year rule.  
Mobutu is well known for allowing US multinationals to access the resources they needed. In 
1982, after following advice from the US Administration, Mobutu liberalized the Zairean 
economy in line with IMF prescriptions. This greatly impoverished the masses as also witnessed 
in the aftermath of the overthrow of Nkrumah of Ghana. 
Oloka-Onyango (1995:3) is of the opinion that Mobutu amassed a fortune far in excess of his 
country's national debt, bankrupting what must be one of the richest nations on the continent. In 
this sense, Evans (1989) termed Mobutu’s Zaire a predatory state, meaning that the elites in 
power (civilian and military) extract huge sums of bankable surplus; provide so little in the way 
of "collective goods" to the extent that these unfortunate attitudes and actions seriously impede 
economic growth.  
Predatory thus refers to the actions of the ones who control state institutions and are given to 
ransacking state coffers without any respect for the welfare of the masses, in the same way that 
lion or leopard is not expected to worry about the welfare of its prey. Accordingly, states become 
predatory when civil-military relations are at their lowest ebb or are non-existent. The security 
institutions in such situations become part of the privileged elites that participate in the looting of 
the country’s resources Ogbeidi (2012).  
Evans (1989:570) accuses Mobutu and his “coterie within the Zairian state apparatus of having 
extracted vast personal fortunes from the revenues generated by exporting the country's 
impressive mineral wealth.” Acemoglu et al (2004:162) calls such types of governments 
“kleptocratic regimes, where the state is controlled and run for the benefit of an individual, or a 
small group, who use their power to transfer a large fraction of society’s resources to 
themselves.” 
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Kleptocracy thus entails a government run by money thieves whose corrupt activities condemn 
them as economic saboteurs. 
Far from rebuilding the Zairean economy, Mobutu plunged his resource rich country into a cycle 
of ever-worsening hunger, disease and malnutrition. Instead of stabilizing his country as to 
benefit all Congolese, his takeover actually paved the way for systematic plunder of the 
country’s resources (Askin and Collins (1993).  
In support of Askin and Collins, it can be argued that Mobutu's continued domination of the 
Zairean political and economic scene systematically side-lined and denied the Congolese civil 
and political human rights the space for free expression, association and participation.  In 
addition, Mobutu’s corrupt activities and plunder of national resources directly impinged upon 
Zaire’s economy, rendering the majority poor and vulnerable. 
It can be argued that Mobutu’s handlers that hail from the west were also active participants in 
fanning corruption and benefitting from a free meal system that further weakened an economy 
under siege. 
In Burkina Faso, President Blaise Compaoré was a close ally of France and he is suspected of 
organizing a coup d'état against Sankara in 1987Christoff(2007).To support this assertion, 
Wilkins (1988) notes that just after the coup, Compaore immediately claimed the presidential 
post accusing Sankara of being a traitor of the Revolution.  
A few months after the coup, Compaore is said to have called in the IMF so that Burkina Faso's 
dire economy could receive a foreign-backed boost Wilkins (1988). Sankara had always opposed 
IMF policies.  
Volumes of research on IMF initiated Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (see: 
Harsch (1998), Elbadawi (1992), Elbadawi, Ghura and Uwujaren (1992) and Ake (1996) have 
shown how the international financial institution’s prescribed policies actually impoverished the 
masses in Africa.  
Contrary to purported IMF success stories in Ghana in the 1980s and 1990s, Odutayo (2015), 
Hutchful (2002), Konadu-Agyemang (2001) and others refuted such claims, arguing that these 
policies actually brought more misery to the Ghanaian masses than anything else.  
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The fate of the Ghanaian masses also befell Burkina-Faso.  
Frere and Englebert, (2015:299) note that “although the country (Burkina Faso) had experienced 
decent growth, inequality had surged under Compaoré, particularly to the benefit of those 
associated with the regime, while the youth had a hard time finding employment.” In his twenty-
seven year reign, Compaoré is accused by Baxter (2010) of having dealt in dubious activities, 
which among others, included diamond and weapon trafficking. He is also said to have been 
ruthless towards political opponents, killing them if necessary before the massive demonstrations 
which finally led to Compaore relinquishing power and fleeing the country in 2014.  
According to Frere and Englebert (2015:299), “impunity, corruption, and inequality (particularly 
salient in the ostentatious behaviour of the presidential entourage) continued to feed popular 
grievances in the ensuing years.” In other words, nepotism, patronage politics, cronyism in 
management of the economy and the appropriation of many assets by regime insiders (elites 
including the security top-rank) negatively affected the economy. It can therefore be argued that, 
in such cases, civilian oversight of both the security institutions and the executive is necessary in 
order to curb the malpractices of the political elites and the military alike. 
In the above cases of Pinochet, Eyadéma, Mobutu and Compaoré it also seems to show that if 
you behave correctly and obediently after seizing power in a coup especially by allowing foreign 
economic interests to do as they please then you can rule for many years in luxury and with great 
impunity.  
It can be argued that in Western industrialized countries, it is not possible that a leader can lead 
with such impunity owing to the various reforms which have since taken place within the 
security institutions.  
In chapter two, it was highlighted how the Western countries have succeeded in carrying out 
democratic reforms within their security sectors which have in a way greatly contributed to a 
more responsible security sector which is also answerable to the civilian population.  
One can therefore be of the view that Africa needs security reforms as a way of avoiding the path 
of the Pinochets, the Eyademas, the Mobutus and the Compaorés who through their cronies (both 
military and business people) become a drain to the economy.  
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It can be argued that, the main purpose of a reformed security institution is actually to serve as an 
instrument against tyrants and dictators who loot state resources.  This can be achieved through a 
mutiny or a rebellion (‘democratic-coup’) against the misuse of power by such leaders. 
A critical analysis of the coups that occur in sub-Saharan Africa indicates that there is a strong 
hand of former colonial powers who seek to preserve and deepen their economic interests in 
complete disregard of a post-colonial dispensation that gives sovereignty to a new and 
independent political leadership. It was evident that the coups caused grief, human suffering and 
weakened the economies of affected countries. 
It can be argued that while the pursuit of neoliberal policies by the current crop of African 
leadership is in voluntary, it does show the coercive nature of relations between the economically 
powerful western nations and the economically weak African nations. 
It has been correctly observed elsewhere in this thesis that the powerful will do what they will 
while the weak will do what they must. While it is correct to argue that the western nations are 
patronizing in their relationship with Africa, it is equally correct to argue that Africans still have 
to come of age to put in place a leadership that is principled enough to serve the people as 
opposed to serving their own selfish interests. 
It is disturbing to witness the embracing of Africom by many African countries, with the promise 
of protection of state and human security interests fronted by the US as necessary in warding off 
both internal and external threats. It appears the African leadership has quickly forgotten the 
source of the demise of their fore bearers in the Congo, Ghana, Burkina Faso, among other 
countries. 
It can be argued that SSR is about creating a peaceful environment that promotes economic 
activities. That said, it is fair to argue that the foreign initiated coups by the very nations that now 
seek to promote SSRs in Africa were used to undermine the sovereignty of independent African 
states by creating conditions of anarchy that disadvantaged the masses while propping up the 
economic interests of political elites and the predators. 
History still has to demonstrate a change of heart on the part of the westerners for Africans to 
warm up to the idea of SSRs by those whose history so far is not in favour of assisting Africans 
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to grow and develop economically. The hidden and hideous agenda exemplified by foreign 
instigated coups on the African continent is being replaced by coercive governance concepts that 
are at variance with African culture, values and principles. 
It can be argued that those countries that benefit from reforms by the western nations are mere 
onlookers as the funders are inclined to prescribe the type of reforms that weaken the security of 
the country with the aim of being invited to physically provide security for the nation. This will 
enable them to lay legitimate claim to the running of the economy while offloading the local 
political leadership to hopeless failures overdue for replacement. 
Unless and until proponents of SSRs from Europe respect what African nations propose for their 
security reforms, it can be argued that the imposition of reforms by outsiders is suspect and 
tinged with evil intent. 
Any proposition by western nations for the institution of SSR on countries that are under 
sanctions or that oppose culturally unsound human rights concepts such as homosexuality can be 
tricky. The likelihood of interference with the internal peace and independence of the state is 
high and this can easily be manipulated by outsiders to bring about undemocratic regime change. 
In consequence, the ethical aspect of SSRs must be investigated sufficiently to avoid the 
undermining of the sovereignty of the state as a result of any actions that may create conditions 
of anarchy. 
It can therefore be argued that it would be too premature for countries in sub-Saharan Africa to 
even consider SSRs by a Europe that still has to demonstrate good intentions towards Africa. The 
much talked about need to cut the security budget, and at the same time embrace human security 
while promoting economic development creates images of a fairy tale. 
With these concerns in mind, the next section seeks to discuss how military coups can either 
impede or promote economic development. 
5.7 Military rule and economic development 
Previous sections have looked at how leaders who usually get in power after a foreign 
orchestrated coup have been worse off than the ousted leaders especially when it comes to 
mending the economy. Evidence from the preceding chapters has shown that at their best these 
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leaders have been very corrupt - looting state resources and at their worst they have been 
autocratic - purging those who oppose them.  
In most of the cases cited above, it has been shown that the military also benefits extensively as 
exemplified in the Chilean, Togolese, and Zairean cases. In other words, the military ‘top-brass’ 
also indulge in the spoils of the regime in power.  
The following section seeks to give a brief analysis of the effects of a coup on the economy. 
We have seen in previous sections how disastrous it was to the economy when foreign instigated 
coups put favoured African elites into power with the assistance of the local military. The same 
outcome was evident in coups were the military takes over state power. Cases of corruption, 
cronyism, patronage, and kleptocracy also occur under military rule as they do under the rule of 
elites (who get in power after a foreign planned coup).  
To avoid unnecessary repetition, the section will briefly discuss the impact of military rule on the 
economy. 
Smith (2001:7) argues that “in Africa, military coups are often preceded, accompanied and 
followed by extreme violence.”  Despite the violence, some scholars have also noted that coups 
can undermine a country’s economic development.  
With regard to the coups which took place in countries such as Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Liberia 
scholars like Ehling and Holster-von Mutius (2001), Nnadozie (2003) and Bassey and Oshita 
(2010) clearly highlight the negative impact these coups have had on a country’s economy with 
special emphasis on development.  
Ehling and Holster-von Mutius (2001:57) are of the view that during the Babangida era in 
Nigeria “he not only dipped the country’s institutions into the lowest slum, but he also 
mismanaged the economy and drained the coffers of the nation.” The country became heavily 
indebted despite its abundant oil resources and most Nigerians’ lives became worse off than they 
had been before the coup.  
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In the case of Ivory Coast, Nnadozie (2003: 124) points out that the military coup of 24 
December 1999 “had negative repercussions on the economy as well as on the political 
development of the once stable country. Ivory Coast soon became categorized among the poor 
countries in West Africa, and also became heavily indebted, as it fell to 34 out of the 42 African 
countries classified as Heavily-indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).” 
Liberia’s coup carried out on 12 April 1980 by Samuel Doe who later became the first 
indigenous Liberian to rule the country also had a very huge negative impact on the country’s 
economy. The negative impacts are put into perspective by   Bassey and Oshita (2010:112) when 
they note that “under President Doe, the Liberian currency was devalued, corruption was at its 
peak, and the mismanagement of public funds was the rule than the exception.” 
It can be argued that in all three countries there was mismanagement of the economy by the 
military regimes which took power through coups. Those who had taken power had promised to 
better the lives of the populace but due to greed, corruption, cronyism, tribalism and so on not 
much came out from those promises.  
In most cases when the military takes over power in Africa there is always an unprecedented 
looting of state resources Zack-Williams and Riley (1993) and Ogbeidi (2012). This can be 
exemplified by the coups in Nigeria (1975, 1985), Liberia (1980) and Sierra Leone (1992). It can 
further be argued that most military regimes that got into power through coups became extremely 
corrupt and autocratic Kandeh (1996), Siollum (2015), Zack-Williams and Riley (1993). The 
corruption and mismanagement of national resources by the military elites usually becomes a 
cancerous disease which eats into the economy until it finally collapses. 
However, it should be borne in mind that not all military leaders who get in power after a coup 
practice kleptocracy. There are very interesting cases in Africa where the military after taking 
over power actually worked to clean up the mess that had been created by the former 
incumbents.  
Three examples can testify to the above point, with the first one in Nigeria (1983), followed by 
the one in Ghana (1981) and last but not least Burkina-Faso (1983).   
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In Nigeria, when Major-General Muhammadu Buhari took over power in a military coup on 31 
December 1983, overthrowing the civilian government of Shehu Shagari, Siollum (2015:16) 
notes that “Buhari’s military government launched the most intense anti-corruption campaign in 
Nigeria’s history. Several ministers were arrested, tried by military tribunals, convicted of 
corrupt enrichment, and given lengthy jail terms.” It can be argued that such rare acts usually 
give the military leader a good name and reputation even after he leaves office.  
Faul (2015) posits that there is evidence from media houses such as Reuters, Associated Press, 
The Times Magazine, Cable News Network, British Broadcasting Corporation, Sky News, China 
TV (and many others) suggesting that Muhammadu Buhari won in the March 2015 Presidential 
elections (beating the incumbent Goodluck Jonathan by a wide margin) owing to his non-
tolerance of corruption dating back to the days when he assumed power in a coup in December 
1983.  
Nigerians tired of what they perceived among other issues as a corrupt Jonathan government 
decided to elect a man whom they believed could best tackle the corruption scourge head-on. 
Michelle (2015) of the Associated Press quoted Buhari (after the 2015 elections) of having said 
“"Corruption attacks and seeks to destroy our national institutions and character ... distorts the 
economy and creates a class of unjustly enriched people. Such an illegal yet powerful force soon 
comes to undermine democracy because it has amassed so much money that they believe they 
can buy government."  
In support of Buhari’s press statement, Kpundeh (2004:121) confirms that corruption has a 
negative impact on institutions, growth and productivity and consequently, development. Osoba 
(1996) adds that corruption is an anti-social behaviour conferring improper benefits contrary to 
legal and moral norms, and which undermines the government in improving the lives of the 
masses.  
It can be argued that regardless of where it occurs, what causes corruption or the form it takes, 
the simple fact remains that corruption negatively impacts the economy Kpundeh (2004) Evans 
(1989) and Askin and Collins (1993). As it was also pointed out in the preceding section, 
Mobutu’s corrupt practices greatly impeded economic development in Zaire (DRC). Until 
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recently, citizens and civil society in African countries rarely held their leaders and security 
institutions accountable. South Africa has come to be an exceptional case as civil society plays a 
very crucial role in checking on the executive and security institutions Modise (2007), Nathan 
(2007) and Chuter (2000).  
On returning to power following the coup d’état of December 31, 1981, Flight-Lieutenant Jerry 
John Rawlings set two major goals: the restoration of power to the people and the waging of a 
"holy war" against corruption Gyimah-Boadi and Rothchild (1982:64). He declared that justice 
was now solely in the hands of the people. In other words, justice in Ghana was to be determined 
by the people. This entailed that “peoples' justice was to be exercised through a peoples' 
government-represented by Peoples' Defence Committees (PDCs), Workers' Defence 
Committees (WDCs), and such extra- or quasi-judicial institutions as Citizens Vetting 
Committees (CVC) and the National Investigations Commission (NIC)” [Gyimah-Boadi and 
Rothchild, 1982:64].   
The varied committees were thus tasked to investigate the accounts and finances of anyone 
referred to them as well as other alleged cases of corruption. The anti-corruption drive was 
effective in that it reduced the rate of corruption to 25 per cent against the previous percent levels 
of 50-100 which had been witnessed in the 1970s Green (1988). However, this success was not 
long lasting as exports and government revenue could not be raised to levels that could sustain 
the economy Adedeji (2001). In the end, the Rawlings government had no option but to ask for 
assistance from the IMF and World Bank.   
When Thomas Sankara assumed power in a military coup in 1983, one of the pillars of his 
revolution was to fight the scourge of corruption. Sankara started the anti-corruption drive by 
cutting ministerial salaries and adopting a simpler approach to life. He rode a bicycle to work 
before his Cabinet insisted that he should own a car. Sankara chose a Renault- 5 which was one 
of the cheapest cars available in Burkina Faso at the time Baxter (2010). Sankara's radicalism is 
shown in one of his anti-corruption speeches were he wrote that: 
Our own nationals undertook the systematic looting of our country with the support and blessing of 
imperialism. They used the crumbs of the loot which fell to them to transform themselves gradually 
into a parasitic bourgeoisie unable to control their appetites. These people were guided only by 
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their personal interests. They did not hesitate to use the most dishonest methods, corruption on a 
grand scale, theft of goods and public funds… All this went on before the very eyes of our brave, 
honest people suffering in miserable conditions. The riches of our country provided paradise for 
this minority, but the majority, our people, lived in hell Sankara (1985: 49-50). 
The above extract serves to demonstrate that Sankara was truly opposed to corruption. Baxter 
(2010) notes that from the start, Thomas Sankara made it clear that he was not going to be 
another corrupt, luxury-loving African president dancing to the tune of foreign masters. In mid-
1987, Sankara’s government launched its Anti-corruption Committee to vet government officials 
and to assess their wealth and assets after more than three years in power Biney (2013).  
Sankara was the first to appear before the committee and according to Skinner (1988:449) it was 
found that he earned a salary of only $450 a month and his most valuable possessions were to be 
a car, four bikes, three guitars, a fridge and a broken freezer. It can be argued that none of the 
military governments in Africa have ever lived such a miserly life like Sankara.  
Sankara was a leader who believed in the utilization of Burkina Faso’s resources to benefit all. 
This is quite rare in African politics as most military regimes (for example Ibrahim Babangida, 
Blaise Compaoré, and Valentine Strasser) believe in enriching themselves at the expense of the 
poor masses.  
President Francois Mitterand of France once said this about Sankara, “he has the earnestness of a 
vibrant youth, and is devoted to his people, but he is too earnest” Skinner (1988:448). It is this 
honesty and sincerity, among other things, that sets Sankara far apart from other African military 
leaders. 
Buhari, like Sankara of Burkina Faso and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana have become unique military 
leaders in that, instead of looting state coffers like what other military leaders have done or do 
(the likes of Shagari, Babangida, Compaoré, Pinochet) they have actually tried to put a stop to 
the scourge.  
In assessing such a situation, it behoves one to subscribe to the statement made by Decalo (1986) 
in the preceding section that the security sector as ‘guardians’ of the masses are supposed to 
mediate, clean up the disorder and then guide the nation back to an ‘uncorrupted’ civilian 
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government. Though Buhari, Sankara and Rawlings did not cede power to a civilian government 
as Decalo (1986) would suggest, their anti-corruption credentials still remain unblemished. 
From the foregoing discussion it can be noted that calls for SSR in Africa have mainly been 
necessitated by a need to promote civil-military relations in order for the military and its civil 
leaders to understand their roles in providing national security as well as in serving their 
countries in a transparent and accountable manner.  
As highlighted in the previous sections, there is an urgent need to professionalise the security 
sector at all levels as to avoid unnecessary coups which have a very negative effect on the 
economy.  
In my view, a professional security sector should not only protect and defend the nation, but also 
safeguard the values that a free democracy represents which include checking on whether the 
executive does not abuse state resources as shown in cases involving Eyadéma, Mobutu and 
Compaoré.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
As already indicated in chapter two, one of the central concerns of this thesis is to examine the 
entrenched belief among some scholars that the SS in Africa has been primarily responsible for 
most of coup d’états that have bedevilled the continent, and that military rule has been 
responsible for the socioeconomic underdevelopment in many African states. It was argued that 
in countries where elites or the military takeover state power through a coup, economic growth 
and development are greatly undermined.  
This chapter discussed the African SSR from the economic development school of thought. It 
was observed under this section that at the end of the cold-war, development experts within the 
European continent began to question why resources had to be channelled towards defence rather 
than other social sectors such as health, education, social welfare, infrastructure development and 
so on. Since then SSR increasingly became an integral part of development policy in both 
developed and developing countries. 
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The chapter established that scholars such as Brzoka (2003) call for African security institutions 
to provide protection for individuals and society as a whole. The main idea of SSR was 
established to be a concept that creates sustainable peace and stability. There appears to be some 
dimensions of commonality in the way an unreformed SS can be an impediment to economic and 
political development.  
Scholars such as Ebo point out that development can never thrive in a state where the SS is 
corrupt, unaccountable and is above the law as was the case in Nigeria, Togo and Zaire during 
the years of military rule.  
Scholars such as Ball observe that security of people is an essential aspect for sustainable 
development and democratisation.  
The chapter established the effects and reasons behind the occurrence of coups as the basis under 
which reformists were calling for SSR in Africa. It was observed that coup d’états have different 
origins, causes and effects which result in impoverishing a country. In Africa it was observed 
that coups where initially related to the weakness of civilian governments which in many cases 
looted national resources for personal reasons. It was observed that some African governments 
used SSI to suppress the population resulting in uprisings which today reformists use as a basis 
for calling for SSR. 
Kieh and Agbes (2004) observe that coups were caused by a strong urge by the military to 
restore democracy in authoritarian states. They further claim that economic stagnation and poor 
living conditions are a breeding ground for coups.  It also emerged that at times coups in African 
states are caused by the role and the way the military is organised.  
Scholars such as Powell note that because of widespread discontent over government legitimacy, 
the population can engage in mass riots, protests and strikes resulting in a government being 
removed as a result of a coup. 
The chapter sought to show that coups where either internally or externally instigated and had 
the same effects on economic development. On the other hand, Chomsky (2007 argues that the 
American and British administration think that they have the right to instigate coups to effect 
regime change in governments they do not like. Scholars such as Chomsky (2007) and Thyne 
(2010) observe that democratically elected Presidents like Allende and Nkrumah of Chile and 
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Ghana, respectively were removed from power due to instigations by foreign agencies such as 
the CIA and MI5. Such coups had devastating effects to the economies and lives of the 
population of their respective nations. Coups impacted negatively on sovereignty and were 
breeding ground for anarchy and instability.  
As most coups in Africa were found to be externally instigated, it was important to investigate 
the motive by outsiders, of European stock, to concern themselves with African matters. The 
motive pointed to the pursuit of economic interests on the African soil by European predators. 
The sponsoring of violent means to pursue economic interests was found to be unethical and 
stood in way of democratic practice. The sponsoring of anarchy to ratchet emotions that lead to 
violent overthrow of a government was meant to undermine the sovereignty of a state and 
promote instability as ready vehicle to achieving the economic decline of the country so targeted.  
Coup leaders sought to show that coups were undertaken as a means of mending the economy 
and improving the lives of the people. The study showed that that Buhari of Nigeria, Sankara of 
Burkina Faso and Rawlings of Ghana became unique military leaders in that, instead of looting 
state coffers like what other military rulers did they actually put a stop to the scourge.  
Scholars such as Decalo (1976) claim that the SS as ‘guardians’ of the masses are supposed to 
mediate, clean up the disorder and guide the nation back to an incorruptible civilian rule. It can 
be argued that though Buhari, Sankara and Rawlings did not cede power to a civilian government 
as Decalo suggests, their anti-corruption credentials remain unblemished.  
What became incontestable was the fact that SSR of SSI demands that due sensitivity be placed 
on the unique legitimate expectations that each state has of its SSI. These expectations would in 
turn inform the relevant and fitting SSR that would be of relevance to the given state’s specific 
needs. While ordinary wisdom and knowledge as well as researched tenets of what supports 
viable democratic practice, is quick to condemn coups, Africa has had a mixed bag of the 
aftermath of coups.  
As demonstrated here, some coups result in the elimination of corrupt and sleazy governments 
and elitism while others entrench that elitism. What is imperative, then is to work out how 
Africa’s particular station, economically, socially, and politically, can best be augmented and 
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defended by SSI as well as to work out which parts of African SSI need reworking to attain this 
goal.  
Increasing calls for gender equality and the rationale for such calls needs examining. In 
considering the importance of professionalisation of the security institutions, I seek to argue, as 
my major focus in Chapter Six, that the security sector should also be sensitive and responsive to 
the needs of women.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISAMBIGUATING THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE SECURITY SECTOR 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was established by different scholars that coups usually benefit the 
political elites as well as those in the security sector while the ordinary citizens languish in 
poverty.  
The security institutions in this case, are seen as objects of fear and distrust only serving the 
political elites in power. It was also observed that coups impact negatively on a country’s 
economy. It was noted that in states where the elites or military takeover state power through a 
coup, economic growth and development are greatly undermined.  
At the same time it was shown that some coups on the continent achieved the exact opposite, 
with authenticity, integrity and honour restored and the ordinary people given back their dignity 
and pride in the way socioeconomic activities were resuscitated. 
In sharp contrast, and in the majority of cases, coups saw corruption shooting through the roof, 
and impunity reducing integrity and honour to valueless ideals, and ordinary people being 
relegated to spectators of a game they were supposed to be managing, monitoring and owning. 
The economies experienced serious downward trends.  
It is with this mixed finding that this chapter seeks to further interrogate why calls for SSR have 
been made on the African continent and with special focus on women to assume considerable 
responsibility in the security sector.  
One of the major goals of this thesis is to examine the evolution of the security sector reform 
discourse with particular focus on women in security institutions. The study also seeks to find 
out how women have been integrated within the security institutions. Equally important, is an 
examination of the reforms being called for in order to accommodate women in positions of 
authority in the security institutions.  
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In analysing the various reforms being called for, it is the intention of my thesis to establish the 
dominant arguments and their ideological orientation against the backdrop of resistance and 
rigidity that most security institutions worldwide have in recruiting women for security duties. 
Gruelling combat tasks and demanding Generalship posts in the security sector have for a long 
time been the preserve of men, and one naturally wants to investigate the advisability or 
otherwise of engaging women in such tasks.  
Thus, to achieve the objectives of the chapter, this section develops by giving a brief history of 
women in military leadership and their rise to higher military command positions arguing that 
their rise to these positions was achieved after demonstrating appropriate and at times 
exceptional leadership qualities.   
I further argue that the ascendance of women to senior positions was not based on traditional or 
political appeasement but rather a confirmation that they possessed the skills and competencies 
required of a military leader.  
Also critical is the need on my part to discuss the issues of women and the profiling of 
masculinity in the military, demonstrating that security sector institutions, particularly the 
military, require the privileging of hegemonic masculinities such as aggressiveness, courage, and 
stoicism and how that gels with traditional profiling of femininity.  
Finally, I concern myself with the rationale of including women in peacekeeping operations and 
give a concise overview of United Nation Security Council Report 1325 (UNSCR: 1325) which 
deals with gender mainstreaming.  
In this section I argue that SSR policy formulation should not only be guided by a political or 
activism agenda but rather by a holistic scientific research that aims at enhancing operational 
effectiveness and efficiency of the military.  
I conclude the chapter by noting major observations that were discussed. 
6.2 Brief History of African Women in Armed Rebellion 
In this section I demonstrate that while history clearly shows that women occupied higher 
command and leadership positions, those positions were not acquired through feminist calls for 
gender equality or gender equity. 
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As will be argued in this section, the few women that became famous strategists demonstrated 
high skills and competencies as well as exceptional leadership qualities that enabled them to 
command regiments of men fighting against the settler or colonial forces.  
In Africa, the themes of female independence and self-reliance were reflected in the organization 
of economic, family, and political roles. In numerous African societies, women were leaders in 
their own right with responsibilities and privileges not derived from men.  
African women developed their own legacy of political leadership which included military 
campaigns against European colonialism as late as the seventieth century Gilkes (2001:65). 
Heroines of this legacy include Queen Hatshepsut whose trading skills renewed the wealth of 
Egypt and the Ashanti (Akan) Queen Mother Yaa Asantewaa who is well known as “the woman 
who carried a gun and the sword of state into battle” Gilkes(20001:65).  
In Nigeria, Queen Amina ruled the Hausa state (Zazzan) in the fourteenth century. In Ethiopia 
two women figures feature prominently namely the famous Queen Sheba and Candace.  Candace 
was one of the Kushite sovereign queens who ruled from Meroe (modern Sudan) to the Indian 
Ocean. Gilkes (2001) points out that Candace led military campaigns of such ferocity that “all 
later queens have borne the same generic name, ‘Candaces’ Gilkes (2001:65). In Southern 
Africa, Queen Nzinga of Angola remains an outstanding military strategist.   
Queen Nzinga was a strong woman who fought several wars against the Portuguese to protect 
her people. In 1622, she attended a peace conference with the Portuguese in the coastal city of 
Luanda. The provisions of the treaty were designed to end all fighting in the region, but the 
Portuguese breached the treaty by invading the Congo region Walker (1999:82). In 1623 when 
she became the Queen her first move was to send an ultimatum to the Portuguese authorities 
demanding the immediate execution of the terms of the treaty, otherwise war would be declared 
Williams (1987:265). 
Queen Nzinga’s greatest act, probably the one that makes her one of the greatest women in 
history, was when she declared all territory in Angola over which she had control a free country, 
all slaves reaching it from whatever quarter were forever free. The Queen was among other 
things, a pragmatic military strategist.  She knew quite clearly that white power in Africa rested 
squarely on the use of black troops against black people. She understood that the first thing to do 
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in order to defeat the Portuguese was to undermine and destroy the effective employment of 
black soldiers by Whites.   
Arguments that seek to oppose the entry of women in the SSIs are weakened when Queen 
Nzinga’s military exploits are presented. It can, however, also be argued that Nzinga was an 
exception as opposed to being the norm and that her record cannot be used to justify the entry of 
women into the heat of SSIs. History will protest against sexist because Queen Sheba of Ethiopia 
and others of Egypt and Nigeria merely confirm that bravery and resilience are not a preserve of 
men only. Nzinga remains particularly outstanding and fascinating for demonstrating a military 
acumen that effectively prevented blacks from aligning with white enemy forces as a major 
recognition of the basic tenets of black sovereignty. Indeed she was able to defeat the 
Portuguese. 
Williams (1987) argues that Queen Nzinga is the first and only black leader in history who was 
ever known to undertake such a task.  Her strategy was to carefully select groups of her own 
soldiers to infiltrate the Portuguese black armies.  The quiet and effective work of Nzinga’s 
agents among the black troops of Portugal was one of the most glorious, yet unsung pages in 
African history Williams (1987:266).Williams further points out that whole companies rebelled 
and deserted to the queen taking with them the much needed guns and ammunition which she 
had been unable to secure except by swiftly moving surprise attacks on enemy units Williams 
(1987:266). 
Queen Nzinga’s armies were also further strengthened by the runaway slaves who streamed into 
the only certain haven for the free on the whole continent of Africa (ibid). She fought the 
Portuguese in several battles especially in 1629 when she managed to unite various chiefs as well 
as creating alliances with other tribes in order to completely defeat the Portuguese.  
Unfortunately, her extraordinary reign only delayed the inevitable Walker (1999:82), meaning 
her rule impeded the colonization of Angola for a while.   
In Zimbabwe, a brave woman like Queen Nzinga called Nehanda Nyakasikana, the medium of 
Chaminuka, led a war against the invading Europeans. Mbuya Nehanda, as she was 
affectionately known, possessed a brave Spirit Medium that fought against white colonialism. 
She was later to be captured and hanged by the colonial white government. Her ability to 
command men in battle is well recorded Kriger (1992).   
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Mbuya Nehanda later became a pillar of inspiration to not only female guerrillas but also to their 
male counterparts. During the Second Chimurenga of 1966 to 1980 leading to Zimbabwe’s 
independence, her words of 27
th
 April 1898 that prophesied the rise of her bones to liberate 
Zimbabwe were particularly inspirational to the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
(ZANLA).  
The participation of Mbuya Nehanda in Zimbabwe’s First Chimurenga (war of liberation) was 
such a defining feature that her image often depicted her standing, boldly and arrogantly, minutes 
before the white colonialists hanged her. She became a symbol of defiance, strength and hope for 
the Zimbabwean guerrilla movement, and her name would later be glorified in Zimbabwe’s 
revolutionary songs in order to give the ZANLA forces courage to carry on with the struggle to 
the end.  
It can be noted that Queen Nzinga enjoyed the support of African men in resisting Portuguese 
colonialism and the same can be said of Mbuya Nehanda who also led men in battle against 
British occupation. Gilkes (2001:65) argues that women of Africa had the care, love, protection, 
and institutional societal support of men as they – the women – carried out major military and 
political responsibilities.  
It can be argued that the support women got had nothing to do with gender equality or gender 
equity. As noted by Gilkes, African societies did not segregate against women. Both males and 
females had to prove their capabilities and potential in order to earn respect from a purely non-
segregatory and all-inclusive society.  
Arguably, calls have been made to reform the security sector Carey (2001), Mobekk (2010) and 
Shepherd (2011) by and to put more women in leadership positions. As may be discerned from 
the foregoing discussion, the women mentioned above did not acquire their statuses through 
affirmative action which seeks to appease as opposed to qualify. No form of traditional ‘reform’ 
was ever conducted to bring about the outstanding women already mentioned above. These 
women were products of their own mettle. 
I argue that the influential political and military titles these women had, came after they had 
proved their combat and leadership capabilities. This argument is consolidated by the 
designations these women hold, or are remembered for.  
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Queen Mother Yaa Asantewaa is well known as the woman who ‘carried a gun and a sword into 
battle’ implying ‘unquestionable bravery’; Queen Candace is remembered for ‘leading fierce 
military campaigns’ against the enemy signifying boldness, courage and above all pragmatism; 
Queen Nzinga is seen as ‘an outstanding military strategist’ suggesting a ‘high degree of 
intelligence, pragmatism and fearlessness’; Mbuya Nehanda is referred to as a brave Spirit 
Medium denoting ‘heroism, courage, audacity,  and the voice from yonder’. 
In Africa, during the liberation struggle, although women also took a combative role against the 
European colonizers their numbers in combat were fewer. Kriger (1992) argues that women have 
fought side by side with their male counterparts in Africa’s liberation wars. Throughout history, 
women have, occasionally, seized opportunities to fight.  
Armies often target women for recruitment, particularly to add legitimacy or symbolic power to 
their war efforts Whitworth (2008). It can be argued that while women occasionally seized the 
opportunities to fight in close quarter battles their presence in military institutions was not 
motivated by gender activism but by their passion, performance and capabilities. 
The female fighter as a symbol was very important in Eritrea and became an important symbol 
for socialist Yugoslavia Barth (2002). DeGroot (2001) argues that in war, women, are also as 
violent as men. It can be argued that women’s contribution in combat includes several visible 
and strategically important functions. Women in many liberation movements have performed 
high-risk tasks such as espionage, planting of landmines and infiltration of enemy camps.  
Women and girls have fought side by side with their male counterparts in the Allied Democratic 
Forces (Uganda), the National Liberation Forces (Burundi), The National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (Angola) and the ZANLA and Zimbabwe People’s Liberation Army 
(ZIPRA) of Zimbabwe (Kriger; 1992, Ranger; 1985, Strobel; 1982). 
It needs emphasising that the argument about women making important contributions in military 
establishments implies that their employment should be based on merit as opposed to advocacy.  
Interrogations into the inner workings of organized revolutionary groups reveal that women are 
an indispensable part of the armed struggle. The ability of women and girls to escape suspicion 
and, sometimes, to infiltrate into enemy camps cannot be equalled. Literature on guerrilla 
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warfare clearly outlines how women have participated in combat as well Ranger (1985) and 
Mahangwa (2005). 
The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and the Front for 
the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) incorporated the liberation of women into their 
ideologies in the course of armed struggle against Portugal from the 1950s to 1975 Strobel 
(1982:126).  
Wilson (1991) points out that in the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), women were 
active in the organization in roles which included the distribution of pamphlets, recruitment, the 
smuggling of arms, and the research of targets for armed attacks.  Women were denied official 
membership in the early history of the organization but they managed to make inroads in the 
1970s taking positions as combatants and leaders in the organization Wilson (1991).  
Rosen (1997) notes that by the time Eritrean independence was achieved in 1990, women had 
come to play such an important role in the movement that their participation was noted in the 
preamble of the country’s never-implemented 1997 constitution.  
The above examples show how women have played leading roles in the armed struggle.  
Mugo (1975) in his study of the Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya in the 1950s argues that women 
acted as messengers, running food and relaying vital information to Mau Mau fighters in the 
forest camps. It must be noted that other women, instead of being mere couriers, also fought 
alongside men. Mugo (1975:6-7) remarks that “the women who suffered and lost their families 
during the war were never really compensated for, whereas the men at least managed to make 
their way through outlets like political parties and special appointments to positions of 
responsibility.” 
It is therefore saddening to note that the majority of women were excluded from the top 
administrative structures during the war and this meant that they were similarly out of picture in 
same level structures after the war.  
It can be argued that, the low representation of women in Africa’s security institutions has 
therefore continued as will be discussed in detail in the subsequent sections. Denzer (1976) in 
concurrence also argues that despite the abundant literature on guerrilla warfare and nationalist 
movements in Africa, there is little mention of women’s role in these activities. He comments 
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that women’s leadership may have been limited owing to their level of education since 
nationalist groups were led by educated men.  
Denzer suggests that the relative absence of women in the top ranks of nationalist movements 
might have been a reflection of their lesser access to education. He contends that “it is more 
likely, however, that women’s role has been largely hidden” (Denzer, 1976:74).  
Mahangwa (2015) argues that during the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, the pre-existing 
divisions of labour between men and women were preserved and reinforced. She reasons that the 
patriarchal notion of men as protectors and women as the protected was effectively used in 
shaping gender roles in the unfolding guerrilla war, and these social arrangements were generally 
acceptable to both men and women Mahangwa (2015:6).  
Mahangwa further claims that women received very little formal education as African parents 
preferred to send boys than girls to school. As a result, she argues, the “gender based disparities 
remained unchallenged” (ibid). Mahangwa (2015) also observes that during the Zimbabwean 
peace negotiations at the Lancaster House, the ZANU component of the Patriotic Front (PF) was 
entirely male. She further establishes that the Zimbabwean media also used the term, the return 
of boys from the bush emphasizing the male component and their involvement in the war and 
excluding women fighters from the limelight Mahangwa (2015:6).  
The above authors highlight how women fighters have been side-lined from the guerrilla war or 
liberation struggle yet literature does acknowledge that women also played an equally important 
role as men during the years of conflict in Africa. It must be noted that these guerrilla women’s 
combat prowess has not resulted in them being necessarily granted the same ranks as their male 
counterparts in the security sector.  
The liberation movements discussed here are historically and ideologically diverse, suggesting a 
picture of women’s contribution to modern conflict that is far more widespread than most 
accounts credit. 
It is worth pointing out that academic work that tends to ignore the presence of women as actors 
in armed rebellion, risks creating an incomplete understanding about how revolutionary wars are 
conducted and settled. The question who does what, and why deserves addressing in a more 
rational manner. 
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Both males and females encountered equal danger, existed under living conditions and roles 
which were not gender stereotyped.  
However, a point to note is that there were more men than women in combat operations during 
the liberation struggles. Armor (2013) has observed that young men are about three times more 
likely to volunteer for military service than young women; thus the supply of men is 
considerably higher than that of women.  
Studies have revealed that females have a less likelihood of volunteering in a time of war as 
compared to males. This problem is not only confined to liberation struggles. For example, 
Canada has not had a combat restriction for decades, and they have about the same percentage of 
women (14%) serving in their active forces and only 2.4% serve in combat positions MacDonald 
(2013).    
Even Israel, which is the first country to draft women into military service, reports that women 
occupy only 3% of combat jobs (Christian Science Monitor, 2013).  
The rigorous training for combat duty also acts as a deterrent for women who may be willing to 
join the defence sector. Society has created stereotypes were women are seen as a weaker sex 
while males are seen as being macho, militant and strong.  
Whitworth (2008) asserts that military training the world over aims to create an individual who is 
loyal and committed to the Security Sector Institutions he or she is attached to. Goldstein 
(2004:266) points out that the recruits also learn to suppress emotions and in particular learn to 
‘deny all that is feminine and ‘soft’ in them. This implies that female recruits ought to behave in 
a masculine way denying them of who they really are. There is no ‘equality’ as the feminine 
attribute is suppressed for a masculine trait.  
Gender activists and feminists - through their calls for reforms in security institutions - tend to 
overlook the physical, emotional, social and technological demands that one has to go through in 
order to be well prepared for combat or warfare (Goldstein, 2004). I argue that, women should 
not merely join the military, only as a way to improve on gender equity or to please gender 
activists but consideration should be made of their combat skills and military capabilities. 
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6.3 Women and issues of Masculinity in the Military 
It is commonplace in some literature to “associate females with peace and passivity” Enloe 
(2000:3). Pankhurst (2003:20) notes that feminised qualities, which include seeking non-
confrontational methods of conflict resolution, willingly working for the good of the collective 
and even remaining passive, are assumed to be inherent to all women.  This means, in the 
majority of cases women are seen as naturally linked to peace, while men are tied to war and the 
war front.   
Arguments concerning women’s biology or social conditioning suggest that they are more prone 
to be nurturing and caring than men. Mason (2005:740) points out that since women are  life 
‘givers’ it precludes life ‘taking’ from their character, rendering them incapable of violence, 
owing to a biological predisposition towards creating new life and nurturing.  
Willet (2010) notes that the values and norms guiding international relations are male dominated. 
She argues that these male dominated concepts are afforded greater social value compared to 
those associated with female values and this leads to the notion of male dominance. Such an 
assumption has been seen to serve male power whilst encouraging female subordination. The 
state, rather than being neutral actually perpetuates gender disparities by endorsing and 
sustaining policy and practices that are primarily in the interests of men Willet (2010).  
The security sector institutions have been turned by many states into ‘men only areas’ where 
females are only seen and never heard.  
The numerical make-up of armed forces the world over clearly show that males outnumber 
females by a very wide margin. Reforms in favour of gender equity cannot succeed under such 
circumstances. For example, the statistical data in SADC militaries on percentages of males and 
females in the defence sector shows that females are under-represented with countries such as 
Botswana having a 1% rate, Madagascar 0.1%, Mozambique and Malawi at 5% each (SADC 
Gender Protocol Barometers 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2015}.  These above percentages, arguably, 
show how men and women are perceived in the respective countries. Simply put, the 
male/aggressive and female/passive nexus is the cornerstone of this feature of high and low 
percentages respectively.  
Goldstein (2004:6) argues that “warfare is generally seen as an act of licensed misogyny, where 
the various sides attempt to dominate the others into submission. Combatants, regardless of their 
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sex, are commonly associated with masculinity.” The link between combatants and masculine 
behaviour is often emphasized through the actions of female combatants. Women, who are 
involved in warfare, whether direct combatants or leaders are considered to act “as men would” 
rather than acting without any gendered agency involved Hale (2010: 1120). Similarly, peace 
activists are associated with femininity.  
Goldstein (2004) observes that constructed masculinity acts as a motivation for soldiers across 
cultures. These norms include: war as a “test of manhood”; masculine war roles balanced by 
feminine war roles such as mothers, wives and sweethearts and women’s roles in actively 
opposing war, thus furthering the notion of war as masculine and peace as feminine 
Goldstein(2004: 5-6).  
As a result of the foregoing perceptions, the presence of women in combat forces is seen to 
undermine the normative aspects of warfare. In other words, warfare is meant to be an arena for 
males and not females.  
With the exception of specific individual examples mentioned in section one; there have been 
very few notable examples of substantial and sustained female involvement in warfare or in 
battle.  In Zimbabwe, no woman has ever taken part in its elite Commando Unit which is 
presumed to be physically straining and only suitable for men. Valesek (2008:3) points out that 
“military training, or ‘boot camp’, is often a tightly choreographed process aimed at breaking 
down individuality and building official military conduct and group loyalty.  
The process of socialization is intimately gendered, as being a soldier is purposefully linked to 
being a ‘real man.’ Physical fitness, endurance, bravery and self-control are seen as attributes 
inherent in males than in females. In this regard, Sjoberg and Via (2010) have noted that 
effective combat requires the privileging of hegemonic masculinities - aggressiveness, courage, 
obedience, patriotism, stoicism, and loyalty - over feminine behaviour. These characteristics or 
traits are attributed to males and not females and the SSR discourse has not done much to change 
such perceptions. 
In October 2013, SADC Special Forces took part in the Special Forces Exercise code named 
Weiwitchia, which drew participants from Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia (hosting nation), 
South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The exercise was code-named Weiwitchia after 
a desert plant which is unique to the Namibian desert. The plant can live for more than 1500 
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years surviving in extremely dry conditions with only moist, mist or morning dew (The 
Zimbabwe National Army Magazine, 2013:13).  
Code naming the exercise Weiwitchia was a way of inculcating survival skills akin to the plant 
into the Special Forces. The participating troops took part in various exercises which included 
airborne, seaborne, mobility and landward skills. The high standard of training in military skills 
makes it easy for the soldiers to quickly adapt to changed conditions, making it possible for them 
to even operate in oceans and deserts even though they may not have been acclimatized to such 
environments.  
The military contingents who took part in these gruelling exercises were male dominated. A 
major reason may be that Special Forces are exposed to tough situations which require endurance 
as to withstand trying experiences (fog of war or unpredictability of situations) which are 
common in war. As such, Special Forces go through excruciating exercises to gain the stamina 
crucial for survival when tough times come. A good example is that during the Weiwitchia 
exercises in the Atlantic Ocean one of the boats capsized and the SADC Special Forces had to 
swim for more than three and a half hours to reach the Namibian coast.  
One Malawian soldier died in the mishap and two South African soldiers were reported missing 
in action (The Zimbabwe National Army Magazine, 2013:13).  
Due to gender stereotypes some states perceive the presence of female soldiers in the army as 
“inevitably a weakening of a nation's military strength” DeGroot (2001:23). In other words, it is 
assumed that if you recruit women in an army you are obviously paving way for defeat in future 
wars. The participation of women in the military and in war has throughout history been limited 
because of these stereotypes.  
“Women, it is held, do not make good soldiers because they are weak, both physically and 
emotionally” (ibid). Defence institutions are not much interested in lifting their ‘veiled’ ban on 
women in direct ground-combat positions.  
A major reason for this perception is that from a basic biological level, men are different from 
women and these differences impact the approach to the role of gender in the war system. These 
biological reasons can be summed up in the following list: men are genetically programmed 
towards violence; testosterone makes men more violent; men are physically more imposing than 
160 
 
women; men’s brains are programmed towards long-distance mobility and aggression and 
women are adapted for care giving roles that preclude participation in warfare Goldstein (2004: 
5). These differences clearly serve as a good starting point when examining the realities of 
military practices and the hurdles and challenges SSR activists are likely to face in their attempts 
to reform the security institutions in favour of gender equity. 
As argued above, the ‘strong’ male body and the military is the norm in societies across the 
world and throughout history. This link between the military and masculinity has over time 
become normalized by societies. Kronsell (2012:282) points out that some behaviour when it 
gets within a certain institution or organisation becomes a norm which will be hard to critique 
imbedded.  
In other words, once society accepts this notion as a norm, young men are naturally recruited in 
the army as a way of proving or claiming their masculinity. This is also supported by Goldstein 
(2004) who asserts that some cultural values and beliefs force young men to endure hardships as 
a way of claiming their status of manhood. Other than that, men within the military are also 
continuously forced to prove their manhood as noted in the SADC Special Forces Exercise code 
named Weiwitchia in Namibia. 
Aulette and Blakely (2000) consolidate the above point by arguing that soldiers are under 
extensive pressure to prove their masculinity through toughness adversity and bravery. Gill 
(1997) is of the view that military service is of an important aspect that denotes masculinity since 
it signifies power as well as toughness which man need to meet daily challenges of life. This 
means the military is a place for men to prove their ‘manhood’.  
The influence that the military has on society goes beyond the walls of the army barracks. Higate 
and Hopton (2005) also assert that the military institutions are the main avenue by which norms 
associated with male dominance are overwhelmingly established. It can be argued that those 
women who enlist in the military are usually regarded as being masculine and no security reform 
can change such a stereotyped mind-set.  
When one looks at arguments put across in this section, it thus becomes quite clear why the 
percentage of women in the enlisted forces has not improved much in the world in general and in 
all SADC countries in particular. From the above paragraphs, it can be seen that the military is 
an institution where males are dominant.  
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In South Africa, women still have very little presence at the highest level of commanding 
structure of the Defence Force despite the calls for SSR in that country. In Lesotho, it has been 
seen that the highest ranking female member of the Lesotho Defence Force occupies the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel and is the Director of Medical Services, heading the military hospital. In 
Zimbabwe, Colonel Shalit Moyo was elevated to the rank of Brigadier General by President 
Robert Mugabe in September 2013, becoming the most powerful woman in the Zimbabwe 
Defence Forces.  
However, Brigadier Shalit Moyo has an administrative post within the Zimbabwean army. While 
such advancements of women within the SADC security institutions are plausible, the stubborn 
fact still remains; the military the world over remains male dominated despite numerous calls for 
reforms to this effect.  
Basing on the above arguments, it can therefore be argued that, women, who excel in the 
military, as seen in the above sections, tend to occupy positions in the administrative and medical 
services.  
6.4 Inclusion of Women in Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs): Concise Overview of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR: 1325) 
The increase of female police officers taking part in PKOs across the globe has become a 
baseline used to call for SSR in Southern Africa. Using this baseline there are increased calls for 
a 50-50 gender balance in all sectors of the security services particularly the military, police and 
intelligence components where women constitute a small population as highlighted in the SADC 
Protocol on Gender 2010 – 15 by gender activists such as Morna and Nyakujarah in SADC 
Gender Protocol  Barometer (2010, 2011, 2012), Morna, Glenwright and Magarangoma in SADC 
Gender Protocol  Barometer (2010), Hendricks and Magadla in SADC Gender Protocol  Barometer 
(2010), Made in SADC Gender Protocol  Barometer (2015), Goettinger and Grange in SADC Gender 
Protocol  Barometer (2015) and Glenwright in SADC Gender Protocol  Barometer (2015).  
The other reason being raised by some scholars is that of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) 
Bridges and Horsfall (2009), Simic (2010), Karim and Beardsley (2015) and Jennings (2008-
2011).The Global Facilitation Network’s SSR Guide for Beginners (2007) points out that SSR 
aims to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction, good 
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governance and in particular the growth of democratic institutions based on the rule of law. The 
Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action which were launched in 2000 called for 
gender mainstreaming as a major component of all peace support missions Simic (2010).  
It can be argued that gender mainstreaming seeks to achieve a ‘political’ agenda without 
assessing its importance on enhancing operational performance of the military. It can further be 
argued that SSR cannot be instituted basing on the argument of balancing figures of males and 
females in the military but should rather be based on performance requirements.  
The increase in the participation of women in peace-making, peacekeeping and peace building 
has been a crucial aim for UN peacekeeping since the introduction in 2000 of UN Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace and security (for more details also see: 
Carey (2001), Willett (2010) and Shepherd (2011). Bridges and Horsfall (2009) are quite 
optimistic and have a strong conviction that “an increased percentage of female military 
personnel on UN peacekeeping operations are beneficial to operational effectiveness”.  
There is advocacy for a greater proportion of female service personnel in PKOs. The major 
argument is that by having more females in PKOs will in a way help to contain sexual abuse of 
civilians by male soldiers Bridges and Horsfall (2009). They further argue that PKOs are best 
carried out by a force that is represented by both males and females because this can help 
improve the reputation of peace keepers among local populations.  
Bridges and Horsfall (2009) observe that peacekeeping missions that have been successful in the 
past have had close to equal numbers of males and females participating. It can be observed that 
the success of peacekeeping missions in the past may not have been achieved by mere equalising 
of numbers of males and females in PKOs but was rather due to their operational effectiveness 
born out of good training and exhibiting good behaviour.  
Resolution 1325 requires commitment by states to include women in peace keeping operations 
(PKOs) and security structures as a part of SSR. It encourages the involvement of women in the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace building at national, regional and 
international levels. Otto (2004:1) hails this resolution as providing “important new leverage for 
local women’s groups to claim a role in peace negotiations and post-conflict decision-making”. 
Bastick (2008:150) is also of the view that “for security services to be representative, trusted and 
effective, they must be reformed to include women as well as men.  
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Bridges and Horsfall (2009) are in agreement that reforms that include female peacekeepers are 
generally well regarded by members of host countries and this is a fundamental advantage (ibid: 
126). They point out that the uniform commands a level of respect and authority and 
simultaneously, women’s presence normalizes the force and reinforces the peace-making agenda 
of the UN peacekeeping troops (ibid). However, it can be argued that host countries which 
usually include women in PKOs do so after considering various aspects which include the skills 
and competencies of these women before any deployment can be done.  
A scientific study needs to be undertaken in order to prove or ascertain why women should or 
should not be on the front lines or PKOs.  
Simic (2010) argues that the need to combat sexual violence in PKOs should solely be the 
responsibility of troop-contributing countries, which need to exercise accountability and 
prosecute sexual violence committed by their peacekeepers. In other words, the presence of more 
females in peacekeeping operations owing to SSR does not in itself deter sexual crimes. What 
deters such crimes, are stringent measures taken by the troop-contributing country on those who 
commit SEA crimes. She notes that other than having female peacekeepers in these operations 
what is more important is for the troop-contributing country to punish or act quickly on those 
who commit such crimes in accordance with the dictates of municipal and international law. This 
means, troop-contributing countries should establish investigative mechanism to investigate 
serious misconduct, including SEA, committed by peacekeepers.  
Simic further argues that, rather than diverting responsibility to female peacekeepers through 
SSR, the UN has to show genuine commitment by taking action and enforcing accountability for 
peacekeepers who commit sexual crimes in PKOs.  
In 2000 the UNSC passed Resolution 1325 in order, among many other things, to enable women 
to participate in peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building, as well as the promotion of a 
gender perspective within these processes.   The calls for an increase of females in peacekeeping 
forces have also intensified in the SADC region since the adoption of Article 28, of the SADC 
Gender and Development Protocol in 2008. The SADC Protocol legally requires gender 
mainstreaming on all peacekeeping and related state actions. In other words, Article 28 of the 
SADC Protocol on Gender and Development on peace building and conflict resolution draws 
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Member States attention to UNSCR 1325 as the reference point (SADC Protocol on Gender, 
2010, Barometer) 
 Figure 4.1 below presents a column graph of the percentage of SADC women peacekeepers 
from 2011-2014. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) target 
for women in country troop contingents is at 10%, while police targets are at 20% (SADC 
Gender Protocol 2011 Barometer, 2011:235). It must be noted that many of the recruitment plans 
of defence institutions in Southern Africa have targets that range between 10-40% (SADC 
Gender Protocol 2011 Barometer, 2011:235).  
However, the SADC region still falls far too short to meet the 50% target for women's inclusion 
in the security sector by 2015 (SADC Gender Protocol 2015 Barometer, 2015:277). New plans 
and initiatives have to be undertaken to extend the target for more years to come.  
Figure 4.1 shows that the proportion of women in peacekeeping missions across the SADC 
region is very uneven. 
Figure 4.1
 
Source: SADC Gender Protocol, 2014 and 2015 Barometer(s) 
The above column graph shows that very few countries in the SADC region have reached the 
UNDPKO female targets of 10% troop contribution and 20% for the police. From the above 
graph it can be noted that a few SADC countries such as Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa 
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continue to perform above the global average for the proportion of female peacekeepers they 
deploy, though, the deployment still falls short of the SADC Gender Protocol which is at 50%.  
From the above graph, it can be seen that Zimbabwe and Namibia contributed 29% which were 
the highest percentage of women peacekeepers in 2014. However, for Zimbabwe it was lower 
than the 35% recorded in 2013. Madagascar showed significant improvement in the number of 
women it deployed, from 3% in 2010 to 17% in 2014. Zambia increased its deployment of 
women peacekeepers from 10% in 2010 to 16% in 2014 (SADC Gender Protocol, 2015 
Barometer, 2015: 288).  
From the graph, it can be observed that Tanzania’s deployment of female peacekeepers remained 
constant at 6%.   
On the other hand, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Africa, and Malawi's 
deployments decreased. It can be observed that the graph only shows data in statistical form 
indicating a rise or fall of female numbers participating in PKOs as contributed by SADC 
countries. 
It can thus be argued that this kind of statistical data cannot be used as bedrock for SSR focusing 
only on increased female figures while neglecting other facets which mould a professional 
military combatant.    
Karimand Beardsley (2015) acknowledges that the proportion of women in PKOs may help but 
still stops short of addressing the root problem. Through their analysis of various PKOs from 
2009-2013, they note that the inclusion of  higher proportions of both female peacekeepers and 
personnel from countries with better records of gender equality is associated with lower levels of 
SEA allegations reported against military contingents.  
Karim and Beardsley (2015:10) go on to argue that in societies that are patriarchal such 
peacekeepers are highly likely to abuse and exploit women and children. This means if troop-
contributing countries have “military institutions that adopt a heightened sense of hyper 
masculinity, then one expectation is for soldiers that come from more patriarchal countries to be 
more likely to commit SEA” Karim and Beardsley(2015:11).  
In other words, Karim and Beardsley (2015) see the representation of women in PKOs as well as 
the norms and practices related to gender equality in the force contributing countries as an 
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advantage in shaping the behaviour of male peacekeepers towards vulnerable women and 
children in PKOs. However, it can be argued that males too can prevent peacekeepers from 
committing SEA crimes if they are well trained and there exist a culture of promptly punishing 
the offenders.  
The two authors, gathered data on the number of SEA allegations reported to the UN as well as 
the proportions of female peacekeepers in PKOs. They also measured gender equality in troop-
contributing countries. 
Karim and Beardsley (2015) found out that the inclusion of higher proportions of female 
peacekeepers does have a link with fewer SEA allegations, as does the inclusion of more 
personnel from countries with better records of gender equality.   
A critical analysis of the above argument indicates a need to reduce SEA challenges in PKOs. It 
can be observed that the data collected does not ethically demonstrate the effectiveness of 
women in combating SEA but only indicates that their increased number helped to reduce SEA 
in PKOs. I argue that it is not enough to make such a conclusion by merely looking at the 
increased number of female peacekeepers and to say troop contributing countries with gender 
sensitive policies were more likely to have morally behaved male peacekeepers than those with 
less effective gender sensitive policies. I further argue that training, nurturing of cultural beliefs 
and prompt effective punishment of those who commit SEA, be they female or male, could be 
the solution in combating SEA in PKOs. 
Karim and Beardsley (2015), basing on their findings, noted that “an improvement in the 
representation of women can help but still stops short of addressing the root of the problem”. 
Representation of women in PKOs cannot be the panacea to combating SEA as highlighted by 
Karim and Beardsley but other mechanisms also need to be considered. It can be argued that 
despite a high proportion of female peacekeepers in PKOs, abuses can still continue.  
Jennings (2008) argues that female peacekeepers may be more loyal to their country than to local 
women and thus may not report abuses. Women also face pressures in the job and may feel 
intimidated to report any misconduct. Just as it is assumed that many male personnel are hesitant 
to report SEA cases for fear of upsetting group cohesion, female personnel are also likely to face 
the same dilemma, and even more so if women suspect that they must overcome gender biases to 
prove that they are team players. She argues that “the deterrence argument” emanating from the 
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SSR discourse that women peacekeepers will have a “civilizing” effect on men peacekeepers, 
thus reducing the prevalence of prostitution, sexual exploitation or abuse in the mission area – is 
found wanting Jennings (2011:5). She observes that “women peacekeepers tend to adapt their 
own behaviour to that of the male group” which is quite contrary to the ideas of SSR supporters 
such as Bridges and Horsfall (2009), Hendricks (2010) and many others.  
The implication is clear: in order to be accepted by their male colleagues, females become one of 
the boys – at least tolerating, if not actively participating in, crude banter and highly-sexualized 
behaviour” (ibid).  
It can further be argued that males committing SEA crimes are not doing it as peacekeepers but 
as males with loose morals or with bad cultural behaviours lacking respect for women and 
children.  
Basing on the above argument, it becomes necessary to point out that men of such loose 
character or deportment are not only limited to the military but can also be found among ordinary 
civilians. This inherent moral weakness is not only found in males but females as well, can be 
major culprits whether engaged in the military or in civilian life.  
Thus, it can be argued that calling or formulating SSR policy basing on the fact of increased SEA 
maybe misleading since both sexes are quite capable of committing such heinous crimes.    
Arguably, women peacekeepers are usually deployed to regions which are highly stable where 
incidences of military escalations are next to none. Research carried out by Karim and Beardsley 
(2015) shows that “female peacekeepers tend to be deployed to the safest missions and not to 
places where the security situation is most fragile. Following a kind of gendered “protection 
norm,” countries willing to deploy female troops and police send them to more economically 
developed places and on missions with fewer peacekeeper deaths”.  
Essentially, men are usually deployed to sensitive areas where they can engage in combat 
operations in the event that security deteriorates during PKOs. As such, peacekeepers are 
required to stand up to the arduous physical and mental challenges and requirements of some 
PKOs. Bellamy (2010) in support of the above assertion point out that in today’s world PKOs are 
now characterised by increasing danger in which the peace keepers might be forced to use 
coercion in order to maintain order.  
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Put differently, male peacekeepers who are usually trained for combat operations can best handle 
situations that go out of control in the course of conducting PKOs.  
Scholars such as DeGroot (2001) agree with the above notion arguing that combat requirements 
are necessary in that peacekeeping may at times be violent which makes it necessary for 
peacekeepers to be trained in combat. The SADC Stand by Brigade in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo is overwhelmingly dominated by male peacekeepers with very few females. This is so 
because of the fragile peace processes in most African regions where violence can escalate 
anytime despite peace agreements having been signed. Under such circumstances, countries are 
compelled to send more competent military personnel to deal with volatile political situations.  
Thus, only women with the necessary skills and competences should take part in PKOs rather 
than adding large numbers of females who may not be qualified. The idea of just wantingto meet 
SSR statistical requirements as proposed by reformists may result in weakening the effectiveness 
of the force thus putting into jeopardy the lives of the vulnerable civilians they are supposed to 
protect. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter it was demonstrably clear that throughout history, women have also taken centre 
stage in Africa’s political and military sphere. However, women positions of power within the 
military ranks were not acquired through feminist calls for gender equity. They earned their high 
military ranks through their high skills and exceptional leadership qualities. It was noted that 
during the liberation struggles in Southern Africa and elsewhere, women also fought bravely 
against White rule. 
Arguably, few women fought in the liberation struggle and this compared well with to their male 
counterparts.  
Dangerous missions into enemy strongholds were usually executed by male fighters. 
The second observation was that though women should be included in PKOs this should be done 
based on their skills, abilities or competencies. The deployment of women in PKOs is usually 
done in more stable areas; consolidating the argument that PKOs are usually male dominated 
owing to male peacekeepers’ ability to engage in combat if conflict suddenly escalates.  
169 
 
Women in the SADC region still occupy low ranking positions and the majority of those who 
have been promoted usually occupy high ranking positions within the administrative and medical 
services. It was argued that most armies are not willing to enlist women in combat operations 
mainly because of the way society perceive women as being ‘weaker’ to men.  
Women themselves have not also been willing to enlist in the security institutions preferring to 
work in other government departments and in the private sector. Various studies have shown that 
men are more willing to volunteer to enlist in the army than women.  
Others have also argued that enlisting more females in the defence sector will weaken it. All in 
all, it has been noted that the military is a male dominated arena and that has been the norm 
throughout the world.  
It can thus be concluded that formulation of an SSR policy must not only be guided by the call 
for gender equity but it must be guided by all aspects of militarism such as sound training, 
fitness, courage, aggressiveness, respect of humanity, morality and good cultural behaviours. 
 
In the next chapter (seven) I seek to analyse democratic oversight of security sector institutions 
and state sovereignty in selected non-African countries. 
  
170 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY SECTOR 
INSTITUTIONSAND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN SELECTED NON-
AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was established that women have been leaders in their own right 
capable of leading men into battle. However, it was found out that these women’s high ranks in 
the military were not as a result of security sector reforms based on gender equity but were 
actually earned through the high military skills which these women exhibited as well as their 
exceptional leadership qualities.  
It was also noted that the security sector is male dominated owing to its rigidity, 
conservativeness and also the rigorous and gruelling exercises which few women are willing to 
undertake.  
In this chapter I seek to give a critical assessment of the effectiveness of executive and 
democratic oversight in the United States of America, Russian Federation and People’s Republic 
of China. The reason for looking at these three great powers is to demonstrate that the problems 
of democratic oversight are not only limited to African states. They are also equally spread to 
countries that are influential on the stage of world politics.  
The SS is liable to abuse locally, regionally and internationally. For that reason, parliamentarians 
are tasked to ensure that such abuse does not occur or is at least curbed. The role of 
parliamentarians in advancing SSR is therefore meant to ensure that sound ethics is applied in 
regulating SS hegemony through well-defined oversight mechanisms. Whether a state follows a 
capitalist or communist ideology, or, whether its political orientations are democratic or socialist, 
it remains the moral duty of parliament to keep a close eye on the usage of state power, as well 
as regulate how the state implements its SS plans, projects and programmes. Fundamental to the 
oversight is the need to ensure that stated policies are respected and followed. 
The constitution is the supreme law of the land and is the document that contains the ethical 
conduct of the nation-state. It is an instrument that governs the behaviour of those who govern 
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and those that are governed. Parliament as a legislative body plays a pivotal role in the policy 
formulation of SSR through democratic oversight. It has been observed that in formulating SSR 
policies the world over, parliament can work for either strengthening or weakening the SSIs. One 
can argue that in the case of great power competition for world dominance, parliament has been 
seen to approve on the strengthening of the SS through continued technological capacitation of 
SSR processes as exemplified in the cases of the USA, Russia and China.   
The USA lauds itself of having a ‘democratic’ security sector. Russia, on the other hand, has a 
security sector that differs from that of the USA in that the executive plays a major role in 
influencing parliament on issues to do with the security sector. China also has its own unique 
way of dealing with the security sector which is oriented and more answerable to the Chinese 
Communist Party than to the parliamentarians.  
It is clear that the three countries have different approach to parliamentary oversight of SSIs.  
The thrust of the three countries is, however, deeply embedded in not only maintaining state 
sovereignty but also maintaining a consistent ethical approach in carrying out parliamentary 
oversight of SSIs. Relevant to this study is the need to note that each country signifies the 
direction in which the discourse and literature on SSR is developing, albeit from different 
perspectives. 
To achieve the objectives of the chapter, the SS of each of the three countries is examined and 
given an in depth analysis with a view to acquaint ourselves with matters that seek to see to the 
evolving and development of the SS and resultant SSIs.  
First, focus is given to the SS situation of the US by giving an in-depth analysis of the security 
duties of the US executive as well as the ethical role of Congress in carrying out democratic 
oversight of the SS.  
Second, focus is given to the SS situation of Russia by giving a critical analysis of how the 
Russian Duma’s ethical role of SS oversight is at times influenced by the executive in order to 
maintain state sovereignty.  
Third, focus is given to the SS situation of China by examining the role of the executive and 
democratic oversight in the People’s Republic of China with special emphasis on  
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parliamentarians’ ethical duty and how this checks the power of the state that risks being 
manipulated by the one-party political system in favour of executive decisions.  
In conclusion, I seek to note major observations discussed in the entire Chapter. 
7.2 United States of America-Democratic Oversight of the SS versus State Sovereignty 
The President of the United States (US) is the head of state and government. He has the ethical 
duty to lead the executive branch of the federal government and is the commander-in-chief of the 
United States Armed Forces.  
Article II of the US Constitution gives the President power over a variety of state issues.  
The President is vested with the executive power of the government; he is named Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces and navy and he has the moral duty to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.” 
From these powers is derived the President's constitutional authority to conduct the foreign 
relations of the United States such as entering into treaties and receiving ambassadors (Rogers, 
1971:1195).  
According to Ostrom and Job (1986:541), as the leader of one of the world's great powers, the 
President of the US is charged with an ethical responsibility of guiding and implementing 
policies to protect and advance US interests abroad by putting in place a strong security sector. 
One can argue that the protection of US interests abroad forms the basis of the stature of USA’s 
SS where the executive implements an SSR that seeks to capacitate the armed forces to 
maximise internal and external security, maintain sovereignty and dominate the world. 
Campbell and Summers (1990:516) also contend that because of the President’s constitutional 
powers as well as the weaknesses of the American congress in foreign policy making it is 
therefore the executive which has extensive control over the military actions of the state. 
Edwards et al (2002) argues that US Presidents retain profound informational and tactical 
advantages over Congress in formulating and implementing U.S. foreign policy and they remain 
the most potent political force in the making of foreign policy, while Congress remains a 
secondary political player.  
173 
 
Blechman and Kaplan (1978) show that the use of force has proved to have been a frequently 
employed instrument of foreign policy by US presidents. They show that between the years 1946 
and 1976, the US deployed military units abroad for political purposes 226 times.  
Howell and Pevehouse (2005) are of the view that since the US President is the commander-in-
chief of the military, Congress has less ethical obligation to stop him or her from using the SS to 
pick up battles with other nations, define the duration of a conflict or set up the terms by which a 
conflict can be finally resolved.  
Meernik (1994:123) borrowing from Job and Ostrom (1986) points out that situations or 
circumstances that entitle the US president to exercise the moral right to use military force are as 
follows: 
 the situation involved a perceived current threat to the territorial security of the U.S., its current 
allies, major clients, or proxy states;  
 the situation posed a perceived danger to U.S. government, military, or diplomatic personnel; 
to significant numbers of U.S. citizens, or to U.S. assets;  
 events were perceived as having led, or likely to lead to advances by ideologically committed 
opponents of the U.S. (i.e., communists or "extreme leftists" broadly defined) be they states, 
regimes, or regime contenders; 
 events were perceived as likely to lead to losses of U.S. influence in regions perceived as 
within the U.S. sphere of influence, especially viewed as Central and South America;  
 Events involving inter-state military conflict of potential consequence; in human and strategic 
terms; or events, because of civil disorder, threatened destruction of a substantial number of 
persons. (Job and Ostrom, 1986:10) 
A critical observation of the above situation or circumstances under which the US President 
determines the use of the military indicates that the President has an ethical mandate to carry out 
an SSR that seeks to technologically capacitate the military as well as to defend the sovereignty 
of the US. While such a proposition may be critiqued, one must note that great powers are 
competing for dominance on the world stage and so the US needs a preponderant SS in order to 
achieve the above objectives. It also needs a strong military in order to remain sovereign, stable 
and socially and economically viable. 
Article I, section 8 of the US Constitution grants Congress a number of specific powers which 
include the power "to . . . provide for the common Defence. . . ; To declare War . . . ; To raise 
and support Armies . . ; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government 
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces” (Rogers, 1971).  
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According to Howell and Pevehouse (2005), while presidents retain considerable ethical 
discretion to use force as they please, Congress also has a moral right to increase the marginal 
costs of doing so. 
Auerswald (1999) argues that Congress has an ethical obligation to use its budgetary powers to 
limit the scope and duration of troop deployments setting strict reporting requirements and sunset 
provisions, targeting money for certain military activities, and restricting the use of appropriated 
funds for others.  
Section 2(c) of the US constitution highlights some moral duties which Congress has in checking 
the power of the executive. The Constitution expresses a congressional understanding that the 
constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to commit military forces exist 
only when: (1) Congress has declared war, (2) legislated specific authority, or (3) the United 
States is under attack (Emmerson,1975:188).  
Howell and Pevehouse (2005) note that there are at least three ways in which Congress has an 
ethical right to interfere with presidential plans to deploy troops abroad; and hence, three reasons 
why presidents should take Congress seriously when contemplating military action. These are: 
 Congress can actively work against the president, materially affecting the course of a military 
campaign by refusing to appropriate needed funds, calling for the return of troops sent on ill-
conceived foreign missions, or raise concerns about the efficacy of an intervention.  
 Congress plays an important role in conveying political resolve. When facing considerable 
opposition within Congress, presidents will have a more difficult time signalling the nation's 
willingness to see a military campaign to its end.   
 Congress can influence media coverage of, and public opinion on, the president's foreign policy 
initiatives. (Howell and Pevehouse, 2005:212). 
 
A critical analysis of why US Presidents must take Congress seriously is that the Congress has a 
legitimate role to counter balance executive powers on the use of SSIs, particularly the military. 
However, one can argue that while Congress has a legitimate right to block executive decisions 
on SS issues, there is also a need by Congress to support the President’s security objectives 
especially during circumstances where the country’s sovereignty and national interest are at stake 
or in situations where SSR goals focus on the capacitation of SSIs in terms of technological 
advancement. 
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While the ethical power to declare war is constitutionally vested in congress, the president has 
ultimate moral responsibility for direction and disposition of the military.  
Whiting (1971:163-4) argues that, Congress may effectually control the military power by 
refusing to vote supplies, or to raise troops, and by impeachment of the President; but for the 
military movements and measures essential to overcome the enemy-for the general conduct of 
the war-the President is responsible to, and controlled, by no other department of government. 
It is thus noted that although Congress has an ethical duty to block the President from engaging 
in some unfavourable wars, it is however, the ethical prerogative of the executive to execute that 
war without any interference from any other government institution. Strangely the obsession and 
the flirtation with the idea of the great power dominating other states normally influence the 
desire to wage war. 
Pomeroy (1870:288-9) also notes that the Legislature may “furnish the requisite supplies of 
money and materials and authorize the raising of men, but all direct management of warlike 
operations are as much beyond the jurisdiction of the legislature, as they are beyond that of any 
assemblage of private citizens.”  
In the US, as the argument goes, it is quite ethical that war operations remain the domain of the 
sovereign.  
Emerson (1975:211) elaborates that once Congress has decided how many men should be 
drafted, or what arms should be constructed, history indicates that the President may station 
those men and send out those arms to such parts of the world as he determines appropriate in the 
national defence, without any geographical or time limitations imposed by Congress. 
Rogers (1971:1195) on the other hand, raises an ethical argument that there is need for Congress 
to exercise its constitutional role in decisions involving the use of military force and in the 
formulation of the USA's foreign policy. At the same time, however, there is a clear ethical need 
in terms of national survival for preserving the constitutional power of the President to act in 
emergency situations.  
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It can be argued that once the US President deploys troops congress may not sabotage the 
President’s decisions and the exercise of restraint on everybody’s part is important in ensuring 
that the lives of the deployed troops are not unnecessarily jeopardized. 
Emerson (1975:201) points out that the President need not rely solely upon practice to establish 
his authority to use armed forces in certain instances.  
The basic moral source of the executive’s legitimate power is the Constitution itself.  
First, article II of the Constitution states the ethical obligations of the sovereign by pointing out 
that “the Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” There 
is authority for the proposition that this is not a passive grant, but includes the traditional ethical 
power of protecting the national safety as historically recognized by the law of nations (Ibid).  
Second, the President is “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign nations” (Ibid).  
Third, sub-section 2 of article II designates the President as "Commander in Chief. This title has 
been defined as ethically encompassing “the conduct of all military operations in time of peace 
and of war, thus embracing control of the disposition of troops, the direction of vessels of war 
and the planning and execution of campaigns” (Ibid:203). 
Fourth, the President could view his oath of office, to "preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States, as both reinforcing executive powers found elsewhere in the 
Constitution and possibly standing alone as a source of power”. “A Constitution which does not 
[morally] permit the Commander in Chief to order belligerent acts whenever they are deemed 
necessary to defend the interests of the nation, would be  less an instrument intended to endure 
through the ages, than a suicide pact”(Ibid: 203).  
According to Meernik (1994) it is the president who exercises supreme control over the nation's 
military actions. Thus, the sovereign has an ethical obligation to be the ultimate decider who 
determines when and how military force is to be used for political purposes.  
Blechman and Kaplan (1978) define the political use of armed forces as physical actions ... taken 
by one or more components of the uniformed armed military services as part of a deliberate 
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attempt by the national authorities to influence or be prepared to influence, specific behaviour of 
individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence. 
It is clear that the arguments proffered by Emerson (1975), Meernik (1994) and Blechman and 
Kaplan (1978) show the legitimacy of Congress’ ethical obligation to limit the sovereign’s 
powers on the use of SSIs in circumstances Congress deems necessary. One must be cognisant of 
the fact that the same Constitution also arrogates the sovereign ultimate control over the SS as 
stated in various constitutional clauses and other academic articles. It is therefore critical to note 
that what these constitutional clauses and academic articles state, can be perceived as the 
foundation on which the US structures SSR that seeks to technologically capacitate its military to 
be strong enough to meet both internal and external (foreign)policy objectives.(domestic and 
international policy objectives) 
The US Congress, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, has a moral duty to authorize any 
troop deployments longer than 60 days (Emerson, 1975:189), although that process relies on 
triggering mechanisms that are hard to employ as will be discussed later. 
The War Powers Act was passed by Congress in 1973, amidst the Vietnam War, overriding the 
veto of President Richard Nixon. The Act was ethically grounded as it set well-defined limits on 
undeclared wars launched on presidential initiative. Its purpose was to prevent future presidents 
from waging open-ended undeclared wars with little or no accountability to the legislature, 
which under the US Constitution has the exclusive power to declare war (Emerson, 1975:188). 
The aforesaid Act gave Congress an ethical right to block any war they deemed unjustified. 
In 1980, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the Act was moral, 
legitimate and constitutional, and no administration has sought to challenge it in court.  The Act 
states that, if the president fails to gain congressional approval within the 60-day period set by 
the law, he has 30 days leeway to accomplish the safe withdrawal of US military forces, after 
which combat must cease (Emerson, 1975:188).  
However, this ethical principle is subject to manipulation by the sovereign. 
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The paradox is that the Act gives the president the right to use military force at his discretion for 
up to 60 days (itself a huge extension of presidential power) but requires withdrawal after a total 
of 90 days if Congress does not vote to approve the military action (Martin, 2011b). 
According to Martin, (2011a) in the 1999 Kosovo War, Bill Clinton escaped application of the 
War Powers Act by quickly bombing Serbia into surrender after 78 days, before the expiry of the 
90-day grace period. Moreover, Congress approved funding for the war against Serbia within the 
first 60 days, although it never voted to endorse the war itself.  
World War II was the last American war to be declared by Congress. All subsequent conflicts 
were undeclared, although usually sanctioned by congressional resolutions passed after a 
presidential decision to begin military action (Rogers, 1971:1200).  
According to Martin (2011b) over the past 38 years, both Republican and Democratic presidents 
have grudgingly complied with the War Powers Act. According to this ethical code concerning 
military intervention, they have given Congress formal notification of military action as required 
by the law and sought resolutions of approval, while at the same time maintaining that they 
retained authority(as sovereigns) to launch military operations at will (Ibid).  
Even Bush followed the ethical procedures by first seeking and obtaining congressional 
resolutions of support before launching his wars of aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
For major troop deployments, as in the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, and the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, Bush sought congressional approval by resolution, as a 
substitute for a declaration of war (ibid). 
In order to get ethical approval from Congress, Fukuyama (2006:78-79) states that the Bush 
administration presented three central arguments supporting the case for an invasion of Iraq: 
Firstly, that Saddam Hussein possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s) that could directly 
threaten US homeland security; secondly, that Iraq (and more poignantly, Saddam) had strong links 
to al-Qaida and might help them obtain WMD’s and thirdly; that the Iraqi people deserved 
liberating from Hussein’s tyrannical regime” (Fukuyama, 2006: 78-79). 
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A critical analysis of the above quotation indicates that the sovereign as Commander-in-Chief of 
the SSI manipulated state intelligence in such a manner that Congress was convinced of such 
propaganda. However, other members of the International Community heavily criticized this 
move, labelling it illegal and unethical. One can argue that, when a sovereign wants to carry out 
SSR that serves the objective of maintaining global dominance, he/she can still manipulate 
Congress through doctored evidence in order to gain support from the parliamentarians to 
endorse an SSR programme that capacitates the military to meet the stated goal. 
When Obama sent American troops into Libya in 2011 he did so short of following ethical 
procedures. He deployed troops without seeking specific congressional approval and without 
specifically basing his authority on the War Powers Act. Emerson (1975:188) points out that, 
Section 3 provides that the President will consult with Congress “in every possible instance” 
before each use of armed forces in hostilities or threatened hostilities and regularly thereafter, 
until United States forces are disengaged or removed from such situations. 
If power goes on unchecked, it is likely to be abused as it fails to conform to stipulated ethical 
norms guiding military interventions. Martin (2011c) argues that Barrack Obama is regarded as 
the first US president to engage in a major war without even attempting to gain ethical approval 
through a declaration of support in the legislative branch.  
President Obama stated on 29 March 2011: 
“We knew that if we waited one more day,  Benghazi … could suffer a massacre that would have 
reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world” (The Guardian, 29 March 
2011). 
Here, Obama as a sovereign was trying to justify the military intervention in an ethical way, 
premised on the responsibility to protect doctrine. It should be noted that in this statement, 
Obama acknowledges in a subtle way, the relevance of ethics in the justification of any military 
intervention. It shows that he was also aware that what he had done was totally against US 
ethical procedures of engaging in war.  
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Meernik (1994:127) argues that: 
Among the most important concerns presidents consider when confronted with an opportunity to 
use force is the need to appear forceful and strong to both international and domestic audiences. 
The president's reputation as a credible protector of the United States' international interests, its 
allies, and Americans abroad rests in large part on his willingness to take forceful action when such 
interests are threatened. To do less would be to risk creating an impression of weakness among 
adversaries, allies, neutrals, and the American public. As hegemony, the US and its presidents must 
be concerned with credibility and reputation. 
While Congress may direct domestic policymaking, its hold over foreign policy is quite tenuous; 
and when the president decides to exercise military force abroad, members of Congress can only 
complain on Sunday morning talk shows.  
For the most part, the president's authority over military matters is beyond reproach (Howell and 
Pevehouse, 2005). This means despite Congress’ ethical attempts to contain sovereign powers, 
the executive can still undermine these ethical considerations in pursuit of national interest. 
The Obama administration sent US forces into combat against Libya on March 20, 2011, with 
the bombing of Libyan anti-aircraft installations and radar sites (Flurry, 2008:2). The 60-day 
deadline passed on May 20, without any effort by the administration to gain congressional 
approval. The 30-day period for withdrawal of US forces elapsed on June 19, but the war 
continued, with no significant opposition from Congress (Martin, 2011b).  
The White House issued a document supporting its claim that the War Powers Act did not apply 
to the Libyan conflict because the US forces were not engaged in “hostilities” as defined by the 
law. They argued that US operations did not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of 
fire with hostile forces, nor did they involve the presence of US ground troops, US casualties or a 
serious threat thereof, or any significant chance of escalation into a conflict characterized by 
those factors (see Patrick Martin (c), 20 June, 2011 for a detailed account).  
Howell and Pevehouse, (2005:210) are of the view that in principle; Congress should contribute 
to the politics surrounding the use of military force. An absence of parliamentary checks and 
balances on sovereign power can lead to a centralized dictatorship. 
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7.3 Russian Federation – Democratic Oversight of SS versus State Sovereignty 
Under the Russian constitution, the president is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. It 
is his/her ethical duty to form and head the Security Council, approve the military doctrine, 
appoint and dismiss the top commanders of the armed forces, and confer higher military ranks 
(Nichol, 2011:9). 
According to Sakwa (2008b) the sovereign also has the moral right to preside over government 
meetings and issue instructions to the government and the federal executive bodies responsible 
for defence, security, internal and foreign affairs.  
The Kremlin, Presidential website states that as Commander-in-Chief, the Russian President: 
... Endorses ... concepts and plans for building the Armed Forces, economic mobilization plans, 
civil defence plans and other laws and regulations involving military organization. The head of 
state also endorses all arms-related regulations and the regulations of the Ministry of Defence and 
the General Staff. The Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff are directly 
subordinate to the President. The President issues annual decrees concerning the draft and he 
reserves, and signs international treaties on joint defence and military cooperation. 
The 1993 Russian constitution set out a democratic state with a form of semi-presidentialism that 
was strongly tilted towards the president, so that Fish (2005) regarded it as ‘super presidential.’ 
Smith (2010:41) argues that the constitution and the 1996 law on defence provide for scant 
legislative oversight over the Ministry of Defence or defence budgets, although defence 
ministers occasionally discuss defence related legislation and defence policy with the legislature. 
While it is the ethical right of legislators to play an oversight role on SSI, in Russia, the 
sovereign seem to wield a lot of power thus undermining the ethical obligations of 
parliamentarians in regulating defence budgets. 
The State Duma’s role in appointing and dismissing the government is limited (Whitmore, 
2010).  
Sakwa (2008a:99-100) argues that: 
In terms of appointment, the Duma confirms the president’s nomination of prime minister, and is 
dissolved if it rejects the president’s nomination three times. Similarly, while both the president and 
the State Duma can both dismiss the government, the right of the parliament to do so is curtailed by 
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other constitutional provisions, so that the accountability of the government to the parliament is 
legally tightly circumscribed.  
President Vladimir Putin’s tenure (2000–2008) was characterised by increasing formal and 
informal presidential domination of the legislature, nested within the wider regime shift toward 
electoral authoritarianism (Whitmore, 2010).  
Lynch (2005) argues that Russia under Putin is neo-patrimonial, where the real power is focused 
around the president and his staff so that access to the president is critical for any government 
office to advance its agenda. 
In a normal democratic state, there needs to be well-established parliamentary checks and 
balances on the sovereign. 
Sakwa (2008a:197) also points out that the 4
th
 Duma brought the breakneck acceleration of the 
legislative process and the widespread perception among observers that it had ceased to perform 
the ethical functions of a parliament, and instead rubber-stamped presidential initiatives. 
A detailed analysis of the above discussion indicates that Russia has legitimate fears of losing its 
geo-political relevance in the region as well as risking its hold on diplomatic clout in global 
politics. In consequence, the Russian sovereign has taken all necessary steps to facilitate 
unassailable control of SSIs. Various criticisms have been levelled against the Russian sovereign 
over its excessive control of SSIs. However, some of the scholars cited above note the absolute 
need for the Russian executive to adopt its present stance as the only feasible and realistic way of 
surviving an international tide that is fraught with anarchy.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis noted theorists who advance realism to explain and support the tenets of 
survival in an untidy environment. The posture that the Russian sovereign has towards security 
of its internal and external interests is thus clearly not out of order. It is in response to this tricky 
global environment, especially after the Cold War, that the Russian Duma has been seized with 
carrying out SSR that capacitates the SSIs in the event that war breaks out between the Russian 
Bear and some hostile countries, especially the USA. 
Democratic oversight of the security institutions in Russia is mainly guided by internal logic, real 
and perceived threats to the state. Naidoo (2006:37) is of the strong view that Parliament as the 
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elected representative body of the public should conform to ethical standards. Naidoo (2006) 
notes that parliamentarians must ensure that the defence forces operate within democratic and 
constitutional parameters and that the sovereign must not abuse its powers. 
Whitmore (2010) argues that there is little appetite in Russia to advance the ethical idea of 
democratic oversight. She bemoans laxity in checking on moral hazards such as corruption and 
the arbitrary exercise of power, citing these aspects as necessary mechanism for greater 
accountability and government efficiency. She further asserts that, at times, ethical practices such 
as democratic oversight are utilized primarily for regime legitimation. 
Remington (2008) claims that there is an informal bargain whereby the sovereign’s party, United 
Russia (Edinaya Rossiya), is given access to resources in exchange for support on political 
issues. However, this practice is not only peculiar to Russia but is prevalent in most countries 
(see Baregu, 2005; Howell and Pevehouse, 2005; Nathan, 2007; Modise 2007; Lunn, 2010). 
When parliamentarians aligned to the sovereign’s party side with him/her in endorsing 
unfavourable security policies this may be considered as unethical especially when such policies 
undermine civil liberties. However, it can also be argued that it is ethical to do so, especially 
when the security or sovereignty of the state is under threat. 
Whitmore (2010) argues that the dominance of the pro-Putin United Russia party (which was 
overwhelming after 2003) and the patrimonial relations that infused the legislature’s operation 
(and those of the wider political system), in many instances, militated against the exercise of 
oversight mechanisms by deputies. 
Some may argue that, although Parliament may be penetrated by patrimonial practices, this 
should not be the reason why Parliamentarians support the executive. Ideally, parliamentarians 
are not in that law house to rubber stamp what the executive says but they are there to question 
unethical sovereign decisions in order to safeguard the rights and security of citizens. 
Nichol (2011:2) notes that Russia’s national security strategy, military doctrine, and some 
aspects of the military reforms reflect assessments by some Russian policymakers that the United 
States and NATO remain concerns, if not threats, to Russia’s security and sovereignty. Real or 
perceived security threats to a country’s sovereignty do play a role in structuring the behaviour 
184 
 
and decision making of democratic oversight. In such cases, as mentioned elsewhere, 
parliamentarians have an ethical duty to endorse these sovereign decisions. 
Arbatov (2000: VI) points out that after an unprecedented decade of disarmament, de–targeting 
of nuclear missiles, cooperation, and transparency in defence and security matters between 
Russia and the United States, Kosovo revived the worst instincts and stereotypes of the Cold 
War.  
American militarism in Europe that started on March 24, 1999 seriously dented US–Russian 
relations to the extent that suspicion as opposed to trust now punctuates the relationship between 
the two great powers. NATO’s war against Serbia in 1999 seriously damaged NATO Russian 
relations more than any amount of expansion of NATO into territories of former members of the 
revered Soviet Union (Lannon, 2011:48). 
NATO’s air campaign against Yugoslavia precipitated the most dangerous turn in Russian-
Western relations since the early 1980s. Some Russian analysts, convinced that NATO and 
Russia came  close to a direct military confrontation, have compared the situation to the Berlin 
and Cuban Crises of the 1960s (Antonenko, 2000:124).  
Arbatov (2000:1) further points out that Kosovo became the melting ground. The war resulted in 
Russia’s experiencing an unprecedented surge in anti–American and anti–Western sentiments, 
and these sentiments had many ramifications (ibid). He adds that the war in Yugoslavia did away 
with the remaining hopes for a genuine security partnership and military cooperation between 
Russia and NATO. Once again, Russia perceived NATO as its primary defence concern for the 
foreseeable future (ibid: 2). 
Under such conditions, where suspicion reigns between two great powers, parliamentarians as 
well as the general public can easily understand and also endorse their sovereign’s military 
decisions. Such action is usually perceived by the whole population as being ethical. 
However, when rearmament exercises are undertaken by a state due to propaganda or for 
patronage purposes then it becomes unethical. Whitmore (2010) is opposed to clientelism, 
patronage and rent-seeking within the State Duma. This is in line with Yamamoto’s (2007: 9) 
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assertion that Parliament’s ethical obligation is to detect and prevent abuse, arbitrary behaviour, 
or illegal and unconstitutional conduct on the part of the government and public agencies.  
However, Nichol (2011:39-41) observes that: 
U.S. policymakers have maintained that Serdyukov’s (the Russian Defence Minister appointed in 
2007 by President Putin) defence reforms pose both risks and opportunities for the United States 
and the West. While warning that Russian military programs are driven largely by Moscow’s 
perception that the United States and NATO remain the greatest potential threats, U.S. 
policymakers also have raised the possibility that Russia’s military reforms might in the future 
make it feel less strategically vulnerable and that it might participate more in international 
peacekeeping operations. 
It can be noted that due to the perceived fear of a NATO attack, this has compelled the Russian 
sovereign to institute SSR that capacitates the SS. 
Serdyukov asserted that the reforms were aimed at switching to a performance-capable, mobile, 
and maximally armed military ready to participate in at least three regional and local conflicts 
(ibid:4). This in a way has everything to do with Russia’s ethical right to project its power, and 
maintain a strong military within its borders in the event of any future attacks and to safeguard 
its sovereignty. 
Some can argue that despite Whitmore’s (2010) assertions on clientelism and patronage, 
Parliamentary oversight in Russia is also morally determined by real and imagined security 
threats confronting the Russian Federation as well as the most effective means of meeting or 
countering such challenges in order to remain sovereign.  
Russia’s civilian leadership’s mantra of military reform is to modernize, downsize, end 
conscription, and increase servicemen salaries (Bartles, 2011:55). This is in line with arguments 
raised by realist scholars in Chapter 2 that in times of peace a sovereign should always prepare 
for war. With regard to military reforms, Putin on several occasions mentioned that ‘the Russian 
military should become more compact, more professional, and more modern (ibid: 56).Putin 
wants to move the Russian military closer to the kind of system found in the West, but he knows 
that in the end it will continue to have its Russian idiosyncrasies (Herspring, 2005:138).  The 
Russian Federation’s main goal is to keep up with modern challenges through the optimization 
and control of the defence forces. The new Security Concept and Military Doctrine are notably 
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very much in line with the current practice of Russian foreign and defence policies and programs 
(Arbatov, 2000:4). Russia is quite aware that NATO has enlarged its military power and moved 
much closer to Russian borders by accepting new member states. During the next 10 years, in 
addition to holding a conventional superiority in Europe of approximately 2:1, or even 3:1, 
NATO will also possess a substantial nuclear superiority in both tactical and strategic nuclear 
forces (ibid:5). 
As highlighted above, security reforms in Russia have concentrated on modernization and 
capacitation of the security institutions as to enable them to meet future security threats and to 
safeguard state sovereignty. 
The annexation of the Crimea by Russia against international opinion and other interventionist 
moves it took in Ukraine led to a raft of sanctions against Russia by America and some NATO 
countries. Russia’s defiance of international pressure to leave Crimea serves not only to restore 
some modicum of military respectability in international opinion but also serves to illustrate that 
the strong will do what they wish and the weak will do what they must. 
Russia’s current military involvement and in Syria on the side of the regime of President Assad 
against the wishes of America and its NATO allies is another show of military strength in 
circumstances where proxy wars are being fought under the guise of fighting Islamist radicalism. 
Russia’s clout in global diplomacy is unavoidable as Syria’s fate has to be negotiated, to a very 
large extent, between Russia and the US. 
To the extent that Russia is affording to stretch its military resources against fierce criticism by 
the entire west it can be argued that the sovereign is capacitating Russia’s SS and enhancing its 
SSIs to enviable levels. 
7.4 Democratic Oversight of SS versus State Sovereignty in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has ruled as the sole source of political power since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 (Leung 1992:96). The CCP exercises 
authority over all aspects of governance (New York Times, 7 January 2013). The US 
Congressional Research Service (CRS, March 2013) asserts that the Chinese state and society is 
dominated by the CCP, which is committed to maintaining a permanent monopoly on power.  
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The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, October 2013:28) describes China’s political system as 
“complex” since the Chinese government consists of two parallel systems, the CCP hierarchy 
and the state hierarchy. According to the EIU (2012:2) the PRC is run by two parallel systems of 
government that interlock at every level and they are as follows:  
There is the CCP hierarchy followed by the state one. The state system is headed by the president, 
with the premier leading the State Council (cabinet) and its various ministries, and the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) serving as a legislature. This branch of the government is important, 
particularly in terms of day-to-day administration, but plays very much a subservient role to the 
parallel CCP one. The party system, in turn, is headed by the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) 
under the leadership of the CCP general secretary (EIU, 2012:2). 
At the top of the Party’s hierarchy, the most powerful policy- and decision-making entity is the 
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), currently comprised of seven men. They are all members 
of the broader Politburo, which has a membership of 25. The PSC and the Politburo are 
supported by the seven-man Party Secretariat. Politburo members are also part of the senior 
grouping of Communist Party officials, the Central Committee, which has 205 full members and 
171 alternate members (CRS, 20 March 2013:21).  
The Party General Secretary is ranked first among the seven and has the responsibility to 
convene the PSC and larger Politburo meetings. He also controls some of the most influential 
portfolios, including military and foreign affairs (CRS, 20 March 2013: 5).Each member of the 
PSC has a rank, from one to seven, and is responsible for a specific portfolio.  
To ensure Party control, the top-ranked members of the PSC serve concurrently as the heads of 
other parts of the political system. The top ranked PSC member, Party General Secretary serves 
as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and as State President (CRS, 20 March 
2013:22).  
Lieberthal (1995:42) asserts that members of the Politburo serve as gateways each responsible 
for a specific functional bureaucratic system in the party-state. One member supervises the 
legal/internal security system, another economics, the other foreign affairs, another party 
organization, yet another is responsible for propaganda and education, and finally another 
military affairs. This distribution of portfolios within the highest echelon has been done since the 
early days of the PRC. 
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Article 57 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (adopted on 4 December 1982 
and amended on 14 March 2004) stipulates that “the National People’s Congress (NPC) of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the highest organ of state power,” with the Standing 
Committee of the NPC being its permanent body.  
 
However, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation 
(ACCORD, March 2014:13) argue that although the NPC is meant to be the most powerful organ 
of the state, in reality it is actually little more than a rubber stamp for party decisions.  
ACCORD (2014:13) further asserts that:  
 
In theory, the congress has the powers to change the constitution and make laws. But it is not, and 
is not meant to be, an independent body in the Western sense of a parliament. For a start, about 
70% of its delegates - and almost all its senior figures - are also party members. Their loyalty is to 
the party first, the NPC second. What actually tends to happen, therefore, is that the party drafts 
most new legislation and passes it to the NPC for ‘consideration’, better described as speedy 
approval. 
 
Article 79 of the PRC Constitution gives the NPC the ethical right to elect the country’s 
President. However, the CCP decides on who will fill this position. The role of the congress “is 
simply to ratify the Party’s decisions” (CRS, 20 March 2013:7).  
Regarding the oversight authority granted to the congress under the country’s constitution, the 
CRS (March, 2013:4) notes that:  “According to China’s state constitution, the NPC oversees the 
State Council, as well as four other institutions: the Presidency, the Supreme People’s Court, the 
public prosecutors’ office, and the military.  
In practice, the NPC is controlled by the CCP and is able to exercise little oversight over any of 
the security institutions officially under its supervision.” The party is heavily entrenched in every 
facet of people’s lives, whether military, economic, social, political and cultural. 
Although ‘democratic oversight’ seems not to exist, it does so in a manner that “will not threaten 
the party’s authority and political stability” (Wang 2002: 156-7).In this regard, democratic 
oversight is more of rubber stamping what the party says.  
Ideally, parliamentarians are supposed to check on state hegemony especially on how the 
sovereign manages its SS. In the Chinese case, democratic oversight of SSI remains a preserve of 
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the party making it totally impossible for the party aligned parliamentarians to come up with any 
decision that can block or upset sovereign decisions on security issues. Such a political set up 
can greatly undermine ordinary citizens’ rights and liberties.  
While such criticisms can be levelled against Chinese parliamentarians’ oversight role of SSIs - 
which  is heavily politicized and biased towards the party – a dissenting voice can also argue that 
the Chinese party’s close attachment to the SS, emanates from the fact that the PRC wants to 
survive in a competitive international system characterized by conflict and competition. 
It can also be argued that the party represents legitimate concerns, aspirations and interests of the 
grass roots thus affording democratic flow of people’s views and opinions. 
Not to be forgotten is the fact that the west has been opposed to China’s political and economic 
ideology and China’s rise to the second largest economy in a world that is increasingly linking 
economic development to soundness of the SS will tend to silence China’s critics on its SSIs. 
Indeed the case of China offers new perspectives as to the reliability and soundness of 
prescriptions that the Europeans in particular and Americans in general claim as accounting for 
credible SSRs. To the extent that China is self-reliant economically and politically it cannot 
countenance a situation where its security requirements are determined by external forces. 
In any case, realists are agreed that those who are strong will do what they want and those who 
are weak will do what they must. It can be argued that this pragmatic approach to the field of 
security consolidates the deterrence capacity of stronger nations against both internal and 
external threats and by implication weakens the capacity of poor nations to handle both internal 
and external security threats. It can thus be argued that the continent of Africa, especially sub 
Saharan Africa must learn to be self-sufficient as China is to avoid the bullying that it is 
currently enduring as a result of undertaking SSRs that are imposed on the continent by Europe 
and America.  
Stokes and Hsiao (2013:18) point out that the Discipline Inspection Department functions as 
inspector general, and support the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) Discipline Inspection 
Commission in investigating corruption and other improprieties. People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) Military Court and Military Procuratorate manage the PLA’s justice system. The idea that 
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the Party monitors itself remains unchallenged, and the CCP continues to reject any idea of 
outside scrutiny (Rosen 1997: 85). The PLA remains the Party’s army. The relationship between 
CCP and PLA remains close, and it remains the army of the Party, but civilian supremacy over 
the generals has been strongly asserted in recent years (You 2006: 59).  
Under former presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the military had little accountability and 
oversight (Baker and Richmond, 2009).  
Xi Jinping’s background and connections to army personnel enabled him as the new president to 
assert control over the armed forces rapidly. It is that control that in turn enabled him to enact 
military reform. According to Jacques (2014:3) Xi passed the "Ten Provisions," which prohibited 
extravagant receptions and banquets and banned alcohol consumption. Another measure 
prohibited government officials and generals from obtaining military license plates, which 
permitted their owners to violate traffic laws with impunity.  
The measures outlined above were designed to curb corruption and remind military officers that 
their dedication should not be to themselves but to the party and to the state (ibid). It has been 
observed that the cordial relationship between the Chinese/Russian Presidents and their military 
is not limited to China/Russia but is also practiced in other countries. 
However, reforms should not only be done to bring about obedience or loyalism of the SS to the 
party and sovereign, but should also be done to strengthen civil-military relations. It is also 
necessary that reforms are not based on patron-clientelism.   
While arguments can be raised against SSR which entrenches patron-client relationships, one can 
argue that in China such a system (despite condemnation by various scholars) has helped to 
establish a strong and effective SS that is capable of defending the sovereignty of the PRC 
against any foreign aggression or internal upheavals. 
The notion that a strong state is one that is able to defend itself against internal and external 
aggression also invariably seeks to promote human security, stimulate economic development 
and prevent anarchy. It can be argued very strongly that President Xi’s clamp down on privileges 
of the military that allowed for offences to be committed with impunity is intended to curb 
corruption and raise the ethical aspect of SSR to a high level. 
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In terms of direct chain of command, the CMC exercises authority over political warfare through 
the General Political Department (GPD) director, who also is a CMC member and a civilian. 
Scobell (2003:52) argues that a soldier has never served as the chair of the CCP Central Military 
Commission (CMC).   
The most senior post with responsibility for military matters has always been occupied by the de 
facto or de jure paramount political leader of the day such as Mao (1935–76), Hua Guofeng 
(1976–80), Deng (1981–November 1989) and Jiang Zemin (1989).  
The Long March symbolizes to many scholars a distinct civil-military elite configuration that 
either firmly established the mechanism of party control over the army, or forged a close-knit 
coalition of like-minded civil and military leaders (Perlmutter and LeoGrande, 1982:781).Under 
the former conception, China’s PLA is viewed as under the total control of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), consistent with Mao’s oft-quoted dictum, ‘the Party commands the gun 
but the gun must never command the Party’ (Scobell,2003:6).  
The CMC is elected by the Central Committee, and is responsible for the PLA (Mackerras et al 
2001). The position of Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman is one of the most 
powerful in China, and the CMC Chairman must concurrently serve as Communist Party of 
China (CPC) General Secretary (Ibid). 
Other CMC members include the Minister of Defence, Chief of the General Staff; directors of 
the General Logistics Department and General Armaments Department; and commanders of the 
Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery Force. These eight members report to the CMC chairman 
through two vice-chairmen (Stokes and Hsiao, 2013:32). 
Unlike the collective leadership ideal of other party organs, the CMC Chairman acts as 
commander-in-chief with the right to appoint or dismiss top military officers as he pleases 
(Mackerras et al 2001). The CMC Chairman can deploy troops, controls the country's nuclear 
weapons, and allocates the budget. The promotion or transfer of officers above the divisional 
level must be validated by the CMC Chairman's signature (ibid). In theory, the CMC Chairman 
is under the responsibility of the Central Committee, but in practice, he reports only to the 
President (Ibid).  This is in many ways due to Mao, who did not want other Politburo members to 
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involve themselves in military affairs. As he put it, the Politburo's realm is state affairs, the 
CMC's is military (Ibid).This state of things has continued until today.  
The CMC has controlled the PLA through three organs since 1937: the General Staff 
Department, the General Political Department and the General Logistics Department. A fourth 
organ, the General Armaments Department, was established in 1998 (Ibid).  
There is widespread agreement that the PLA is becoming a more significant and influential 
institution in China’s security policy (Scobell, 2003:7). The PLA has always had substantial 
political clout in the PRC by virtue of its intimate relationship with the CCP (Jencks, 1982:30). 
Godwin (1978:229-30) argues that PLA soldiers at times direct their loyalty toward the state, but 
usually owe their allegiance to the party.  
China’s military and civilian leaders do not approach decisions to use force at home or abroad 
from a single perspective. Rather, China’s strategic behaviour is more accurately conceived of as 
the outcome of the interplay between two distinct and enduring strands of strategic culture that 
are filtered through an evolving civil-military culture and tempered by military culture (Scobell, 
2003:2).  
Chinese policymaking is usually rational with the goal being national self-interest. Chinese 
foreign policy is made by a small elite group without necessary consultation with other entities 
or society-at-large. What drives China’s foreign policy is ‘vulnerability to threats’ (Nathan and 
Scobell, 2012:3).   
Geopolitically, these threats fall into four “rings”: 
 First Ring: the territory China administers (i.e., domestic threats, including Taiwan, Tibet, 
Xinjiang, etc.). 
 Second Ring: twenty countries adjacent to China that form a circle including Japan, Vietnam, 
India, Central Asian countries, and Russia. Taiwan is included in this ring and the first, as well 
as the United States due to its power projection capabilities and military presence. 
 Third Ring: six multistate regional systems–Northeast Asia, Oceania, continental Southeast 
Asia, maritime Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. 
 Fourth Ring: the rest of the world, including Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas 
(Nathan and Scobell, 2012:3). 
The PLA is currently seeking to meet the needs of 21
st
  century warfare by transforming itself 
into a smaller, higher quality fighting force; this has required across-the-board reforms in its 
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personnel system, its doctrine, and its training routines and other daily practices ( China’s goals 
and grand strategy objectives are laid out by Nathan and Scobell (2012:14) as follows: 
 Territorial integrity: restore territories lost and maintain current territories. 
 Prevent external powers from dominating Asia and increasing Chinese influence in the region. 
 Encourage economic growth. 
 Shape the global order toward Chinese preferences. 
A critical analysis of China’s goals and grand strategy objectives as advanced by Nathan 
and Scobell (2012) demonstrates the need for a SSR process that seeks to capacitate the SS. 
The major reason why the Chinese are embarking on SSRs that help to boost their security 
sector apparatus in terms of both defensive and offensive capabilities is propelled by an 
ambition to become a permanent global power. 
 
In China, those in the Chinese Communist Party-Parliamentarians and Politburo have 
always supported the modernization of China’s defence forces as well as the revamping of 
policies which strengthen China’s defence capabilities.  
 
The primary goal of these initiatives is to maintain an unassailable sovereignty.  
 
China’s Defence White Paper of 2010, describes increased defence spending as part of a 
general process of modernization and restructuring.  
 
The Chinese argue that the growth in military spending primarily relates to: 
 improving support conditions for the troops (i.e. increasing salary and 
benefits of servicemen, improving living conditions, and amending falls in 
the standard of education and training);  
 accomplishing diversified military tasks – improving MOOTW capabilities 
(put simply, making sure that the PLA is not just a fighting force but one 
that is capable of dealing with natural disasters, rescue operations, arms 
control, and peacekeeping); 
 Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics (i.e. 
updating the weaponry and information technology capabilities of the 
military) [Chinese Defence White Paper, Section VIII, 31 March, 2011)]. 
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The dominance of the CCP in Chinese politics has seen most legislators in the National People’s 
Congress giving their loyalty to the party first, then second to parliament. The NPC as a law 
making body can best be described as being theoretically an independent arm of the Chinese 
government, but which in reality simply is a rubber-stamping body that approves whatever has 
been handed down from the CCP. As a consequence of this, the line between the CCP and 
parliament has, at times, been blurred and this extends to democratic oversight. Most parliaments 
and legislatures in both African and non-African countries fail to exercise sufficient control over 
their Ministry of Defence and the armed forces (as in the case of China) and  85% of them lack 
effective scrutiny of defence policy (Transparency International UK’S Defence and Security 
Programme, September 2013). 
Overall, it has been observed that great power competition for world dominance has seen 
powerful nations such as, the USA, Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China 
establish military industrial complexes (through the blessings of Congress, the Duma and the 
National People’s Congress) for the development of advanced military armaments. The creation 
of these industries has also become a major source of mega income through the sale of arms. 
Military industries have also become a source of employment creation, where millions of citizens 
enjoy gainful employment. 
Born (2002:2) has pointed out that the major function of parliament is the exercise of democratic 
oversight of the sovereign and the security institutions of the country. The greatest dilemma that 
Parliament experiences, is its compromised moral stance in dissuading the executive and MoD 
from increasing military spending against the knowledge that abutting sovereign states are also 
increasing their military expenditure 
The American Congress, Russian State Duma and Chinese Communist Party-Parliamentarians 
are more interested in the modernization and the capacitation of their security sector as 
evidenced in the defence budgets which range from 640 billion dollars for USA, 87.8 billion 
dollars for Russia and 188 billion dollars for China (SIPRI, 2013).  
According to Farmer (2014) the United States spent £351 billion in 2014 - 1.3 per cent less than 
in 2013, China spent £90 billion in 2014 - 6.3 per cent more than in 2013 while the Russian 
Federation spent £48 billion in 2014 - 13.5 per cent more than in 2013. Farmer (2014) further 
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argues that spending increases are highest in Russia, whose military budget has risen by more 
than 44 per cent over the next three years as it too modernizes its forces - spending £48 billion 
($78 billion) on defence in 2014 - despite a slowdown in economic growth. 
Due to a need to dominate each other in the international system, sovereign states boost their 
armaments and in doing so other states follow, thus precipitating an arms race and creating an 
international security crisis. 
A strict democratic oversight in keeping with the spirit of parliament would undoubtedly 
endanger the effectiveness and efficiency of the defence forces which need high budgets to give 
them the capacity to carry out today's missions as well as to defend state sovereignty. Members 
of Parliament have little or no say in the government’s decisions over the whole range of foreign 
policy and defence budgets. The Executive and its MoD dominate much of the discourse on 
defence budgets thus overriding and undermining the exercise of democratic oversight that 
parliamentarians are entitled to. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The chapter observed that parliament is the mediator between government and the people. The 
main ethical principle of democratic oversight is to keep the government accountable and to 
secure a balance between the security policy and society by aligning the goals, policies and 
procedures of the military and political leaders (Born et al, 2003).  
This chapter touched on the power struggles as well as the relations between the executive and 
the parliament; between the military and political parties; between parliament and political 
parties (with a high representation in the legislature), and between the military and parliament in 
providing effective democratic oversight.  
It was argued that the security institutions play a pivotal role towards the ‘survival’ of a nation-
state and this ethical duty cannot be underestimated. Observations emanating from the arguments 
in the chapter were also that, regardless of whether the state is democratic or authoritarian an 
efficient and effective security sector was seen to be vital to the above states’ social, economic, 
political and national survival. In discharging some of these duties, the security sector was seen 
to rely more on the support of the sovereign in helping to safeguard the state’s national interests.  
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The major observation in this chapter was that, the application of democratic oversight of the 
security sector as seen in the USA, Russian Federation and China depends more on specific 
contexts and is challenged by various factors such as the need to be a dominant global power, the 
need to protect national interests, the need to safeguard state sovereignty, the need for dominant 
political parties to show loyalty and facilitate the exercise of executive decisions. 
The chapter observed that Parliamentarians may be less interested in scrutinizing the executive 
as well as the security sector because of party politics. This tendency was common practice in all 
the countries, namely USA, Russia and China. More often than not, political parties, which are 
represented in parliament, are not very eager to oversee their own colleagues in the executive and 
security sector. Political Party issues and decisions are given first preference than issues to do 
with Parliamentary oversight.  
In the cases of Russia, and China it was observed that a strong executive has been created, which 
has been able to count on the numerical advantage of its party’s MPs, who display strong 
inclinations to weigh in on national issues based on political party resolutions. As a consequence 
of this, parliamentary oversight has been at times motivated by the need to protect executive 
decisions at the expense of genuine SSR. 
 All in all, this chapter discussed the literature on Parliamentary oversight of the security sector 
and concluded that in most cases Parliamentary oversight of the security sector is undermined by 
the executive and Ministry of Defence in cases where both (executive and MOD) feel national 
security is being threatened directly or indirectly. It has also been observed that Parliamentary 
oversight of the security sector depends on varied contexts and is mainly challenged by various 
factors which include executive control, national interest and political party dominance.  
Least discussed and yet the dominant undertone is the fear, genuine or imagined, that state 
secrecy occupies in shaping attitudes towards the role of the SS in safeguarding the sovereign as 
representative of state power. Economic debates and economic information that is availed to 
parliament serves to minimise exposing state secrecy that is central to protecting the institution 
of nation-state from interrogation and scrutiny by groups or persons harbouring ill against the 
state. 
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Libya was long suspected of possessing weapons capable of massive destruction, with Colonel 
Gaddafi accused of training terrorists and exporting terrorism. Constant denials by Gaddafi did 
not allay the fears of the western nations. For as long as Libya maintained state-secrecy about its 
combative abilities this secrecy firmed into a currency that deterred both internal and external 
aggression against the state.  
It is an open secret that the day Gaddafi chose to be a gentleman and started warming up to the 
west, hitherto his sworn enemy; he also willingly exposed state-secrecy resulting in weapons of 
mass destruction being destroyed in a trade-off that was meant to give Libya the status of one 
belonging to a ‘family of nations’. 
A UN resolution 1973 that allowed for aerial defence of Libyan civilians on the pretext the 
Gaddafi was ‘killing his own people’ enabled NATO to attack and take out Gaddafi on 20
th
 
October 2011 because the biggest state-secrecy Gaddafi had enjoyed and had kept Libya from 
aggression was exposed and destroyed by cunning European powers. 
The importance of state secrecy is contextual and differs from state to state. North Korea is seen 
as the rogue in international circles and considered a threat to the Korean peninsula as well as 
America. The extent to which North Korea is a danger to world peace remains largely unknown 
but sufficiently deterrent as to have kept the neighbours and big powers away from its territory, 
at least to this day. 
It is only in the event that state secrecy is exposed that ways will be devised either to allow for 
compromise of such secrecy as was the case with Libya or for aggressors to attack on the basis of 
leakage of a weak security sector. 
It is therefore a major preoccupation of any state to keep sensitive information from public 
debate as this renders the SS vulnerable. 
Cyber warfare and the hacking of information expose state secrecy and espionage conducted by 
citizens is considered as a treasonable offence.  
It can be argued that the maintenance of state secrecy is central to maintaining the stability of a 
nation and parliamentary democracy has had difficulties penetrating areas considered the 
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province of the sovereign, with the result that SS oversight has being more academic than real in 
both developed and least developed nations of the world.  
Having examined the impact or lack of it, of democratic oversight in security matters, in the 
foremost economically and militarily powerful countries  such as America, Russia and China, the 
next chapter seeks to situate the SSR discourse as its relates to the exercise of SS oversight in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY SECTORAND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTYIN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was ascertained that great powers rarely ‘walk the talk’ when it comes 
to reforming their security sectors. It was observed that in most cases, the executive overrides 
parliamentary decisions on the security sector especially on issues concerning the deployment of 
the military in war or conflict situations. It was also noted that states, especially the most 
industrialized ones, are not reducing their armaments but in fact they are spending billions of 
dollars in re-arming themselves and also improving on their military capabilities.  
 
This Chapter thus concerns itself with analysing approaches to democratic oversight of the 
security sector in selected three African countries, namely South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
Namibia. 
The choice of three countries, out of many countries in sub Saharan Africa, seeks to deepen 
insight into how democratic oversight differs in application and also how the major political 
parties in these countries (ANC, ZANU (PF) and SWAPO) have helped create a powerful 
sovereign that has been able to advance national interests through the security sector.  
The effect on the choice of SS options that are pursued as a result of the numerical advantage 
that these parties enjoy in parliament is considered representative enough to reflect the general 
trend of SS configurations on the African continent, south of the Sahara. It is, however, pertinent 
to note that the sample comprising the three countries also reflects the norm in some African 
countries to the north of the equator, namely Nigeria (Garba, 2008), Senegal (N’Diaye, 2008) 
and many others. 
Thus, to achieve the objectives of the chapter, this section develops by analysing democratic 
oversight of the security sectors in three selected African countries which are South Africa, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia. A critical analysis of democratic oversight vis-a-vis the Skills and 
competencies of parliamentarians on SS issues is undertaken. Also given is a critical analysis of 
Western influence and the SSR debate in Africa. In addition, a critical analysis of State 
Sovereignty vis-à-vis a strong or weak SS is given. Finally, of critical importance is the debate I 
present on the need for a “Political’’ or “Apolitical’’ Security Sector. 
I conclude by noting major observations discussed in the whole Chapter. 
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8.2 South Africa- Deployment of Defence Forces and Democratic Oversight 
On 3 January 2013 President Jacob Zuma authorised the deployment of 400 SANDF soldiers to 
the Central African Republic (CAR). 
President Zuma took action without first informing parliament. He was criticised by SSR 
reformists as having acted in an undemocratic manner.. 
When the President revealed that 13 soldiers had died during a gun battle with Seleka rebels in 
the CAR, defence and constitutional experts as well as opposition parties accused the president 
of not fulfilling his ethical obligations as stipulated in the constitution. These obligations 
required him to adequately inform Parliament about the whereabouts and actions of South 
Africa's military (Bauer, 2013). 
For ethical reasons, the South African Constitution requires the President to inform Parliament 
promptly of a deployment to prevent the government from misleading the public. As the 
deployment of the SANDF in a war situation is a radical step, and as the president is accountable 
to Parliament and to the electorate for taking such a step, the president cannot deploy troops in 
secret to avoid accountability for his actions (De Vos, 2013). 
The SA constitution is ethically grounded on the need for the executive to inform both the law 
makers and the general public on any troop deployment to foreign lands. This ethical principle 
within the SA constitution helps to keep on radar the powers of the executive and to ensure that 
there is no arbitrary use of the SS locally, regionally and internationally. 
In this instance, because the president did not make his case to Parliament, the parliamentarians 
as well as South African people had no clear understanding of the country’s interests at stake in 
CAR, how much this would cost and what other priorities would have to be sacrificed.  
The President claimed that SANDF personnel were on the ground as a bilateral military 
agreement with the CAR, which was signed in 2007 and renewed in 2012 (Bauer, 2013). Lustig 
(2013) points out that ‘the South African presidency claimed that the troops were sent in order to 
“assist with the capacity building of the CAR defence force and would assist the CAR with the 
planning and implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.’  
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Interestingly, Rademeyer (2013) disputes, as misleading, President Jacob Zuma’s suggestion that 
South African soldiers killed in the CAR were on a mere training mission. It was revealed in 
2011 that SANDF soldiers were also in Bangui to protect the CAR president. Rademeyer further 
argues that: 
What the president and Minister of Defence (Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula) did not mention was a 
parallel SANDF military operation in the CAR, dubbed “Morero”, which was conducted in 
conjunction with Operation “Vimbezela”. This operation was in place long before late 2012 and 
had nothing to do with training. Rather, it involved a unit of South African Special Forces soldiers 
serving as bodyguards for the CAR’s then president, François Bozizé, later ousted in a coup. 
A critical analysis of Rademeyer’s arguments (2013) shows that SSR tenets of democratic 
oversight were not practiced. The President needed to inform parliament to secure endorsement 
of security operations in CAR. Instead President Zuma had tried to circumvent the whole issue 
by misleading parliament that a bilateral agreement existed between his country and CAR to 
allow for the conducting of capacity building of the CAR’s defence forces. It was thus intriguing 
that the President side-lined parliament in circumstances where the ANC would have used its 
parliamentary majority to enable the President to secure the sanction he needed to send troops to 
the CAR. 
The South African Constitution is clear on the need for the President to inform parliament on the 
deployment of the SANDF. Section 201 of the South African Constitution authorizes the 
President to deploy the SANDF ‘in fulfilment of international obligations’. Such an ethical 
obligation is plausible especially when the deployment is done on moral grounds to save human 
lives or help build peace in a war torn country. However, the section also requires the president 
to inform Parliament ‘promptly and in appropriate detail’ of the reasons for the deployment of 
the defence force; any place where the force is being deployed; the number of people involved; 
and the period for which the force is expected to be deployed (De Vos, 2013). 
SSR tenets of good governance require that troops be deployed in a legitimate and transparent 
manner through endorsement of such action by Parliament. Section 18 of the Defence Act further 
requires the president to inform Parliament of the ‘expenditure incurred or expected to be 
incurred’ by the deployment. Modise (2007:5) argues that one of the main governing ethical 
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principles prescribed in the SA constitution is that national security is subject to the authority of 
Parliament and the national executive.  
Born (2002:2) contends that the main ethical obligation of parliament is the oversight of the 
executive and its security services. The legislative oversight includes activities and issues such as 
dis-approving the budget, adopting new laws, over viewing the defence procurement processes 
and adopting/discussing the security policy of all security services.  
In the CAR case, Lustig (2013) points out that: 
Parliament called for an ad-hoc committee to gain answers to questions raised by the Democratic 
Alliance’s Shadow Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, David Maynier. Those questions 
being: Did the president intentionally mislead parliament to the role of the troops in the CAR? Why 
were the troops deployed based on an understanding between South Africa and the CAR rather than 
a mandate from the United Nations or the African Union? And why was there so little support for 
the troops that had been deployed? 
The SANDF was deployed when parliament was not in sitting. In such a situation, it is the 
normal and ethical practice that during the first seven days after the defence force is deployed, 
the president must provide the information required to the Portfolio Committee on Defence. This 
meant president Zuma had to inform the Portfolio Committee (PC) of the deployment as well as 
the estimated cost of deployment. Failure to inform the PC as required would make the 
deployment unethical, unconstitutional and unlawful (De Vos, 2013). Parliament approves 
security legislation and budgets, performs oversight functions in respect of the security services 
and provides a forum for political parties to deliberate on security policy and activities (Nathan, 
2007:9).  
The South African parliamentarians are quite vocal on security issues and it is their ethical duty 
to do so. While it is acknowledged that there are inherent dangers with exposing security matters 
to parliamentary scrutiny, it cannot be overstated that in a well-functioning liberal democracy no 
area of government is ethically considered to be a “no-go” for the legislature (Lunn, 2010).  
However, South Africa’s parliamentary oversight somehow fails on the key element that 
provides for parliamentarians to have access to important information. Parliamentarians from the 
smaller political parties were clueless on what the SANDF were actually doing in the CAR. It 
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therefore becomes unethical to inform some while keeping others in the dark. Dissemination of 
information need not be selective in a parliamentary democracy.  
African National Congress (ANC) parliamentarians knew what was happening in the CAR. The 
argument is highlighted by Lustig (2013) when he points out that: 
There is much speculation over why South African President Jacob Zuma deployed his forces to 
support the CAR's clearly failing and dictatorial government. The major reason is that both the 
ANC and a number of its individual members have private mineral and natural resource interests in 
the CAR that they wish to protect. There are many South African companies exploiting the oil the 
CAR has to offer, with most of them linked to powerful political figures in South Africa and 
arguably fuelling the coffers that drive the ANC's political machine. 
The above arguments by Lustig (2013), indicate that the deployment of SANDF soldiers was 
largely motivated by national interest and in Chapter 2 realist scholars such as Morgenthau 
(1951) argued that states are more interested in pursuing their own interests at the expense of 
other states’ interests. Realist scholars would also argue that the deployment of troops to the 
CAR could have most likely been motivated by a desire on the part of the South African 
Government to position itself as a regional and continental power. It is worth noting that South 
Africa, among other African countries, is also vying for a permanent seat at the UNSC. 
It can also be argued, however, that failure by the president to secure an easy endorsement of the 
deployment of troops through a guaranteed ANC parliamentary majority, and his attempt to 
mislead parliament as to the reason for the deployment of the troops do not pass as actions of a 
leader who is ethical and his actions are not likely to be viewed as done in uttermost good faith. 
The South African Parliament has the ultimate say over any deployment of troops, both inside 
SA and abroad. In terms of section 18 of the Defence Act, Parliament is ethically authorized to 
confirm the deployment of troops; order the amendment of such authorization; or order the 
termination of the employment of the Defence Force. This has to be done by a resolution within 
seven days after receiving information about the deployment from the president. This means if 
Parliament is not happy with the deployment of South African troops, it has an ethical duty to 
recall the troops if need be.  
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However, given the fact that the ANC has a large majority in Parliament and that its members 
will not oppose the president’s decision, it would be unthinkable that an ANC dominated 
parliament would use their constitutional power to recall the troops already in a foreign land. 
As already stated in chapter 7, it is inconceivable to imagine parliamentarians aligned to the 
executive’s party acting against the President’s decisions on state security. 
Howell and Pevehouse (2005) argue that members of the president's party, all else equal, ought 
to actively support the president's plans to exercise force abroad, as members of the opposition 
party, at a minimum, raise cautious reservations. This was the case with the CCM in Tanzania 
(Baregu 2004: 40) where all CCM parliamentarians would be made to go into a caucus with the 
view of adopting the same view and position. This compromises individual independence of 
sitting MPs as their loyalty to the party counts more than their own independence. 
The above actions can be viewed as both unethical and ethical. They are unethical in that ideally 
parliamentarians are supposed to check on the power of the executive as well as represent the 
interests of the electorate who voted them into such positions. Secondly, such actions are ethical 
in that some opposition parliamentarians are in the habit of opposing anything out of spite. The 
risk of frustrating sound executive decisions on critical security matters as a result of a polarised 
environment is extremely high. It is thus understandable that parliamentarians the world over 
give undivided loyalty to their party and anything else occupies lower priority. 
It can also be argued that if the South African parliament debated on the issue of troop 
deployment in CAR and the voices of ANC prevailed in exonerating the President’s action it 
cannot then be said there was no parliamentary or democratic oversight. This is a typical 
example where the doctrine of responsibility to act and unlimited discretion to protect and 
promote the national interest remain not only too open ended to meaningfully criticize but also 
deemed sufficiently sound to exonerate the actions of the sovereign and the security apparatus. 
8.3 Zimbabwe – Democratic Oversight, Political Parties and Troops Deployment  
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe deployed troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
August 1998 without parliamentary approval (Griggs, 1998:61).This action has been criticized 
by many scholars such as (Chitiyo, 2008; Rupiya, 2009; Muchabaiwa, 2010, Hendricks and 
Musawengana 2010) as being unethical and unconstitutional. 
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ZANU (PF) parliamentarians were quite aware of this move, despite it not being deliberated in 
parliament as consultations had been ongoing within the political party structures. This weakness 
has been highlighted in the SA case where only those who belong to the ruling party are aware of 
such deployments, thus leaving those in the opposition ranks ignorant of what is happening. 
It can be argued, however, that even if the matter of the unauthorised deployment of troops had 
been taken to parliament, ZANU (PF) would have used its parliamentary majority to support and 
endorse the deployment of the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) to the Congo. It is noted that 
ZANU (PF) enjoyed close relations with the Laurent Kabila’s government.  
Also to note is the fact that the ruling ZANU (PF) party enjoyed single-party rule in driving 
parliamentary business from the 1980s until 2000.  
Sylvester (2012:20) argues that though oversight is formally institutionalized within 
constitutions, strict party discipline exercised within the majority party dilutes the quality of 
oversight.  
Howell and Pevehouse (2005) further contend that when members of Parliament are said to have 
an ethical obligation to work against the president it does not mean that they necessarily will. 
Just as members of the same party can ethically oppose their party President and state President 
they are also within their right to also morally support him in times of crisis. 
If for instance, opposition parliamentarians go against the President’s decision or call for new 
legislation that might undermine the President’s powers - what usually happens is that 
parliamentarians in the President’s party will always support him/her in authorising the use of 
coercion or voting for more funds to sustain military operations. This phenomenon is not 
peculiar to Africa and has in fact been the major trend the world over. 
After the 2000 Zimbabwean elections (two years after the deployment of Zimbabwean troops to 
the DRC), the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) won 57 out of 120 
parliamentary seats. The MDC parliamentarians as way of practicing their ethical mandate then 
sparked heated debates and growing opposition to the DRC war.  
The MDC thus called for an immediate withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from the Congo. They 
argued that the President’s August 1998 decision to intervene in the DRC was unethical since it 
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had more to do with the President’s personal ambitions to assert his leadership as an African 
statesman, and boost the economic interests of the ruling elite, than advance the interests of his 
country (International Crisis Group, 2000:69). 
Critics such as Rupiya (2008) have accused the Zimbabwean head of state of sidestepping a clear 
ethical principle within the former constitution that a president obtains parliamentary 
authorization to go to war.  
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2000:296) claims that:  
Kabila had promised Zimbabwe a great deal more in return for its military support. On 4 September 
1998, Presidents Kabila and Mugabe signed a deal providing for a ‘self-financing’ intervention by 
the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF). Under its terms, Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) was 
to provide arms and munitions to the DRC, in return for which the Zimbabwean mining company, 
Ridgepointe, would take over the management of Gecamines, and receive a 37.5 per cent share of 
the DRC state mining company. 
A critical analysis of the claims made by SIPRI (2000) indicates that there was need for 
democratic oversight over the deployment of Zimbabwean troops to the DRC. The same 
arguments also show a realist perspective that seeks to advance the national interests of the 
Zimbabwean Government. 
Outside the mining sector, Harare had other interests.  
The ailing Zimbabwean Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) had signed a deal to double its 
import of electricity from the Inga Dam in Bas-Congo (ICG, 2000:71). The deal was dependent 
on rehabilitating Inga’s power plant, as well as upgrading the capacity of the link to Zimbabwe 
via Katanga and Zambia.  
ZANU (PF) parliamentarians on the other hand argued that the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) 
came to Congo in order to help a SADC ally invaded by enemies and that their motivation was to 
guarantee and safeguard the integrity of the Congolese territory. Baregu (1999) also points out 
that Zimbabwe could not refuse the request made for military assistance made to all SADC 
countries by the DRC President Laurent Kabila.  
According to Howell and Pevehouse (2005), presidents work on behalf of members of their own 
party. Republican members of Congress rarely have anything to gain from currying the favour of 
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Democratic presidents; as Democratic members have little reason to go out of their way to 
support Republican presidents. It can be observed that while Griggs (1998) and Rupiya (2008) 
state that Zimbabwe side stepped legislative intent by deploying troops in DRC without 
parliamentary authorisation Zimbabwe acted under the auspices of the SADC Organ on defence 
and security which states an attack on a member state is an attack on all member states. 
It can also be argued that Zimbabwe did not unilaterally deploy troops in the DRC but was 
invited by the host country. However, students of international law would argue that states are 
more inclined to the dictates of municipal rather than international law. 
The drafters of the current Zimbabwean Constitution, aware of the shortcomings of the former 
Lancaster House Constitution, made it clear in the new Constitution (which came into effect in  
June 2013) that the President can deploy the Defence Forces outside Zimbabwe in defence of the 
country’s national security or national interest- Section 213 (3) (d). Section 213 (1) (a) states 
that, only the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, has power – to authorize 
the deployment of the Defence Forces; or has power to determine the operational use of the 
Defence Forces. Section 213 (3) (a-c) further states that:  
With the authority of the President, the Defence Forces may be deployed outside Zimbabwe – on 
peace keeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations Organisation or any other 
international or regional organisation of which Zimbabwe is a member; to defend the territorial 
integrity of a foreign country; in fulfilment of an international commitment. 
The above constitutional obligation indicates the need to have a well-resourced SS in order to 
meet international and regional assignments. It can be deduced that such a constitutional mandate 
obligates the sovereign to devise a SSR policy that adequately capacitates the military. Needless 
to add that any SSR that seeks to weaken the SSI is ill advised and unpatriotic. 
According to Nathan (2007:7) the executive determines security policy and exercises control 
over the security services. The President usually has direct authority over the armed forces as the 
commander-in-chief. The executive branch controls the security sector by giving them direction, 
including tasking, prioritizing, and making resources available (Born, 2002:2).  
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Lunn (2010:17) is also of the view that the executive is normally responsible for the decision to 
go to war—with legislative approval—and for the strategic command and control of any conflict. 
Section 214 of the Zimbabwean Constitution states that: 
When the defence forces are deployed - in Zimbabwe to assist in the maintenance of public order; 
or outside Zimbabwe; the President must cause Parliament to be informed, promptly and in 
appropriate detail, of the reasons for their deployments and - where they are deployed in 
Zimbabwe, the place where they are deployed; where they are deployed outside Zimbabwe, the 
country in which they are deployed. 
However, according to Leigh (2003:4-5), the dilemma in executive direction is the balance 
between too much or too little control. What Leigh is worried about and cautions against is that 
too much executive control poses dangers of political manipulation and abuse while too little 
control may lead to the security sector becoming a law unto themselves or a state within a state.  
The dominance of ZANU (PF) in the politics of Zimbabwe has led to a concern among scholars 
on the politicization of parliament. ZANU (PF) has been at the helm of Zimbabwean politics for 
three decades, winning most of the elections with a wide margin.  The dominance of ZANU (PF) 
has thus created a strong executive, which historically has been able to count on the numerical 
advantage of its party’s MPs, who display strong inclinations to weigh in on national issues 
based on party caucus resolutions. 
Apart from disturbances that occurred in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands in the 
formative years of independence from 1982 to 1987, which were successfully contained in a 
unity accord of 22nd December 1987 between liberation movements of ZANLA and ZIPRA led 
by ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU, Zimbabwe has enjoyed enviable peace. 
Zimbabwe’s ability to maintain a SS that deterred both internal upheavals and external 
aggression shows that Zimbabwe’s SSIs have been very effective. It can be argued that the 
safeguarding of the sovereignty of the nation is attributed to the effectiveness of the SS in 
preventing anarchy.  
On the other hand, the ability of the SS to engage in defence exercises to protect the Beira 
Corridor against attacks by Renamo insurgents in Mozambique in 1986, at a time when 
disturbances were also being experienced in the western part of the country shows the resilience 
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and robustness of the Zimbabwean SSIs. It can further be argued that sufficient ethical practices 
were observed to the extent that peace continues to be enjoyed in Zimbabwe, thus allowing for 
the safe movement of citizens even at night. 
Indeed there were not much of parliamentary oversight challenges worth writing home about as 
Zimbabwe’s peacekeeping operations at regional, continental and international level spanning 
both the military and police have been commended as way above average. 
It was further observed that factors that impact parliamentary oversight are similar not only 
between Zimbabwe and South Africa but also include the USA, Russia and China. As a 
consequence of this accepted norm, the line between the executive branch and parliament has, at 
times, been blurred and this also extended to parliamentary committees. 
8.4 Namibia – Parliamentary Oversight and knowledge of Security Sector issues 
In terms of the Namibian Constitution, the president is ethically considered the Commander-in-
Chief of the defence force with the authority to appoint senior military officers and to declare 
war (Government of Namibia 1989: Article 27, 32 sub-Article 4c).  
Article 32 (4) (c) of the Namibian Constitution also stipulates that the President shall have the 
power to appoint the Chief of the Defence Force on the recommendation of the Security 
Commission. The Security Commission is chaired by the Chairperson of the Public Service 
Commission and includes the Attorney General and members of the Parliament (Negonga, 
2003:81).  
The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia makes the following ethical provisions for stable 
civil-military relations: 
 The President is the commander-in-chief of the Namibian Defence Forces (NDF) and directs 
the Chief of the Defence Force during the state of national defence. 
 The Minister of Defence directs the Chief of the Defence Force in executing his duty in times 
of peace. 
 The Chief of the Defence Force enjoys executive military command of the armed forces (ibid). 
 
Mwange (2009a:178) argues that some ethical provisions as contained in the constitution were 
undermined as the executive deployed the NDF in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
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in 1998, without the knowledge or approval of parliament. This case resonates with the South 
African CAR case and the Zimbabwean DRC intervention.  
All interventions were seen to be unethical and unconstitutional as the executive had gone ahead 
with the deployment of troops without the knowledge of some opposition parliamentarians. 
However, it was noted that even if the above cases had been presented to parliament, the 
deployments would have still gone ahead bearing in mind the overall majorities these parties 
commanded in parliament. 
Griggs (1998:61) says; President Sam Nujoma of Namibia sent 600 troops, armoured vehicles 
and helicopters to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to assist Kabila in 1998. Namibian 
participation was based on President Nujoma’s directives without consultation with his cabinet 
or parliament. 
At times, scholars overstate that these leaders did not consult cabinet or parliament yet the 
majority of those in cabinet and parliament belong to the president’s party. It will be quite 
unrealistic that these Ministers and parliamentarians did not know their party’s position as 
regards the deployment of troops to the DRC. In the SA and Zimbabwean cases, both the cabinet 
and ANC and ZANU (PF) parliamentarians were well informed of such a move. 
Blick et al (2007:1) point out that the British governments can make foreign policy as they see fit 
without being required to seek effective parliamentary or public approval. They further point out 
that ‘among the decisions and actions that the government can take under prerogative powers and 
which are thus outside effective democratic control are: making war and deploying the armed 
forces, playing a military role in NATO and representing the United Kingdom (UK) on the 
United Nations Security Council (Ibid:2). 
However, Lamb (1999) argues that such presidential powers in Namibia were soon put under 
checks and balances when opposition political parties upset South West African People’s 
Organization’s (SWAPO) dominance in the legislature by winning quite a reasonable number of 
seats in Parliament.  
Lamb asserts that:  
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Civil supremacy in Namibia was further consolidated by the failure of SWAPO to win a two-thirds 
majority in the first democratic elections when the opposition parties secured 31 out of 72 seats in 
the National Assembly. The existence of a reasonably strong opposition meant that the risk of the 
ruling party using the military for political reasons was significantly reduced (Lamb 1999: 7). 
In contradiction to Lamb’s (1999) assertion and the argument forwarded by Mwange (2003) 
Negonga (2003:85) is of the view that Parliament expects the principle of transparency to apply 
to all the activities of the state including those concerning the NDF. The executive power of the 
commander-in-chief of the NDF to deploy the defence force in accordance with a threat 
assessment and national interest is sometimes criticized by the opposition in Parliament. 
It therefore becomes ethical to oppose the executive as it is also ethical for the executive to 
defend its position as regards the deployment of troops.  
However, Parliament should not expect transparency to apply always in deployment of the 
national defence force and due consideration should be given to the necessity for confidentiality 
based on operational requirements (ibid). 
The Namibian Constitution states that the Parliament has legislative powers, approves the 
defence budget and reviews the President’s decisions to deploy defence forces in critical 
functions. The Minister of Defence is responsible for the defence function of government and is 
accountable to the President, the Cabinet and Parliament for the management and execution of 
this function Negonga (2003:82).  
According to Mwange (2009a: 182) the specific role of parliament in civil–military relations is at 
the heart of issues of democratic control. Parliaments are expected to impose serious checks on 
the dictates, authority and roles of military establishments and structures. Additionally, 
parliaments should scrutinize the actions, not only of the military, but also of the executive 
(ibid).  
The functions and powers of parliament, among others, are: 
 to oversee the activities of government ministries/offices/agencies and ensure detailed scrutiny 
of the executive’s work; 
 hold public hearings to hear the views of citizens on bills being considered; 
 approve government spending and regulate taxation by considering the budgets prepared by 
government ministries;  
 approve international agreements entered into by the government of Namibia with other 
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governments/organisations; 
 Debates issues and advise the president on matters the Constitution authorizes him/her to 
undertake (Parliament of Namibia 2001: 2). 
 
Nathan (2007:9) also points out that Parliament approves security legislation and budgets, 
performs oversight functions in respect of the security services and provides a forum for political 
parties to deliberate on security policy and activities.  
Luna (2010:11) is of the view that Parliaments perform a dual function in the sense that they 
must both influence and reflect public opinion. It is their task to explain and justify military 
expenditure, why military personnel are deployed ‘overseas’ and why such deployments may 
result in the loss of life.  
However, Baregu (2005:40) stresses that independent and unconstrained parliamentary oversight 
requires that there be a clear separation of powers and checks and balances particularly between 
the legislature and the executive.  
Mwange (2009b:93) notes that: 
In Namibia, the legislature possesses oversight powers which include the enactment of legislation 
that seeks to prevent excessive secrecy with respect to the budget. The legislature determines the 
military’s budget allocation and procurement expenditure. The National Assembly has the power to 
approve budgets. As per the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Cabinet Ministers are 
accountable to both the President and Parliament (Articles 63 sub-Article 2A, 41). Equally, the 
National Council, which is composed of representatives from the thirteen political regions of the 
country, has the power to review bills passed by the National Assembly and has certain 
investigative powers (Article 59 sub-Article 3). These are important mechanisms for ensuring 
checks and balances. However, their effectiveness is undermined by lack of in-depth debates in 
Parliament on issues of defence and security.  
Mwange (2009a:183) notes that in Namibia, despite the existence of the parliamentary 
committees on security and defence, none of these committees has effectively performed its 
oversight duties so far. He argues that these committees are not active but react to security and 
defence issues that are of national concern (Ibid). For instance, they seem to be doing something 
when there is a bill to be debated, but on other days they are dormant. On top of that, members of 
parliament who constitute these committees are not well vested in security and defence issues. 
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Moreover, there is not enough supporting staff to assist members of parliament in executing their 
duties (Ibid: 184). 
Negonga (2003:84) is also quick to point out that although the Republic of Namibia enjoys a 
legal and institutional framework for healthy civil-military relations, challenges exist in 
exercising these principles. He further argues that the fact that the military has insufficient 
resources to support civil communities in cases of emergency constitutes a challenge to civil-
military relations.  
An imminent challenge to civil-military relations in Namibia is the lack of modern defence 
resources to meet territorial defence needs (ibid: 85). Scholars who include Modise (2007), Born 
et al (2010), Ball (2004), Baregu (2005), Lunn (2010), and Caparini (2004) have noted that not 
all parliamentarians have sufficient knowledge on oversight issues such as weapons 
procurement, arms control and the readiness/preparedness of military units.  
The security sector is a highly complex field.  
The Namibian Parliament, just like all other Parliaments still have a lot of work to do in regards 
to sufficient knowledge on the security sector. The area on parliamentary skills and competence 
in relation to democratic oversight will be analysed below in detail. 
8.4.1 Parliamentary Skills and Competence on Security Issues 
The composition and competencies of parliamentary oversight committees is necessary. A 
committee composed of a majority of people with some relevant competencies in the field is 
likely to be more effective than one with only a few competent people or none.  
According to Born et al (2010:7) the security sector is a highly complex field, in which 
parliaments have to oversee issues such as weapons procurement, arms control and the 
readiness/preparedness of military units. In most African countries, owing to the backgrounds of 
most MPs the committees do not enjoy a broad range of skills and experience on security issues 
(Baregu, 2005:41). 
It should be noted that not all parliamentarians have sufficient knowledge and expertise to deal 
with security sector issues in an effective manner (e.g. studies carried out by Koungniazonde 
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(2008) –Benin; Aning (2008) – Ghana; Ebo and Jaye (2008) – Liberia).  Nor may they have the 
time and opportunity to develop them, since their terms as parliamentarians are time-bound and 
access to expert resources within the country and abroad may be lacking (Born et al, 2005:7).  
Baregu (2005) in his study of Tanzanian parliamentarians argues that this lends them vulnerable 
to browbeating state bureaucrats, particularly when it comes to technical issues and complex 
security matters.  
Ball et al (2006:70-71) acknowledge that: 
There is a serious shortage of individuals well versed in security matters within oversight bodies in 
most countries. The need for technical knowledge of the security sector is greater in some areas 
than in others. Legislators, for example, require detailed knowledge of a range of security- related 
issues in order to make decisions. Oversight capacity is limited not only by inadequate knowledge 
of security issues, but also of inadequate knowledge of governing processes. For example, 
legislators frequently do not understand how to use the committee system effectively, lack 
experience in drafting legislation, and are uncertain about the role and functioning of legislative 
oversight bodies.  
It can be observed from the above quotation that legislators’ moral right of playing an oversight 
role on SS issues is at times greatly hindered by the lack of knowledge that the law makers 
themselves have about SSIs. At times, opposition parliamentarians have incessantly debated on 
security matters that they know little about, with the result that they oftentimes call for SSRs that 
weaken instead of strengthen the SS thereby compromising the sovereignty of the state and 
exposing it to internal and external aggression. In such circumstances, social and political 
upheavals are likely to occur, rendering the country ungovernable. With a weakening in human 
security, it can also be argued that even prospects of socioeconomic growth and development 
will be adversely affected. 
Those who are responsible for democratic oversight of the security sector in African Parliaments 
rarely bring issues which address the capacitation and modernization of the country’s defence 
capabilities. It would have been necessary for Parliamentarians in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola 
(after DRC war) and South Africa and Botswana (after the Lesotho crisis) to have taken a post-
mortem of the strength and weaknesses of their defence forces with a view to institute measures 
to improve the operational efficiency of the SS. 
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A typical example relates to how, in Chapter 7, Russian parliamentarians reflected on the war 
with Georgia in 2008 and saw a need for the rearmament and restructuring of Russian forces for 
future contingencies (Allison, 2008:1170). 
 
Bartles (2011:69) also points out that, “despite Russian victory in the Russian-Georgia war and 
initial accolades in the government and media, few in the (Duma and Executive) were pleased by 
the performance of the Russian military.” Lannon, (2011:27) also notes that although on the 
surface, the five-day (Russian-Georgian) war seemed a major triumph for Russia, it took less 
than four months, after the war, for the Russian Ministry of Defence to announce that the entire 
Russian military was going to be radically transformed, to such an extent that when the reforms 
were completed, all vestiges of its former Soviet structure were eliminated.  
 
Contrary to the above Russian case, in Africa, as noted by Sylvester (2012); Ebo and N’Diaye 
(2008) and Baregu (2005) parliamentarians lack knowledge and experience of the defence sector 
and the parliaments’ research capacity is usually under-resourced.  Thus, Parliament’s 
democratic oversight remains weak within sub-Saharan Africa. Baregu (2005:40) argues that 
where the sovereign is clearly and overwhelmingly more powerful than the legislature in terms 
of information and material resources, it is unlikely that parliament, let alone the oversight 
committee, will be capable of sustaining a strong critical stand against the government.  
 
8.4.2 Western Influence and the SSR debate in Africa 
In Chapter 4 it was noted that the end of the Cold War brought with it calls for reforming the 
security sector institutions. These calls came from development theorists whose major argument 
was that security spending during the ‘tense’ Cold War period had been a major drain on the 
budgets of many European countries.  
Security Sector Reform (SSR) was intended to create proper structures for civil-military relations 
where the civilians would have control over the security sector. According to this liberal school 
of thought, security personnel also needed to undergo training in various aspects of human rights 
law. In addition, civil society groups, parliaments were also to act as watchdogs of security 
institutions by taking an oversight role and also spearheading the ownership of SSR.  
216 
 
Ownership of SSR initiatives has thus remained problematic.  
The whole discourse on SSR in sub-Saharan Africa and even most of the arguments raised by 
African liberal scholars concentrate much on Western views on the ownership of SSR. Most of 
the security institutions in Africa and their ideologies have been imported from the West rather 
than emerging from Africa’s own dynamics and processes, such as liberation struggle 
experiences and African political cultures.  
The international community, NGOs and a plethora of African civil society groups have been 
calling for democratization of the security sector as part of the peace building process. However, 
there has not been an integrated African approach on how best to deal with issues concerning the 
security sector. It raises concern that where the SSR is taking place in Africa, one finds that the 
whole programme is sponsored by the former colonial powers under the pretext of bringing 
about military professionalism. 
In Chapter 5 it was observed that most Western orchestrated coups were successful owing to the 
manipulation of those who either had undergone Western military training or had a close link 
with Western countries. It also became apparent that any donor driven process was usually 
associated with some conditionalities that tended to undermine the sovereignty of the state where 
such reforms were instituted. 
Bendix and Stanley (2008:30) observed that: 
Donor bias is evident in the exclusive focus of the SSR debate on the reform needs of countries in 
the global South, while major deficits in the advanced industrialized countries, including a general 
lack of transparency, arms exports, and discriminatory policies with regard to immigrants, remain 
outside of the SSR dialogue. 
Edmunds (2003;17) is of the view that while models of security sector organization from other 
countries may be useful as reference points for particular security sector programmes, it is 
unlikely they will be successful if they are used as rigid blueprints for reform.  
Smith (2001) has been a fierce critic of “a one size fits all” type of SSR. His major argument is 
that each country has its own unique security sector setup which is totally different from other 
countries’ security institutions. In this respect, the local process of developing appropriate 
217 
 
democratic security sector arrangements can be at least as important as the policy end-point 
itself.  
It can therefore be argued that “imposing an externally generated blueprint for security 
institutions avoids domestic security sector planning processes which in themselves are a 
fundamental part of any country’s national security and sovereignty” (Williams, 2000:8).   
It can also be claimed that “if the security sector improvements are not driven from within the 
local context then they are more likely to remain superficial and will not tackle the underlying 
problems of the security institutions” (Adedeji, 2007) in Africa and the SADC region in 
particular.  
In pursuance of the above discussion, Germann and Edmunds (2003:8) argue that with regard to 
the principal objectives concerning the security sector as propounded by Western policy 
practitioners on emerging democracies it would be short-sighted to target only governing 
liberation political parties. The prospect of alternating governments must satisfy society as a 
whole that advantages exist in instituting any security reform programmes. Donors will seek to 
impose their views on a recipient country by influencing the direction of SSR. 
As noted by Chalmers (2001:8), “it is much more difficult to get a government to genuinely 
believe in the reform in its own right, to participate in its design and to be ready to continue it 
when external threats are explicit”.  It therefore can be argued that certain sections in Africa are 
resentful of the patronising attitude of Western and civic groups in matters of SSR. Consequently 
external prescriptions for SSR are viewed with a lot of suspicion. 
Calls by Western countries for reforms of SSIs in Africa can also be viewed as being illegal 
under international law. Bodin and Hobbes rightly argued that a sovereign state is one that is 
fully self-governing and independent of external control. This implies that, “no authority exists 
to order the state how to act” (Russett and Starr, 2000:58).  
It therefore becomes questionable on whether Western states have a right to call on another state 
to reform its security sector apparatus using their SSR models. It was noted in Chapter 1 under 
United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) 1970 Declaration on Principles of International 
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Law Concerning Friendly Relations that no state or collective of states have the sole obligation 
to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.  
Following the above UNGA 1970 Declaration, it can be argued that any SSR that is externally 
driven becomes unethical because it is a violation of international law. This argument is 
particularly significant because it resonates with the views of the African Union and how SSR 
should be carried out on the continent. The AU prohibits all national, regional, continental or 
international entities from carrying out activities in Africa, in the name of SSR, which may 
undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, domestic jurisdiction of a 
Member State, including the use of SSR to effect regime change in a Member State, or its ability 
to fulfil its international obligations (AU Policy Framework on SSR, 2011:2).  
In addition, The Africa Forum on Security Sector Reform held in Addis Ababa from the 24
th
 to 
the 26
th
 of November, 2014 highlighted the importance of political leadership (sovereign) in the 
SSR processes. It was noted that political leadership was to be included in all SSR stages 
consisting of the conception, resource mobilization, implementation, and coordination of 
national SSR processes, taking into account the fact that SSR can have far reaching political 
implications on nation-state sovereignty. This means that Western states and other actors have no 
authority whatsoever to dictate SSR to sovereign African states. 
The literature on security sector institutions which includes the works of Doro (2002), Bendix 
and Stanley (2008), Nathan (2007), Smith (2001), Williams (2000) have shown that in order to 
avoid undermining a state’s sovereignty it is imperative to consider a local approach when 
dealing with SSR. 
What is clear from the preceding findings is that most of the academic work on the SS in Africa 
is characterized by Western ideas that do not address some of the problems Africa and the 
Southern African region in particular are currently facing. It appears that the thinking and action 
of some African SS scholars and practitioners is heavily skewed and fixated on the Eurocentric 
model. Williams (2000) points out that the concept of SSR is exclusively Eurocentric in origin. 
Mobekk (2010:230) in concurrence with Williams argues that: 
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Security sector reform (SSR) is a very political process aiming to deliver effective security services 
with democratic oversight, good governance and control. However, SSR is frequently based on a 
Westernized view and objectives established to meet donor requirements.  
 
Scholars such as Bendix and Stanley (2008:29) also note that, local SSR ownership is frequently 
reduced to a question of securing the agreement of local governments to programmes and 
strategies devised by foreign donors. This could be clearly seen in the Sierra Leonean and 
Liberian cases in chapter 3 where there was a high degree of external control in the whole SSR 
process. 
 
While a number of research studies have been conducted on SS in Africa, particularly on issues 
concerning security reforms, democratization, good governance, military professionalism, ethics 
and civil military relations a gap still exists in this body of literature that points to lack of 
appreciation of the need to incorporate local views in complementing the Euro-centric model of 
the SS. Much of the literature on SSR recognizes the need for local ownership of reform, while 
conceding that the SSR agenda is often externally and donor driven (Brzoska, 2003:12). The 
rationale is that SSR, no matter how well intended, can neither be successful nor sustainable 
without the support of the consumers of such programmes.  
Ball and Fayemi (2003:7) argue that: 
…a major problem in the area of security sector reform and transformation in Africa has been 
precisely the lack of African input to and ownership of the emerging reform agenda. Donors of 
both security assistance and development assistance aimed at supporting changes in the security 
sector have tended to dominate the process of defining the reform agenda. 
To give true expression of SSR in Africa there should be a genuine recognition of the importance 
of African actors actually ‘owning’ these processes and of providing the necessary resources 
with which they can achieve the objectives that are, explicitly and implicitly, at the heart of the 
security sector reform discourse.  
Adedeji (2007:17) is therefore of the view that: 
While donor states and agencies may pursue the alternative track of securing a ‘local partnership’ 
with opposition elements, the media, academia, civil society and some parliamentarians, this can 
ultimately only be for the purpose of pressurizing the government. Donor enthusiasm cannot 
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replace local ownership, and perhaps the most practical path is for the former to support and 
encourage the necessary conditions for the latter, rather than seeking to supplant it.  
 
A new methodology is required that looks at SSR from divergent viewpoints. It could be argued 
that any theoretical revision can only be effected on the basis of an interdisciplinary approach 
that incorporates both African and Western intellectual traditions. This means that priority 
should be given to local views, opinions and interpretations on how best reforms within the SS 
should be carried out. What is needed is a local model grounded on local African experiences, 
traditions, institutions and heritages. 
8.4.3 Analysing State Sovereignty in the Context of a Strong or Weak SS 
Reformists such as Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2009), Rupiya (2008) and Mhanda (2015) have raised 
genuine concerns on the coercive apparatus of African states. They note that some African states 
have inherited as well as preserved a mentality where security structures and the very methods of 
defence system management, are similar to those of former colonial governments. They contend 
that the brutal force used by members of the security forces on citizens can be described as 
illegal and unethical since it is in violation of provisions made by the constitution. This fact 
cannot be refuted in that security sector institutions in some African states can be a nightmare or 
albatross on the very citizens they are supposed to protect.  
Disturbing cases exist where African governments have not carried out security duties 
responsibly and ethically. 
The following case studies are pertinent: the insurrection of RENAMO in Tete, Sofala and 
Zambezi provinces raised serious allegations against the FRELIMO army that they were beating 
and at times shooting civilians they suspected of supporting or collaborating with the rebel group 
(Frey, 3 May, 2016).During the Libyan conflict Gadhafi unleashed his military on civilians who 
were challenging his rule (Shabi, 2012); in the DRC people living in some rebel controlled areas 
were at times raped or brutalised by the military (Harsch, 2009; Ouédraogo, 2014). And in 
Nigeria those suspected of aiding or living in areas mainly controlled by Boko Haram were 
brutalized by the Federal state army instead of being given sanctuary (Solomon 2012, 2015; 
Ouédraogo, 2014).  
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Given the foregoing examples of irresponsible and unethical behaviour, it can be argued that the 
call by ‘reformists’ that requires the state to carry out SSR that can best help address 
victimisation of the citizenry is plausible and justified. It can be further argued that rogue 
behaviour by the state undermines its claim to legitimacy. 
At times, as noted by Doro (2012), SSR debates are merely cosmetic political bargains between 
those in the ruling party and the main opposition parties as well as civil society groups to jostle 
for political ground without giving any consideration to long term plans or policy initiatives that 
can bring about genuine SSR. By genuine and enduring reforms Doro (2012) is implying that 
reforms should make the security institutions more transparent, efficient, and effective and above 
all be in a position to defend and protect the state and its citizens from both internal and external 
threats. He adds that after 9/11, the USA and other western governments had to come up with 
wide ranging reforms within the security institutions as a way of countering the emergent threat 
of terrorism.  
Doro believes that reforms are not about upsetting the status quo or weakening the security 
sector institutions but they are for making improvements on defensive and offensive capabilities 
of the SS.  He argues that “security reform therefore is not necessarily an exercise meant at 
wholesale dismantling of the existing structures and supplanting them with totally new 
institutions’’ Doro (2012:10). It can be argued that this terrible mistake is committed by most 
reformists.  
As noted in Chapter 7, the security reforms carried out by countries like the USA, Russia and 
China are meant to improve on these great powers’ military capabilities as to meet internal and 
external threats of the twenty-first century” (Arbatov, 2003;Stratfor, April: 2013;Farmer, 2014).  
From the foregoing, Doro (2012:5) is quick to assert that “SSR is a constructive and evolutionary 
process which involves confidence building and improvements within the security sector. Its aim 
is to attain high levels of efficacy, transparency and inclusive participation within the security 
sector”.  
To quote Doro in full, he goes on to argue that;  
A security reform agenda therefore need not focus only on political aspects but should expand its 
gaze to incorporate the physical and technical reform and transformation of the security sector, the 
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modernization of security systems, the abandonment of obsolete technologies, adoption of modern 
recruitment methods, the financing of the sector which takes into cognisance the various 
modernization programs and the need to engage and confront the new security challenges. In short 
security sector reform has to be conceptualised broadly and in this broad conceptualization it is 
imperative that a holistic and comprehensive model be co-opted, one which goes beyond merely 
defining and limiting the problem to civilian control of the armed forces (Doro,2012: Parliament 
of Zimbabwe /RD/4.2.4/6RE). 
In light of the above quotation, it is evidently clear from Doro’s argument that security sector 
reformists sometimes miss the point on what exactly constitute genuine SSR. The reformists see 
SSR as a magic bullet that if once implemented by a state can bring about transparency and good 
governance of security institutions, provide women with good opportunities for recruitment in 
various security institutions, paves way for rule of law within the security sector, and ushers in 
democratic principles within the ‘rigid’ security institutions.  
It is with great concern that ‘reformists’ seem to brush aside the ability and intent of both state 
and non-state actors in destabilising or threatening the security of states in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Examples of such notable incidences include: interstate conflicts (e.g. NATO deposing Gaddaffi 
in Libya in 2011) ; a rise in incidences of  terrorism (e.g. Al-Shabab in Somalia; Boko Haram in 
Nigeria ; Islamic State terrorists in Libya); the insurrection of rebel movements (Mozambican 
National Resistance (RENAMO); M23 in the DRC);  and some big power sponsored conflicts 
(e.g. during DRC  Conflict in 1998 - Rwanda and Uganda intervening militarily in another 
sovereign state (Baregu,1999); the ethnic conflict in South Sudan). These incidences have been 
subject to debate as well as documented in numerous research articles (Doro, 2012 and Baregu, 
1999). 
An examination of arguments by the above reformist scholars as they relate to SSR will reveal 
that the security sector discourse in the African region seems to place emphasis on total de-
alienation of the military from governance issues. It can be argued that the democratisation of the 
military; enhancing institutional capacity to respect humanity, improving the protection and 
defence of national interests and state sovereignty are plausible aspects of SSR. 
Intriguingly, it is noted that some ‘reformed’ militaries have nearly collapsed in the face of 
attacks by rebels, insurgents and terrorist groups as exemplified by ISI in Iraq, Boko Haram in 
Nigeria, M23 in the DRC and Renamo in Mozambique. It can be argued that the obsession by 
external donors of SSR to enhance human security without equal zeal to safeguard national 
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interest and state sovereignty will inevitably weaken state security and open the doors to anarchy 
and derailment of economic activities.  
It is observed that, most of the liberal scholars are suspicious of any security sector institution 
that is politically aligned to the party in power. It is further observed that the scholars are silent 
on the security sector institutions which lack combat efficiency as was the case with 
Mozambique and the DRC.  
It can be argued that there appears to be selective criticism and characterizations of some 
security sectors in the African region. It is paradoxical that some SSIs, in the exercise of regional 
mandates to defend the sovereignty of regional allies in crisis are seen as unprofessional and 
partisan, whilst, those that lack combat efficiency are viewed as professional. It can be argued 
that such skewed SSR as advanced by some donor states is a deliberate strategy that seeks to 
weaken the forces in the region, thus placing their national interests and sovereignty at risk. 
It is interesting to note that reformist scholars cited in Chapter 1 as well as those cited in this 
Chapter, have not criticised the violation of the sovereign right of the DRC by Uganda, Rwanda 
and Burundi.  
I thus argue that the security sector debate appears geared at alienating the security forces from 
governance or political issues. The foreign sponsors of SSR tend to criticize a strong relationship 
that exists between the security forces and the executives, ignoring the need to improve combat 
efficiency, as exemplified by the poor performance of the Nigerian, Mozambican and 
Democratic Republic of Congo security forces in dealing with armed gangs in their countries. 
The DRC’s security sector failed to contain the March 23 rebel group, and this raised concerns as 
to its preparedness to repel a stronger rebel group or a military invasion from another African 
country. It should be noted that the DRC has not been able to deter military threats coming from 
a small country like Rwanda. It can therefore be argued that the rebel menace, foreign invasions 
and other problems the DRC is facing would not have arisen if the country had sufficient 
deterrent military capability.  
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The ability to speedily eject invaders or easily contain rebel groups should inform the basis for 
sound SSR. Countries that sponsor their own SSRs such as China, Russia or the United States of 
America can easily counter any form of aggression against them. 
In contrast, the DRC, a country vast in size has failed to contain security threats to its territory 
and sovereignty. A security sector that lacks combat readiness is weak and this might end up 
reinforcing rebel groups and other extremists in and outside its territory, in which case one 
cannot eliminate the possibility of a Hobbesian anarchy, civil strife or foreign invasion. 
I therefore argue that the African region needs a well-equipped and politically conscious security 
sector which can deter any threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. African countries 
should be able to address security challenges within their own territory as well as in the region.  
I seek to argue further and suggest that African member countries should learn from their 
experiences and build defence institutions that not only safeguard their national interests and 
sovereignty but also contribute to regional and international security. In addition these countries 
should also support humanitarian assistance efforts as well as participate in peace keeping 
operations in and outside the sub-Saharan region. 
I further argue that whilst liberties and rights as espoused by Kant in Chapter one, must be 
enjoyed by every citizen, the question that remains unanswered is how practicable is Kant’s 
philosophy of sovereignty in the body politic of the current generation. Kant’s view of 
sovereignty is in line with the Western neo-liberal thinking that advocates human rights, 
democracy, rule of law and good governance.  
It can be argued that most Western leaders such as Bush, Blair, Cameron, Obama and civil 
society groups collectively claimed that there were no human rights and freedoms in some 
African because of weak SSIs. Examples of such countries include Libya, Somalia, Angola, and 
the DRC.  
It is further observed that Kant’s conception of human rights and freedoms is what seems to be 
propelled and exploited by big powers such as Britain and America in their patronising relations 
with African countries.  
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I, however, seek to argue that the greatest threat to the African state in the 21
st
 century is 
emanating from donor funded civic groups which are now being used as a front to challenge and 
even call for change of governments in the Southern African region (Shivji 2006:15-17).   
Put into historical context, it is fair to question the advisability of African countries embracing 
the Western view of democracy and also accepting Eurocentric models of SSR. The fact that 
African countries were colonised by European nations makes it prudent for African nations to 
chart their own democratic path in pursuit of their own values, principles, beliefs and security 
architecture.  
It can be said that the arguments for SSR being propagated by ‘reformists’ are not entirely honest 
since the de-politicisation, re-professionalisation and demilitarisation of the security institutions 
is influenced by Western political and ideological thought. However, in the end as happened in 
Iraq this might weaken a state’s military capabilities as the military was overrun by insurgents 
something the insurgents would not have done under Saddam Hussein since he had a more 
capable security sector than the current American and British ‘reformed’ SS. 
In Central and East European countries as observed in Chapters one, the reforms served their 
purpose of alienating Russia’s SS from those of the CEE countries which were once a part of the 
Soviet Union. In the CEE case, reforms were quite favourable to the Western countries which 
master-minded the whole SSR process. African countries have not been spared either, as seen in 
the lack of military capacity displayed by the Somali, DRC, Nigerian, and Mozambican SS to 
contain rebels or terrorists operating within their territories. A poorly equipped and trained SS 
makes a state vulnerable to rebellious groups thus jeopardising nation-state sovereignty. 
 
8.4.4  The need for a “Political’’ or “Apolitical’’ Security Sector 
SSR advocates/reformists have been undeterred in calling for the SSI to be ‘apolitical’. This is 
the major argument being propounded by scholars like Rupiya (2009), Chitiyo (2009), Ebo and 
N’Diaye (2008), Hendricks and Musavengana (2010), Sachikonye (2011), Porto and Parsons 
(2003), Lindeke et al (2007) and a plethora of other African and European scholars and civil 
society groups in many African as well as European countries. 
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Nyakudya (2009) and Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2008) are in agreement that countries such as Angola, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the DRC and Namibia do not need a coercive and partisan army but a 
security sector which is framed around the pertinent issues of governance, democracy and human 
rights. 
Rupiya (2009:5) contends that in the African region, reform of the security sector is a priority 
area that needs to be addressed. He proposes that the military should gain the trust of the people 
and cease to participate in politics.  
Sachikonye (2011:5-9) states that the military in some African states, south of the equator, 
should exercise a high degree of professionalism by desisting from involvement in party politics.  
Echoing the same arguments as Muchabaiwa (2010), Hendricks and Musawengana (2010) 
contend that since independence liberation movements have maintained hegemony of the 
security sector and for this reason the security sector should be reformed.  
Hendricks and Musawengana further claim that fundamental to the survival of most regimes in 
Africa has been a partisan and politically active security sector that has been accused of human 
rights violations (Harsch, 2009) particularly in relation to elections and political activism 
(Mhanda, 2015). 
The questions raised by Sachikonye (2011),Nyakudya (2009),N’Diaye (2008) and many others 
of the security sector desisting from involvement in politics have long been opposed by African 
nationalists like Julius Nyerere as cited in Luanda (2006) when he argues that:  
It is not that the colonial army was apolitical. Indeed, the military is a political tool. The 
issue really is whose politics. I am unable to imagine a situation where the army is 
apolitical. To say that (British) officers commanding Colonel Army and cohorts (native 
troops) did not represent a political ideology is a fallacy. To say that these officers were 
merely just mercenaries is absolutely not true. They stood for British imperialism. Ours is a 
people’s army. The task of the army has changed. It is a people’s army whose task is to 
make sure that the people do not suffer another colonial disaster. Its task is that the people 
do not experience another colonial invasion. (Luanda: 2006: 16-17). 
 
However, I have reservations with the above assertion in that though the military is regarded by 
Nyerere as a political tool it does not make it, in any way, superior or equal to civil authority. To 
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just say the military is a political tool, is more of a careless statement as it denotes violence, 
brutality and coercion in the service of a political view. 
 
In most cases, the military use legitimate violence which is sanctioned by a Constitution and 
other Acts of parliament.  
While Williams (2000:27) regards the military as being ‘political’ he differs with Nyerere in that; 
Nyerere calls for a ‘people’s army’ which is ‘political-party-centred’ such as the Chinese 
People’s Liberation army discussed in Chapter 7. Williams believes that the political role of the 
military should never include the terrain of the party-political. This implies that the armed forces 
must always be non-partisan in orientation. Their partnership with the civil authorities should not 
be based on an equal partnership with these politicians but it should merely be based in the 
terrain of national policy that is clearly circumscribed and mutually acknowledged. 
Williams’ arguments as well as those of the above SS reformists can also be critiqued in that 
some countries undertook positive reforms during the decolonization phase, especially in the 
SADC region. It should be remembered that in Chapter 3, it was highlighted that at 
independence, most African countries underwent various SSR processes. The major SSR 
programme noted in Chapter 3 centred on an integration of the once conflicting armies into one 
army. It can be argued that this process also helped to partially dilute the notion of party-political 
as observed in SA (at independence), Mozambique (after the conflict) and Namibia (at 
independence) to mention only a few. 
The arguments raised by Williams and the other reformists do not also clearly address how 
militaries which were borne out of vanguard parties can best untangle themselves from loyalty to 
their party of origin. His suggestions tend to be a bit idealistic; most militaries have remained 
loyal to the parties in power. What he suggests is easier said than done. It is more of one of 
Aesop’s fables on who among the mice would bell the cat. The idea was brilliant but the means 
of executing such an idea came to naught because it was an uphill task to bell the cat. 
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I argue that the security sector in some African countries south of the equator were borne out of 
the liberation struggle and have remained resolute in their ideals; strong in their liberation beliefs 
and aspirations; loyal in defence of the region’s integrity, independence and sovereignty.  
 
Liberation movements have also remained rooted in the nationalist ideology, an ideology that has 
preserved peace and anchored stability and development in the region. It therefore becomes 
difficult or simply impossible to separate the two. I further argue that the security sector in the 
SADC cannot be divorced from the liberation movements that are in power.  
 
However, what I am seeking to advance may be opposed by those who argue that since 
independence, liberation movements have maintained a grip on the security sector, abused the 
trust invested in them and committed acts of human rights violation with impunity, and for this 
reason the security sector should be reformed. 
 
Looking at the countries in Africa south of the equator, it can be seen that the security sector 
institutions of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe fall under the 
command of the nationalist and liberation movements which were at the forefront in organizing 
and deploying young men and women to fight protracted liberation wars against the colonialists.  
 
The vanguard parties which waged the liberation struggle are currently in power especially in the 
SADC region. While not retracting from my position that the SS in the SADC region cannot be 
divorced from the vanguard parties, I seek to agree as well as disagree with reformists when they 
say that the military in some African states, south of the equator, should exercise a high degree 
of professionalism by desisting from involvement in party politics. 
 
I agree that while some of the militaries in the SADC region were borne out of the vanguard 
parties this should not make them mere surrogates of their political parties. Their focus needs to 
be national, regional and international rather than political-party-centred. It is therefore important 
to observe that security sectors need to abide by their constitutional mandate which is framed 
around the pertinent issues of governance, democracy and human rights. 
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As noted in the above section, security should not be a hindrance to but a protector of legitimate 
citizen rights.   
 
It can, therefore, be asserted that the African military, as guided by most sub-Saharan African 
constitutions, serves a mandate to protect its people, its national security interests, and its 
territorial integrity as well as uphold the Constitution. Such constitutional clauses are in line with 
realist perceptions of state-centrism.  ‘Protection’ of a people invariably infers preservation of 
such abstracts, concepts, practices, values, principles, traditions and ideas of such people.  
The fact that most African constitutions use the term ‘protect’ when referring to people who by 
nature are known to be mobile, this duty, then, to protect is not confined to the state’s borders but 
does extend to keeping its people safe from harm wherever they maybe i.e. within or without its 
borders.  
Protection thus entails rescuing from harm or danger or taking of proactive measure to ensure 
that people are shielded from adverse conditions that pose harm or danger to them. 
The African militaries should be able to respond and extend protection to people undergoing 
distressful conditions in any part of the country including outside where deemed necessary. To 
this end, it is an ethical obligation of the Defence Forces to prepare themselves for extra 
territorial operations/missions in the interest of regional, continental and international peace. 
If the vanguard party focuses on democratic principles, mentioned above, then that separation is 
not necessary at all. In my view, the separation only becomes necessary as pointed out by the 
above reformists when the SS turns out to be coercive, thereby violating citizens’ rights.  
Yates (1980, 85-86) sees a People’s Army as one that “not only engages in the defence of the 
country, but is also involved in the production and construction processes as well as being highly 
conscious through the study of politics.’’ He adds that a highly organized, conscious and 
disciplined army can only be a great asset to the country insofar as it is law abiding and is able to 
reduce government expenditure and costs on the military through being self-sufficient in food 
production, and even manufacturing small agricultural implements as well as its own munitions 
to save its vital foreign exchange.  
230 
 
I agree with Yates in that if a military borne out of the liberation movements is law abiding, 
highly organized and disciplined then the only reforms that should be carried out are those in line 
with the Constitution as well as with other Acts of parliament.   
It can also be claimed that if the so called de-politicization process is not driven from within the 
local context then it is more likely to remain superficial and will not tackle the underlying 
problems of the sector in most African regions. It can be further argued that recruiting, training 
and administration policies of the military can never be championed by the former colonial 
masters without seriously compromising the principles, values and ethos that guided the 
liberation struggles in the African region. I therefore argue that democratization of the military 
must be done in line with the African security value systems and the need to protect the 
revolution; at the same time enhancing economic growth creating a futuristic heritage for the 
common good of the regional population. 
 
It is my submission that some of the arguments of reformists about being apolitical lack touch 
with reality and cannot be supported. In this vein, it must be noted that the politicisation of any 
security sector is a natural and predictable outcome (Williams, 2000) since the security 
institutions are by themselves a coercive arm of the state which is a highly political organ in 
word and deed (Weber cited in Newton, 2005).  
In consequence, depoliticising the SS is very problematic (Doro, 2012), noting that soldiers are 
human beings and are therefore political animals that are also affected by any political process.  
Mehler (2009) and Smith argue that the concept of SSR tends to be biased in favour of Western 
political principles which are at times incompatible with the political norms, values, ideologies, 
and beliefs of African security institutions. It can be noted that in the American Military 
Leadership Manual (1983:88-89) (AMLM) political loyalty to the ideals of the nation are clearly 
highlighted.  
The aforesaid Manual states that, “to be a true military professional, loyalty to the ideals of the 
nation means a deep belief in serving and defending the ideals of freedom, justice, truth and 
equality found in the declaration of independence and the constitutions.”  
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The Chinese people’s army has linked military professional leadership to the political values of 
independence and the constitution and over the years, has created sound symbiotic civil-military 
relationships between the military and civil authorities. Indeed China is not doing anything any 
different from what western countries like America are doing on civil-military relationships. This 
vital relationship ensures that the security sector respects the values and ethos of independence 
thereby limiting the conflicts between the military and the people.  
In line with the above thinking, the same concepts link military leaderships to values of 
independence as also celebrated in Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Russia and Britain. 
Vladimir Nicolai Lenin saw that for a revolution to be successful, a vanguard party was needed 
to stimulate the revolution. Lenin, unlike Marx, saw the vanguard party as the principal 
revolutionary agent that would lead the liberation struggle through organized structures. 
The vanguard parties in Africa, south of the equator are MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in 
Mozambique, SWAPO in Namibia, ANC in South Africa, TANU in Tanzania and ZANU (PF) 
in Zimbabwe.  
Mao Tse-tung also argued that liberation movements were supposed to have political and 
military leadership. He claimed that:  
Guerrilla fighters must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies—resolute, loyal, 
sincere, and robust. These men must be well-educated in revolutionary technique, self-
confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counter-propaganda. In 
short, these leaders must be models for the people. 
The Maoist theory of guerrilla warfare supports the idea of the non-separation of the military 
from the civilians. In Mao’s thinking, the military is the fish and the civilians are the water, thus 
it is not possible to take the fish out of the water. A regular People’s Army has to take over 
where the freedom fighters left off in the radicalization of the peasantry and also in raising the 
masses’ political consciousness.  
The military, as an institution, draws its ethical practice from the society. A symbiotic 
relationship between the military and the people allows for mutual respect for each other. The 
army comes from the civilians and it is only natural that its core duty is to defend and protect the 
civilian population alongside other mandates. This approach broadens the scope in advancing 
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civil-military discourse through a more radical perspective of a People’s Army created through a 
symbiosis between the civilians and the military. 
In essence, while I appreciate legitimate concerns of some reformists, I wish to argue against 
SSR perspectives that are being propagated by some ‘reformists’ as insincere, because the de-
politicisation, re-professionalisation and demilitarisation of the security institutions they are 
calling for suffers from undue influence of certain political and ideological standing favourable 
to those making such calls. In consequence, such insincerity, bordering on hypocrisy, seeks to 
undermine the legitimacy of the military, weaken its capabilities and render it vulnerable to 
abuse by hostile states. 
The research findings on security sector institutions have also shown that there is a need to 
consider a local approach when dealing with issues to do with the SS. This is particularly 
significant in so far as it is necessary to always safeguard the integrity of the sovereignty of a 
state. 
What is clear from the preceding findings is that most of the academic work on the SS in Africa 
is characterised by Western ideas that do not address some of the historical and political contexts 
within which problems besetting the African region must be understood. 
The discourse on the security sector has concentrated much on Kant’s ideas of sovereignty while 
side-lining and indeed ignoring Bodin and Hobbes’ theories on the less reasoning basis that they 
are undemocratic.  
As argued elsewhere, it appears that the thinking and actions of African SS scholars and 
practitioners is skewed and fixated on the Eurocentric model. While a number of research studies 
have been conducted on SS in Africa, particularly on issues concerning security reforms, 
democratisation, good governance, military professionalism, ethics and civil military relations a 
gap that still exists in this body of literature is a lack of an appreciation of the application of local 
political views in complementing the Euro-centric model of the SS.  
I thus argue, with conviction, that what is needed within the SS discourse is a local socio-
political model grounded on local African perspectives that are informed by peculiarities located 
in the history and culture of the African people. 
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8.5 Conclusion 
 
The chapter observed that states are sovereign entities and in terms of security, every sovereign 
state has some basic responsibilities and duties that include the ability to protect and defend its 
territory, air space, sea frontiers, and critical national infrastructure. In addition, a state is only 
secure by ensuring that its national interests are properly protected. 
The state is also obligated to guard its borders and safeguard its citizens against any danger or 
harm.  
However, it was noted that the discourse on sovereignty has tended to favour ‘reformists’ and 
‘idealists’. In this regard a lot of attention was given to Kant’s ideas of sovereignty while 
ignoring Bodin and Hobbes’ ‘realist’ and ‘pragmatic’ theories which accord the civilian leader 
and security sector institutions more power and control over issues to do with national security.  
It was observed that powerful nations protect Kant’s conception of sovereignty as a way of 
continuing to cause anarchy in the global arena under the pretext of safeguarding human rights 
through the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine.  
One can be argued that it is unethical to pounce on weaker nations in order to benefit from their 
natural resources under the cover of human security that is invariably weakened by a carefully 
crafted anarchical environment. 
A second observation was that most African liberal scholars argue that if the military in the 
African region wants to gain respect and the trust of the people, it must not participate in state 
politics nor should it be seen as a mere appendage of the elites in power. However, it was also 
noted that some sub-Saharan African countries located to the south of the equator won their 
independence through armed struggle.  
The armed struggles in these countries were led by vanguard political parties through their armed 
military wings. It has now remained a big challenge to separate the African armies from their 
former political parties. Liberation movements have actually preserved peace and anchored 
stability and development in the region. The most important thing to be considered by those who 
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are calling for SSR is to come up with a local approach that neither undermines the revolutionary 
ethos nor compromises state’s sovereignty. 
To be noted in this debate is the perennial problem of the need for change. While change is 
coined as the only constant in the world, such change must not be seen to be advancing the 
opposite of what it seeks to achieve. For instance the very western nations that advocate the 
separation of politics from the military have an endless list of former high ranking army 
personnel that occupied high ranking political office on retirement.  
Retired American general, General Collin Powell, became Secretary of State under the 
Republican administration of Bush. I thus seek to argue that African leaders must identify ironies 
in western sponsored SS initiatives and be able to argue their cases from a position of 
knowledge.  
It can be argued that at times, the debate calling for SSR in the African region seeks to advance 
military reforms, some of which might actually compromise the sovereignty of the states in the 
region. The reformist agenda has potential to create instability than enhance peace and security 
in the most peaceful and stable region in sub-Saharan Africa.  
In examining the dominant SS arguments in this thesis no notion of prescribing security sector 
requirements for Europeans has been made by Africans. It has been very clear that the strong do 
what they want or wish and the poor do what they must. The adage ‘do as I say and not as I do’  
must be understood as defining the game of unequal as Africa endures the humiliation of 
undertaking SSRs that have potential to sink the ideals of state-security, human-security, state 
sovereignty and state secrecy into the ground.  
It can therefore be concluded that a strong Africa, in terms of socioeconomic and political 
development, poses unusual and serious threat to the foreign policies of western nations. It is 
therefore in the interest of sponsors of a ‘reformist’ SS agenda to deepen Africa’s dependence on 
the west’s generation of ideas concerning the minding of SSIs on the African continent. 
It can clearly be argued that a strong Africa will sponsor its SSRs in accordance with its culture, 
values and principles drawn from historical journeys, and, independent of foreign interference. 
Should Africa south of the Sahara be industrialised as is the case with the west, there would be 
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no scope for western ‘reformists’ and African ‘reformists’ driving the capacitation needs of 
Africa, especially south of the Sahara. 
As the same western nations compete in arming the very countries whose SSs they purport to 
want to capacitate, it becomes evident that African countries are being used as pawns in the 
game of westerners whose ultimate idea is to drive the economic seat of African countries as was 
the case during colonial days. 
When, in 2016, former President of America, Barrack Obama, urged African states to continue to 
export raw materials as the surest way of maintaining the ‘current pleasing rates’ of economic 
growth of the African continent, this stance sought to deliberately undermine current efforts by 
Africans to industrialize their economies. 
It can be argued that Obama’s views resonate with those of the ‘reformists’ who prescribe 
security reforms that weaken the preparedness of African governments in addressing both 
internal and external security threats. 
It can be argued that it is the weakness of the SS that has led most African governments into 
subscribing to and adopting constitutions that are driven by western sponsored CSOs and an 
array of human rights activists. In essence most African countries host constitutions that are 
prejudicial to African values, norms and principles, a matter that can also be attributed to the 
alarming decline in moral values even within the religious fraternity. 
To the extent that SSRs for African countries are predicated on the need to secure outside 
support for economic plans, projects and programs they are as relevant to a fire fighting economy 
as they are disastrous to sustainable long term economic plans for Africa and long term security 
needs of Africa. 
One can conclude that, any SSR must pass the test of local ownership irrespective of the 
sponsoring party. The need for an African ontology is as natural as SSRs in European countries 
that have a European centred ontology.  It is industrialisation that produces finished or value 
added products for maximum return on exports and appropriate inflow of imports. On the other 
hand the current export of raw materials also attracts in appropriate levels and flow of imports 
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that do not stimulate levels of economic growth commensurate with levels of available human 
and material resources that Africa is endowed with. 
A critical analysis of ethical consideration in the consummation of SSRs as they affect SSIs in 
Africa, south of the Sahara, reveals that in most cases both drivers of the reforms and recipients 
have not been entirely ethical in their conduct, noting that the reforms have not been effective 
and the executive has sometimes taken advance of anarchic situations to brutalize civilians that 
are not seen as politically correct at election time. 
I can therefore humbly argue that current reformist measures to deal with the SS are not entirely 
appropriate, and are in fact viewed as irrelevant, for purposes of bringing stability to sub-Sahara 
Africa, and that the solution lies with African countries devising their own reforms on the back 
of significantly improved economic conditions that should take shape once the current efforts at 
industrialization take firm root. Only then will reforms work in the interests of both human 
security and state security. 
Because of historical considerations, it can be argued that reliable SSRs are only possible with 
the assistance of Africa’s partners in ridding colonial oppression, and Angola stands out as a 
clear case where it’s partnering with Russia and Cuba in its war against colonisation has created 
a strong country able to safeguard its borders as well as contain internal discontent.  
It is also because of the predatory nature of western countries, as supported by the Berlin 
Conference of 1884/85 that saw European countries occupy Africa by force, that any SSRs 
initiated by European countries and their allies are not only suspect but may also be hypocritical. 
The foregoing concluding remarks take serious note of the need to maintain state secrecy which 
can be compromised by those prone to revealing state secrecy to CSOs and other activist groups 
that are opposed to the government of ruling liberation parties in return for personal financial 
benefit. A weak SS is fertile ground for anarchical activities and this compromises the 
sovereignty of a nation to the extent that those in power are prone to succumbing to unethical 
ways of maintaining and retaining power.  
The oversight role of parliament and other interested parties such as CSOs is important in so far 
as they bring pressure to bear on a government and thereby check on excesses. However, as has 
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been noted elsewhere in this thesis, whether it is a western government or African government, 
matters of security are not only complex but are also highly technical and those entrusted with 
oversight responsibility are clearly no match for the initiated administrative bureaucrats. In any 
case, the executive arm of government normally overcomes any sanction by applying the concept 
of ‘responsibility to act’ to defending the other nebulous concept of ‘defending the national 
interests’ as located and vested in the sovereign. 
State secrecy as discussed in Chapter 7 is also applicable to the SS of sub Saharan Africa. There 
is little reference, if any, to state secrecy as a subject for public debate. The subject remains 
closely guarded for the reason that any robust debate on the matter will lead to incredible efforts 
at getting to the bottom of the matter. Any responsible parliamentarian will not want to expose 
whatever weaknesses or strengths exist within the SS as a result of scandalous leads about state-
secrecy. 
However, as mentioned elsewhere, only the executive and members of the ruling administration 
are privy to the sensitive side of SS operations as they relate to state secrecy, with members of 
the opposition kept in the dark when Zimbabwe entered the DRC and when South Africa entered 
CAR.  
Only bugging scandals expose some of the state secrecy and once the lid is off as was the case 
with the US President Richard Nixon, parliamentarians will have a field day and even call for the 
impeachment of the President. Short of exposing state-secrecy this subject matter rarely gets 
traction from any quarter and yet all matters of state security, human security and state 
sovereignty revolve around how well state-secrecy is upheld and maintained. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 Overview of the Study 
This chapter provides a detailed and broad outline of the whole study. The problem identified by 
this study was as follows; to what extent does the debate on SSR as advocated by the reformists 
in Europe and sub-Saharan Africa affect the region’s sovereignty?  
Since conclusions have been provided in each chapter, the main thrust of this chapter is to 
reiterate the major observations and arguments that were raised above.  
9.2 The Conceptual Definition of Security 
In chapter 3 I juxtaposed the two theories of realism and idealism in an effort to bring a balanced 
conceptualization of the term ‘security’ which remains a very broad area/subject with varying 
interpretations on what it stands for.  
The two schools have different approaches to what security means with realists advocating for 
state security which tends to focus more on military capabilities in order to safeguard the state 
from both internal and external threats.  
Idealists, on the other hand, support the definition of security that is concerned with the 
protection of the individual from various forms of threats which can be grouped under economic, 
social, political, environmental, food, health and personal (individual) security. They see all 
these aspects as falling under human security. 
The study showed that countries exist in a world which is characterized by both internal and 
external threats to the state’s survival. This has, therefore, forced most states to rely more on 
their military (state security) in order for them to survive in an anarchical international system. 
On the other hand, idealists who include SSR advocates actually see the state as the greatest 
danger to its citizens and seek to propose that it should undergo ‘democratic’ SSR in order to 
make the SSIs more answerable to citizens as to safeguard their freedoms and rights. 
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It can be argued that the importance of security institutions (defence) to the livelihood of a 
nation-state cannot be underestimated. This is regardless of whether the state is democratic or 
authoritarian. An efficient and effective security sector is vital to any government for economic, 
defence, domestic stability and foreign policy decisions. In discharging some of these duties, the 
security sector is at times authorized to use force.  
However, the study observed from this chapter that the two notions of state and human security 
actually complement each other. The fact that the world we are living in is anarchic, makes it 
advisable for Africa to leverage on its vast resources and carry out SSRs that ensure that its 
militaries are well trained, capacitated and managed in order to provide  the security insurance to 
the continent that results in inclusive socio-political and economic development. 
9.3 The Evolution of Security Sector Discourse 
In chapter 3 I sought to show that many African countries were engaged in some form of SSR 
activities long before the end of the Cold War - when the concept gained full international 
recognition. During Africa’s decolonization process and after the end of liberation wars, the 
pressing issues were mainly on the merging of all the security formations into a single army. 
These policies (reforms) were aimed at inclusiveness within the security sector.  
Various terms were used in this chapter in reference to the SSR. These included terms such as 
‘an upgrade’, ‘reorganisation’, ‘modernisation’, ‘capacitation’, ‘restructuring’, ‘amendments’, 
‘modifications’, ‘transformations’, ‘improvements’, adjustments’ and ‘changes’ within the SSIs. 
This chapter further sought to show that various cases analysed therein were aimed at spelling 
out the type of security ‘reform’ each country carried out in line with the situation and 
circumstances it found itself in.  
It was observed that West African countries, in the 1950s and 1960s, reformed their SS through a 
transformational process whereby the governance of SSIs fell in the hands of the once oppressed 
elites. The personnel changed (was reformed) though the structure and purpose of the SSI 
remained the same or even got worse. It can be argued that the inherited colonial structure made 
it easy for external players to influence coups in Africa as was discussed chapter 5. 
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Reforms in Angola were directed towards rebuilding its SSIs in order to improve their offensive 
and defensive capabilities. It was observed that Angola’s capacitation systems of reforms 
enabled it to repel any forms of enemies and maintained its sovereignty though, at times, it found 
itself in situations that turned anarchic.  
In South Africa, some scholars argue that the ‘reforms’ were more of an absorption of other 
security groups into the dominant and preponderant white controlled SADF which was later 
named SANDF. It was observed that such an arrangement was to give security and economic 
assurance to the white population that in the foreseeable future their stay and economic interests 
in South Africa would be guaranteed.   
In Zimbabwe and Namibia, it was observed that the ‘reforms’ were carried out in order to 
maintain a specific liberation ideology. I argued that the reforms carried out in Zimbabwe and 
Namibia ensured the protection of the history and principles that guided them during the de-
colonisation phase. I further showed that such reforms helped these countries maintain and 
sustain enviable levels of peace and stability to this day. 
This Chapter also observed that a significant number of reforms that now come under the 
umbrella of SSR had taken place or were already under way in some African countries. Some of 
these, as in the Angolan case were externally directed while others occurred as a result of a 
country’s own initiatives (South Africa). Ongoing SSR in the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia 
shows the dominance of donors in directing the form and nature of the reforms. It was observed 
that both countries followed a European model of SSR. The model will be further examined in 
Chapter 4.  
It was also observed that while there are various forms of SSR that took place in Africa as 
indicated above, the most talked about, and well popularised forms of SSR is the one that 
emerged in Europe, particularly in the UK, in the 1990s. The study observed that many 
reformists use the 1990 SSR model and seek to influence its adoption and operationalisation in 
Africa. 
One can thus argue that to insist that the 1990s SSR based on a European model is good and the 
only choice for African countries lacks not only merit but also academic objectivity. It is 
submitted that such characterization or contextualization of SSR ignores other equally relevant 
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and important forms of SSR which happened much earlier as stated and covered widely in this 
Chapter.  
The 1990s SSR model that was advanced by the UK gave prominence to human security as it 
relates to ideals of democracy and the need to develop the economy to advance the welfare of 
citizens. The new thrust signalled a departure from the traditional concept of security that 
confined security to state security. In consequence, the study sought to analyse with a view to 
develop the rationale of the new thrust.  
This chapter concluded that SSRs as commissioned by African countries had their strengths as 
well as their weaknesses in the way they impacted the capacitation of African SSIs and 
maintenance of continental sovereignty. 
The above notwithstanding, it was argued that a one-size-fits-all approach in matters of security 
against peculiarities of values, cultures and priorities of different countries would not solve 
Africa’s woes on the security front. On the contrary, Africa had a right to determine the way it 
wanted its security matters handled and that sponsors needed to operate as partners and not as 
predators. 
9.4 The SSR Debate in the Context of the Post-Cold War Era in the USA and European 
Institutions 
Chapter 4 noted that the concept of security sector reform was first put forward as a post-cold 
war idea in a speech by Short in 1998.TheLabour government that came to power in Britain in 
1997 created the Department for International Development (DFID) and appointed Short as first 
Minister for International Development. 
The need for comprehensive reform of the ‘security sector’ had been identified earlier, but it was 
the speeches by Short in 1998 and 1999, and the policy statements by her department, UK DFID 
that made ‘security sector reform’ prominent as a term and as a concept.  
Various definitions of SSR are also given in this section including that of the UN which is 
mainly concerned with local ownership of SS initiatives. 
A common terminology on the concept does not yet exist despite various attempts by the OECD, 
DFID, UN and many other organisations which have an interest in SSR. This clearly 
demonstrates the slow pace of progress since the 1990s, when the concept was first put forward. 
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The second observation was that the European Union has quite a different perspective of SSR 
with their American counterparts.  
The European perspective of SSR is firmly rooted in the tradition of constructing a liberal peace 
and, therefore, a liberal state as propounded by Immanuel Kant in his ‘democratic peace’ thesis. 
Close analysis of the European conceptions of SSR shows that they are more interested in a 
democratized security sector which is accountable to citizens. The Europeans’ idea of SSR is 
based on the new paradigm of human security.  
The security sectors of West European countries, though democratic, are not similar at all in their 
set up, command structure or the ways in which they are administered. It can be seen that in 
almost every case these forces are organized not as a result of the calls and demands emanating 
from civic groups or international organisations; rather, these institutions grew naturally in 
response to the demands of the circumstances and societies in which they were situated.  
The third observation was that the absence of a multilateral, holistic, integrated, coordinated, and 
comprehensive approach to SSR has produced one-sided Euro-centric models and programmes 
with limited and, at times, counterproductive impacts. The European view of SSR tends to 
undermine African initiatives of SSR. This has been seen by some African countries as a way of 
weakening rather than democratizing the security sector in targeted African countries. 
The fourth observation was that the US Administration sees SSR as a way of enhancing and 
capacitating the security sector to make it more efficient in discharging its duties. The American 
concept of SSR is grounded on the notion of traditional security.  
Empirical evidence suggests that the Americans have in many instances undermined human 
security in order to advance state (traditional) security.  
The military intervention in unjustified wars in some parts of Africa and the Middle East is clear 
testimony to this. It has also been observed that the USA’s approach is largely based on the need 
to capitalise on patronage in its pursuit of enhancing its own national interest. Evidence in the 
given literature shows that USA security assistance to its African and the Middle Eastern allies 
has led to the sustenance of repressive regimes that are supportive of American strategic interests 
as happened in Bahrain, Egypt and Libya. Washington’s perspective of SSR has more to do with 
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promoting its foreign policy goals and gaining a foothold on the African continent than 
promoting the state and human security of countries it purports to assist.  
The fifth observation is that the imposition of SSR on African countries is a Western geo-
political strategy meant to neo-colonise African states. It is argued that the development aid 
African states are promised is the all-too-familiar carrot and stick diplomacy meant to assist the 
predators gain hegemonic control of the African continent. 
It can be argued that the SSR concept is a facade that seeks to portray an Africa enjoying 
democratised security institutions while Africa would have in effect weakened its security to 
allow for the plunder of its natural resources at the behest of its former colonisers. 
9.5 A Critical Discussion of SSR in Post-Colonial Africa South of the Sahara 
As already indicated in chapter 5 one of the central concerns of this thesis is to examine the 
strong position among some scholars that the SS in Africa has been primarily responsible for 
most of coupe d’états that have bedevilled the continent, and that military rule has been 
responsible for underdevelopment in many African states.  
It was argued that in countries where elites or the military took over state power through a coup, 
economic growth and development were greatly undermined. 
This chapter discussed the African SSR from the economic development school of thought. It 
was observed under this section that at the end of the cold-war, development experts within the 
European continent began to question why resources had to be channelled towards defence rather 
than other social sectors such as health, education, social welfare, infrastructure development and 
so on. Since then SSR increasingly became an integral part of development policy in both 
developed and developing countries. 
The study established that scholars such as Brzoka called for African security institutions to 
provide protection for individuals and society as a whole. The concept of SSR created images of 
sustainable peace and stable governments. 
It is generally imagined that an unreformed SS serves as impediment to economic and political 
development. Scholars such as Ebo pointed out that development can never thrive in a state 
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where the SS is corrupt, unaccountable and is above the law as was the case in Nigeria, Togo and 
Zaire during the years of military rule.  
Scholars such as Ball (2002) observed that the security of people accounted for sustainable 
development and democratisation.  
The study established the effects and reasons behind the occurrence of coups as the basis under 
which reformists were calling for SSR in Africa. It was observed that coup d’états have different 
origins, causes and effects which ultimately result in impoverishing a country. In Africa it was 
observed that coups were initially related to the weakness of civilian governments which in many 
cases looted national resources for personal reasons.  
It was observed that some African governments used SSI to suppress the population. When this 
precipitated uprisings, the reformists were quick to capitalise on this as premise for calling for 
SSR. 
Kieh and Agbes argue that coups were caused by a strong urge by the military to restore 
democracy in an authoritarian state. They further cite economic stagnation and poor living 
conditions as the cause of coups.  It was observed that at times coups in African states were 
caused by the role and the way the military was organised.  
Scholars such as Powell note that because of widespread discontent over government legitimacy, 
the population engages in mass riots, protests and strikes resulting in the removal of a 
government through a coup. 
The chapter argued that it did not matter whether coups were internally or externally generated 
as they had the same adverse effects on economic development. Scholars such as Chomsky 
(2007)argue that the American and British administration think that they have the right to 
instigate coups to effect regime changes in governments they do not want to be in power. 
Chomsky (2007) and Thyne (2010) observe that democratically elected Presidents Allende and 
Nkrumah of Chile and Ghana respectively were removed from power due to instigations by 
foreign agencies such as the CIA and MI5.Such coups had devastating effects on the countries in 
question, resulting in poor performance of the economy and lowering of the standards of living 
of the people.   
245 
 
Where coups have happened, at times they would have been a means of mending the economy 
and improving the lives of the people. 
The study showed that that Buhari of Nigeria, Sankara of Burkina Faso and Rawlings of Ghana 
became unique military leaders in that, instead of looting state coffers like what other military 
rulers did they actually put a stop to the scourge. 
Scholars such as Decalo observed that the SSs, as ‘guardians’ of the masses, are supposed to 
mediate, clean up the disorder and guide the nation back to an uncorrupted civilian rule.  
It can be argued that although Buhari, Sankara and Rawlings did not cede power to a civilian 
government as Decalo points out, their anti-corruption credentials remain unblemished.  
9.6 Disambiguating the Role of Women in the Security Sector 
This chapter started by noting that throughout history, women have also taken centre stage in 
Africa’s political and military sphere. However, these women’s positions of power within the 
military ranks were not acquired through feminist calls for gender equity. They earned their high 
military ranks through their high skills and exceptional leadership qualities.  
 
It was noted that during the liberation struggles in Southern Africa and elsewhere, women also 
fought bravely against White rule. Arguably, few women fought in the liberation struggle as 
compared to their male counterparts.  
 
Dangerous missions into enemy strongholds were usually executed by male fighters. 
The second observation was that although women should be included in PKOs this should be 
done on the basis of their skills, abilities or competencies. The deployment of women in PKOs is 
usually done in more stable areas; consolidating the argument that PKOs are usually male 
dominated owing to male peacekeepers’ ability to engage in combat if conflict suddenly 
escalates.  
Women in the SADC region still occupy low ranking positions and the majority of those who 
have been promoted usually occupy high ranking positions within the administrative and medical 
services.  
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It was argued that most armies are not willing to enlist women in combat operations mainly 
because of the way society perceives women as ‘weaker’ to men. Women themselves have not 
also been willing to enlist in security institutions preferring to work in other government 
departments and in the private sector.  
Various studies have shown that men are more willing to volunteer to enlist in the army than 
women. Others have also argued that enlisting more females in the defence sector will weaken it.  
All in all, it has been noted that the military is a male dominated arena and that has been the 
norm throughout the world.  
It can thus be concluded that formulation of an SSR policy must not only be guided by the call 
for gender equity but it must be guided by all aspects of militarism such as sound training, 
fitness, courage, aggressiveness, respect of humanity, morality and good cultural behaviours.  
 
9.7 Democratic Oversight of Security Sector Institutions and   State Sovereignty in Selected 
Non-African Countries 
 
Chapter 7 looks at democratic oversight of the security sector focusing on the checks and 
balances and control mechanisms which parliamentarians exercise on security sector institutions.  
It was established that the task of parliamentarians is to commit themselves to the defence of 
democratic rights and processes and to control military spending.  
The chapter also notes that parliament is the mediator between government and the people.  
The main principle of democratic oversight is then to keep the government accountable and to 
secure a balance between the security policy and society by aligning the goals, policies and 
procedures of the military and political leaders (Born et al, 2003).  
The chapter sought to show that although it is plausible to involve parliamentarians in an 
oversight role of the security sector; at times the security institutions also need some secrecy in 
the execution of their various mandates.  
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However, the need for this secrecy can also be abused by both the security sector and those who 
have authority over them (the executive). In addressing these conflicting needs it can be 
concluded that a strong and balanced oversight regime is crucial. 
It was further shown that the SS, particularly the military, the police and the intelligence services 
as loco institutions of governance are less subjected to parliamentary and democratic oversight. 
This is a way of protecting state secrecy as practiced by the majority of developed and 
developing countries.  
The research demonstrated that security organizations in any nation state are employed as 
governance tools that provide huge platforms for employment, research and development. In 
addition, SSIs are regarded as national insurance policy organs for national peace and security.  
It thus can be argued that SSIs play a pivotal economic development role through establishment 
of military industries which contribute immensely to a nation’s gross domestic product. It is an 
open secret that the US, France and the UK are huge exporters of military equipment 
manufactured from military run industries. In that regard, it is not proper for any nation state to 
alienate the military in matters of governance.  
This chapter also touched on the power struggles as well as the relations between the executive 
and the parliament; between the military and political parties; between parliament and political 
parties (with a high representation in the legislature), and between the military and parliament in 
providing effective democratic oversight.   
The chapter showed that the security institutions play a pivotal role towards the ‘survival’ of a 
nation-state and this ethical duty cannot be underestimated. Observations emanating from the 
arguments in the chapter did not distinguish between democratic or authoritarian states, noting 
that an efficient and effective security sector was all that was needed to boost the state’s social, 
economic, political and national survival. 
In the discharge of duties, the security sector tended to rely heavily on the support of 
parliamentarians in its bid to adequately safeguard the state’s national interests. 
The major observation in this chapter was that, the application of Parliamentary oversight of the 
security sector, as applicable in the USA, Russian Federation and China depends more on 
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specific contexts, and subject to challenge when account is taken of the place of national interest, 
dominant political parties and the exercise of executive decisions. 
Scholars such as Baregu argue that Parliamentarians may be less interested in scrutinizing the 
executive as well as the security sector because of party politics. This scenario was seen to obtain 
in the USA, Russia, China as well as South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. More often than 
not, political parties, which are represented in parliament, are not very eager to oversee their own 
colleagues in the executive and security sector.  
Political Party issues and decisions have priority over the exercise of Parliamentary oversight.  
In the cases of South Africa and Zimbabwe where the ANC and ZANU (PF) respectively enjoy 
the majority in Parliament, this invariably creates a strong executive that relies on the numerical 
superiority of its party MPs. This situation creates natural and strong inclinations on the part of 
members to weigh in on national issues on the basis of political party resolutions. In 
consequence, the line between the party and parliament becomes blurred and largely motivated 
by the need for party members to protect revolutionary morality, thus rendering parliamentary 
oversight a mockery.   
It has also been argued in this chapter that unless elected representatives have either a 
commitment or the political will to hold the government to account, no amount of constitutional 
authority, resources or best practices will make them effective (Born, 2010). If the 
parliamentarians do not want to use their powers for scrutinizing the government, then 
constitutional or other legal powers will be of little use.  
In consequence, parliamentary oversight as is the case in both non-African and African countries 
will not be used to oversee the government, except to rubber stamp what the executive and the 
security sector would have determined. 
However, it can also be argued that it is necessary for parliamentarians to rally behind the 
executive and security sector institutions especially in situations or circumstances where state 
secrecy and national interest are at stake. 
Further, this chapter discussed the literature on Parliamentary oversight of the security sector and 
concluded that in most cases Parliamentary oversight of the security sector is undermined by the 
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executive and Ministry of Defence in cases where both (executive and MOD) feel national 
security is being threatened directly or indirectly. It has also been observed that Parliamentary 
oversight of the security sector depends on varied contexts that may prove difficult to challenge. 
9.8 Democratic Oversight debate on SSI and implications on state sovereignty in Selected 
African Countries 
Chapter eight interrogated the concept of sovereignty, anarchy, ownership of SSR, and the 
politicization of the security sector in the African region. 
It is observed that states are sovereign entities and in terms of security, every sovereign state has 
some basic interests that include the ability to protect and defend its territory, air space, sea 
frontiers, critical national infrastructure and national interests. The state is also obligated to guard 
its borders and safeguard its citizens against any danger or harm.  
It was noted, however, that the discourse on sovereignty has tended to give prominence to Kant’s 
liberal concept of sovereignty while ignoring Bodin and Hobbes’ theories which accord the 
civilian leader and security sector institutions more power and control over national security 
issues. 
It was observed that powerful nations protect Kant’s conception of sovereignty as a way of 
continuing to cause anarchy in the global arena under the pretext of safeguarding human rights 
through the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine.  
A second observation is that most African liberal scholars, such as Rupiya, argue that if the 
military in the African region wants to gain the respect and the trust of the people it must not 
participate in state politics nor should it be seen as a mere appendage of the elites in power. 
It was also noted, however, that some sub-Saharan African countries located to the south of the 
equator won their independence through armed struggle. The armed struggles in these countries 
were led by vanguard political parties through their armed military wings. It has now remained a 
big challenge to separate the African armies from their former political parties.  
Most of the former guerrilla fighters, who later became integrated into the new African armies, 
have remained resolute to the ideals of the liberation struggle. 
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The symbiotic relationship between the liberation parties in power and the guerrilla fighters that 
form the majority leadership of the newly integrated southern African armies cannot be easily 
broken. The democratisation of liberation armies through SSR need to be done in line with the 
liberation movements’ security value systems which will protect the revolutionary ideals.  
Liberation movements have actually remained rooted in the nationalist ideology. This ideology 
has preserved peace, improved stability and stimulated the economic development of the region. 
In the circumstances, SSRs have to assume a local approach that does not undermine 
revolutionary principles, values and ethos under which the war of liberation was fought. 
Interestingly, notwithstanding the above realities on the ground, calls are being made to institute 
military reforms of a nature that contravenes what the liberation ideals stand for. Reflections 
inform anyone that SSRs simply have to take the form as determined by a sitting government 
whether that government has a revolutionary background or not. Any imposition renders the 
reforms irrelevant and such reforms are seen as intended to weaken the power in the sovereign 
and by extension render the country easy prey to both internal and external threats. 
There are genuine fears that seek to assert that the west would like to destabilise the peaceful and 
stable region in Africa by denying Africans the space to advance an African centred ontology in 
the same way that Europeans establish their SS requirements on the basis of a European centred 
ontology. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN AFRO-CENTRIC BASED SSR 
 
10.1Introduction 
The concepts of sovereignty and anarchy were analysed in relation to the discourse on security 
sector reform for post- independent Africa south of the Sahara. The debate provided leads upon 
which a critical investigation was made to determine whether calls for reform were founded on 
any ethical consideration. Of intense interest was also the need to establish why Europeans that 
once occupied Africa by force of arms were inspired this time around to return with a view to 
reform the security sector of countries they once colonised. 
 
There was as much considerable consensus about the need for SSR as there was also 
considerable apprehension about ignoring African centred ontology in advancing such SSR. The 
African who is defined as having norms, values, beliefs, ideologies and experiences accounted 
for nothing in a reform equation meant to serve his interests.  
 
The proponents of SSR were Western governments which enjoyed the ready support of donors 
and some African liberal scholars. With conditionalities coercive enough to disturb those 
countries that did not particularly like the idea, such reforms soon gained traction from some 
African countries. 
 
However, since the reforms were imposed with little input from the recipient country, they were 
tilted in favour of Western governments and patron-client relationships based on both executive 
and military loyalism resulted in the safeguarding of foreign interests at the expense of domestic 
interests.  
 
Curious have been sudden calls for gender equality emanating from the West whose history has 
nothing to show for decency towards women, with tales of slavery reducing black women to 
sexual items at the mercy of white men. 
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Indeed the form that SSR is taking suggests a firming of strategies whose brief is to weaken 
African armies by increasing the number of females within the ranks and files of the SSIs. 
Women have nothing to apologise for being women, and must feel proud just like men, noting 
that they have their special and separate roles from those of men. In exceptional circumstances, 
women with unusual gifts and competencies have made a mark in a predominantly male domain. 
 
Honourable members of parliament and CSOs are being required to do the dishonourable thing 
of dabbling in security matters that are too technical and too complex for the ordinary person to 
unbundle. In consequence, both parliamentarians and CSOs have consciously or unconsciously 
endangered a state’s national security when carrying out their oversight roles.  
 
The study saw major critiques interrogating the objective and intended objective of SSR, against 
the backdrop of an unclear composition of ownership of SSR; the rationale of parliamentary and 
CSO oversight of SSIs; the diminished significance and role of the sovereignty in devising SSR; 
and the obsession with and push for a non-partisan SS. 
 
The study made a number of disturbing observations about the formulation and implementation 
of policy as it affects SSR in Africa, South of the Sahara. The concepts of sovereignty and 
anarchy, measured against a critical ethical investigation into matters arising from the debate on 
SSR revealed overt and covert attempts to diminish the significance of sovereignty as well as 
attempts to cultivate and enhance an atmosphere where anarchy would thrive. 
 
The study thus concerns itself with generating recommendations that seek to give proper 
guidance on SSR to African countries, south of the Sahara. Significantly, sub Saharan Africa 
should come of age and initiate, create and develop SSRs that reflect an African centred ontology 
where basic values relating to policies, practices, principles are socially and culturally grounded.  
 
On the other hand, the need to safeguard the sovereignty of a nation will invariably entail the 
identification and removal of an environment that allows for the germination of conflict and the 
stimulation of anarchic conditions. In addition, the exercise of ethical practices will increase 
levels of self-esteem in a manner that will also boost state security and human security. With 
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proper organisation and management of the SSIs, the all important aspect of maintaining state 
secrecy will be achieved and maintained. 
10.2Formulation of African security sector reform policy 
Chapters 2 and 3 presented scenarios that point to the need to have a dependable security sector 
to safeguard the sovereignty of a nation. 
 
Sovereignty confers complete power to govern a country. The state of being a country with 
freedom to govern itself is compromised if the security sector is compromised. The formulation 
of African security sector reform policy is thus integral to achieving the end goal of sovereignty. 
 
The oft talked about need for self-reliance to attain sustainable development espouses the 
harnessing of a multiplicity of human activities that stimulate the development of a country in 
different areas. The need for a peaceful environment in which socioeconomic activities are 
conducted is therefore vital. Sufficient deterrent measures would therefore need to be in place to 
discourage those given to fomenting discord and violence at the slightest provocation. 
 
Economic independence is a function of political independence as vested in the sovereign. The 
sovereign thus exercises his power to give direction to economic policy that must seek to reduce 
the cost of living while raising the standard of living of the citizen. This desirable goal of any   
responsible government sees to the maximum deployment of human capital in the optimum use 
of available resources in order to create wealth for the nation. The amount of wealth a nation is 
able to create will give it a status in the region, continent and the international community.  
 
The creation of economic independence and the safeguarding of the national interests will in turn 
safeguard the sovereignty of the nation. 
 
The foregoing background assists in understanding the current emotional debate on SSR as a 
function of imposition by outsiders as opposed to being the natural responsibility of a sovereign 
nation to define its security requirements and needs. 
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As already captured in Chapter 1 it can be argued that European nations have enlisted the 
services of SS reform theorists, CSOs and neoliberal African academics in directing the form and 
nature of SSR for African nations. However, the real values of Western countries are concealed 
under the moral abstractions of SSRs, with the result that the African SS has not been 
strengthened but weakened hence the endless aggressions of an internal and external nature that 
are being experienced in some of the countries that were offered assistance in reorganising their 
SS.  
 
The Europeans have thus sometimes been accused of class deception as shown by a coterie of SS 
theoretic reformists, neoliberal African academics and CSOs. This group, that pushes an idealist 
agenda, argues for human security ahead of state security oblivious of the fact that it is state 
security that offers room for the advancement of human security. The other group of realists 
believes in the historical concept of state security as responsible enough to do what it can to 
safeguard the position of the sovereign that will in turn protect citizens as it sees fit. 
 
It is therefore recommended that African SSR policy planners should understand the dynamics 
involved in coming up with a loyal, patriotic, professional, well managed and combat effective 
SS. To this end, the African SSR must be shaped by considerations that seize the locals and must 
therefore conform to policy formulation and implementation by domestic players, as represented 
by the sovereign. 
10.3A need for Western countries to adhere to the democratic values of SSR 
Chapter 4 sought to analyse the reasons behind SSR in light of the Post-Cold War Europe. 
 
It was argued that the security sectors of many Western European countries were largely SSR 
compliant as devised by reform theorists who believed in the supremacy of the freedom and 
security of the individual. Set criteria for a viable SS entailed civilian control, accountability, an 
elected legislature to exercise oversight and monopoly on the use of force by a democratically 
elected government. 
 
It was, however, noted that different standards were applied in the formulation and 
implementation of SSR on the African continent; with governments in SADC regions subjected 
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to conditions where civilians have overwhelming discretion as to how government should use its 
power. In addition, prescriptions for SSR were more coercive than cooperative, with the recipient 
countries threatened with unspecified action if they had shown resentment for western values 
(such as homosexuality being accorded the status of a human right) that were offensive to the 
culture of Africans.    
 
European countries have tended to be selective when dealing with some countries especially 
those in the SADC region which have a revolutionary background. Such selectiveness has 
created a situation where some Southern African countries have been quite cautious in 
embracing Eurocentric SSR.  
 
It was interesting to note how the US, in reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
placed renewed priority on the use of “traditional” state-security approach to national security. 
This change of heart undermined the human centred approach to SSR. It is therefore significant 
to note that no idealist reformist or CSO or neoliberal African are known to have condemned 
America for failing to meet post-Cold War imperatives in reshaping the security sector. 
 
It was also noted that the USA’s approach to SSR is different from that of the Europeans in that 
the USA believes more in reforms that seek to capacitate the security sector in countering any 
internal or external threats than those that seek to advance human security at the expense of state 
security. 
 
Close analysis of the European conceptions of SSR showed that they are more interested in a 
democratized security sector which is ‘accountable’ to citizens. The Europeans’ idea of SSR is 
based on the new paradigm of human security. On the other hand, the USA is concerned about 
SSR that can enhance its security apparatus. Evidence in the given literature suggested that the 
USA as part of its SSR assistance to its African and the Middle Eastern allies has led to the 
sustenance of repressive regimes that are supportive of American strategic interests as is 
happening in Bahrain and Egypt. 
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In light of the observations that were made in this chapter, the study makes three 
recommendations.  
Firstly, further research must be carried out to establish why European countries fail to adhere to 
their own democratic values when assisting African countries with SSR.  
 
Secondly, further research needs to be done to establish the actual reasons behind the desire by 
Western countries to supply state-of-the-art military equipment to the very countries they are 
assisting with SSR programmes yet failing to account for human rights abuses perpetrated in 
those countries. This recommendation has been driven by the observation that the supply of 
armaments to African states has in most cases undermined or contradicted European principles 
of a democratic security sector. On the contrary these externally initiated reforms have seen the 
escalation of hostility on the African continent as the various DRC conflicts can reveal. The 
capacitation of the African security sector by western countries has also provided a justification 
for a few countries to repress opposition movements such as happened in Egypt.  
 
Thirdly, I recommend a study that relates to a penchant for Western governments to resort to 
double standards and hypocrisy in framing their foreign policy as well as examine what tools 
could be made available to dissuade these nations from imposing SSR criteria on African 
governments. 
 
10.4 A Call for Genuine SSR that brings Development in Post-Colonial Africa 
Chapter 5 has raised concerns on cases where both the civilian leadership and the security sector 
institutions connived in draining the state’s coffers to their own advantage. In extreme cases it 
was argued that the military staged coups in order to benefit immensely from the state’s natural 
resources thus undermining economic development.  
In reaction to the aforesaid excesses, calls were therefore made by Western countries as well as 
development donors for African states to carry out SSR in order to professionalize the security 
institutions in order to curb the recurrence of coups whose effect retarded economic 
development.  
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However, a scrutiny of the background of the majority of coups which have taken place in Africa 
revealed a pattern of direct or indirect instigation and influence of Western countries in the 
execution of the coups.  
The cynicism with which Africans regard calls for SSR in the SADC region in particular, and 
Africa in general, has its roots in a history of coups that are traced to the doorstep of western 
nations. The insincerity of westerners as revealed by their past behaviour is clearly 
overshadowing the good intentions that some of the SSRs may seek to bring to Africa.  
In some SADC countries, there is now a real or perceived fear regarding the calls for SSR, seen 
rightly or wrongly as some “Trojan horse” intended to undermine Africa’s sovereignty thereby 
precipitating anarchy through a well-orchestrated regime change agenda. 
In light of this brief summary of chapter 5, the study came up with three recommendations. 
Firstly, Africa in general, and the SADC region in particular, should retool and recapacitate 
security personnel as well as revamp SSIs in order to improve not only the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the personnel but also to sharpen their respect for an ethical relationship in the 
safeguarding of the interests of the citizens.  
The proper custody of the national interest must be understood as the only surest guarantee of 
hosting a sovereign nation capable not only of defending itself against external threats as well as 
containing internal conflicts but also of making meaningful contribution to regional, continental 
and international peacekeeping operations. 
It is argued that a professional security sector should not only protect and defend the nation, but 
should also safeguard the values that a free democracy represents, including the need to check on 
any excesses in the use of state resources by the executive. 
It is thus recommended that the spirit of oneness that informed the birth of the Organisation of 
African Unity in 1963, and later the Frontline States, as currently constituted as SADC, be re-
learnt to create a sub Saharan Africa whose leadership is people oriented and given to servant 
leadership. Independent forums should be created at national and regional level where free 
exchanges in honest debates, discussions, discourses are conducted, with highlights made 
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available to governments and the educational sector for their information and any necessary 
action. 
It is noted that this recommendation locates corruption, by far the biggest of all ills, as product of 
self interest, patronage, regionalism and ethnicity; matters that were shunned by pioneers of the 
liberation of Africa, including the sub region. 
Secondly, the relationship between the security sector and the ordinary people should not be 
exploitative and predatory where citizens become victims rather than beneficiaries of the state’s 
resources as happened in Zaire under Joseph Mobutu, Burkina Faso under Blaise Compaoré and 
Sierra Leone under Captain Valentine Strasser. It has been observed that coups have had an 
adverse impact on socioeconomic growth and development; with cases galore where corrupt 
elites (civilian or military) take over power and loot state coffers instead of controlling such 
vices in the interests of the citizens. 
It is thus recommended that the history of Africa in general, and individual nations in particular, 
be availed to students in schools and universities in order to raise the political consciousness of 
the sub region and individual nations so that the love for the motherland, also called patriotism, 
becomes a practical national anthem. The recommendation notes with concern current political 
activities that fail to project the protection of the national interest as the duty of every citizen 
irrespective of political affiliation, and hence the violence experienced at election time is a 
display of lack of appreciation of the one journey of shared concerns and interests that brings 
people together as one nation. This recommendation is relevant to the lessening of pressures on 
the minding of the SS and the abuse that this sector often suffers as a result, oftentimes, of the 
irresponsible actions of the executive. 
The third recommendation is that African countries, in general, should undergo SSR programmes 
within an African context to enable Africans to claim ownership of security reforms as well as 
take responsibility for what happens in the sector. This addresses the case of the foreign element 
that is blamed, rightly or wrongly, for causing coups which bring in leaders who (with their 
cronies both military and business people) become a drain to the economy. It is thus 
recommended that research be undertaken with a view to introduce home grown and nation 
specific security reforms that can effectively act as proper instruments to curb corruption, 
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buttress national interests, protect both the executive and the ordinary citizen, and discourage the 
rise of tyrants and dictators who loot state resources.  . 
10.5 Enlisting Competent Females within the SSIs in order to safeguard state sovereignty 
Chapter 6 was a detailed critique of SSR mainly focusing on calls for equal female 
representation within the security sector institutions. The chapter clearly demonstrated that while 
it is plausible to have more females in the security sector institutions than is the case at present, 
these women could only be promoted to high ranks within these institutions after demonstrating 
high skills and competencies, as well as exceptional leadership qualities in the execution of 
assigned security tasks.  
The SSR policy formulation should therefore not only be guided by a civil society or activism 
agenda but rather by a holistic scientific research that aims at enhancing operational 
effectiveness and efficiency of women within the military. The security institutions the world 
over are male dominated due to the rigorous and demanding nature of the job.  
Fears expressed in some quarters within Africa point to appetite by Western countries to weaken 
African armies, and compromise the continent’s sovereignty using a seemingly innocent thrust 
that seeks to promote gender equity.  
In light of this brief summary of chapter 6, the study came up with four recommendations. 
 
Firstly, Africa security sector institutions should undergo SSR that entail more involvement of 
women in peace keeping missions, recruitment, advancement and leadership. The reason for this 
recommendation emanates from the statistics coming from the various studies on gender issues 
as was shown by the graph of the SADC region which clearly demonstrated that there are few 
women recruits in SSIs especially in the military. SSR should therefore be done in order to 
provide a favourable environment for both males and females who want to enlist in the security 
institutions.  
 
Secondly, women in Africa graduating from various institutions of higher learning should be 
encouraged to take up various posts within the SSIs.  
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Thirdly, women should be included in PKOs as a majority of scholars have come up with 
evidence that in most cases the presence of women peace keepers in PKOs at times helps to deter 
sexual exploitation and abuse of vulnerable women and children in post-conflict situations. It 
was also surmised that local communities tended to trust female peacekeepers than their male 
counterparts.  
 
My fourth recommendation is that the inclusion of women in SSIs should not be based on the 
quota system but it should be based on sound leadership qualities as well as skills required in the 
profession. My major concern here is that, women should not merely join the military to sanitize 
the exciting theory on gender equity or to please gender activists but as recognition of their 
combat skills and military capabilities.  
 
Future studies must dig deeper into the merits or otherwise of incorporating women into all 
aspects of SSIs, including military operations. 
10.6 A Need for Democratic Oversight that Strengthens the SSIs 
Chapter 7 sought to acquaint itself with the role and effectiveness of parliamentarians as well as 
civil society organizations as they exercise an oversight responsibility in the running of the 
country’s security sector institutions.  Of particular interest to this oversight role have been the 
measures that enable both parliament and civil society groups to play a new and decisive role in 
monitoring the national security and defence policy.  
Under this new democratic dispensation, Karkoszka has noted that it is now the duty of 
parliament, and at times civil society organizations, to assess the credibility of threats to a state’s 
security by deciding on what the state’s response should be, the number of troops required, and 
above all to determine the size of the defence budget to counter any real or perceived threats.  
In light of this brief summary of this chapter, the study came up with three recommendations.  
Firstly, parliament should not control budgets and operations of the agencies of the security 
sector.  
Secondly, parliamentarians as well as CSOs should complement government efforts by being 
sincere in carrying out their oversight role of the SSIs without compromising national security or 
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the provision of sustainable peace and stability. This means that, parliamentarians and CSOs 
should not get entangled in donor funded SSR programmes which are directed at incapacitating a 
country’s SSIs.  
My third recommendation which seeks to consolidate recommendation 2 is that, though it is 
plausible to involve parliamentarians and CSOs in an oversight role of the security sector; at 
times the security institutions should also be given some secrecy in the execution of their various 
mandates. As such, it is imperative that security institutions through some secrecy should uphold 
their mandate of safeguarding both the security of the state and human security, without any fear 
or favours.  
It is thus recommended, for future studies: 
(a) That it be established how African SSIs can adequately fulfil their roles 
and also adequately account for their actions to civilian authority. 
(b) That ways be found to strengthen institutional memory and enhance the 
expertise of legislative bodies on SSR issues.  
(c) That research be conducted to establish how best legislative bodies can 
develop and strengthen SSR expertise, noting how important the 
legislative arm of governance is measured against its apparent weaknesses 
in intervening in matters of security. 
10.7 Lessons learnt through Democratic Oversight in selected non-African countries 
Chapter 7is a critical analysis on how democratic oversight is carried out in three selected non-
African countries.  
Three great powers, namely the USA, Russian Federation and China were selected and the study 
showed that three had divergent perspectives on how their parliaments carried out oversight 
responsibilities. 
It was argued that great powers rarely took parliamentary oversight seriously. The study revealed 
that the respective executive in these countries always wielded a lot of power over parliamentary 
decisions, including major decisions that impacted national security. Parliamentary oversight in 
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these countries was greatly curtailed even in critically important issues concerning state 
sovereignty and national interests and it was noted that political party affiliation of those in 
parliaments was used to frustrate open and candid debate on issues that had a direct bearing on 
their party superiors who also occupied the reins of government. 
In light of constraints cited above, I propose four recommendations.  
First, the executive, in consultation with security experts, should be mandated to deploy troops in 
war or other conflict situations.  
From the three selected case studies in chapter 6, it was noted that the executive overrode 
parliamentary decisions to do with the deployment of the military in war or conflict situations.  
I would urge the African member states to appreciate, with a view to learn, from the rationale 
behind the bold decisions that are taken by the leaders of these great powers.  
In the DRC conflict of the late 1990s, SADC heads of states were divided on whether to 
intervene or to leave the situation to escalate, never mind the unimaginable proportions of 
violence that was sure to happen 
Second, the security sector in Africa should be capacitated to counter any internal or external 
threats.  
This recommendation also includes the need to have a security sector whose status is deterrent to 
aggressors; and, it is appropriate to note that North Korea’s defensive capabilities have deterred 
America from attacking it for a number of decades. 
In chapter 6 it was noted that the three great powers are not reducing their armaments and are in 
fact spending billions of dollars in re-arming themselves and also improving on their military 
capabilities, something which Africa should earnestly embark on.  
State secrecy has hardly been understood as critical to the survival of the security apparatus of a 
nation. It is common knowledge that North Korea is feared by its enemies who secretly revere its 
operations because of a tight lid on the secrecy surrounding its military arsenal and any security 
official suspected of leaking security information faces the highest penalty of treason. The aspect 
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of state secrecy should not be jeopardized by anyone including those parliamentarians and CSOs 
tasked with an oversight responsibility over security operations. 
Third, Africa should continue with its combined military exercises in order to keep the military 
on stand-by for any future escalation of conflict within its borders.  
The hopeless security situations besetting the DRC, CAR, Somalia and South Sudan could have 
been contained with a sufficiently strong standby African military. 
It was observed that the three great powers engage in military drills and exercises in order to 
enhance competence among their troops in the event of a war situation erupting. 
Peace is never permanent, and in times of peace the great powers are always preparing for war as 
part of their on-going SSR programmes. These states believe in capacitating their militaries 
through procurement of modern advanced weaponry as well as carrying out constant military 
exercises.  
Fourth, the security institutions must be given the status of big business and important employer. 
Africa must come on board and accord the security sector its deserved role in revamping the 
livelihood of the nation-state. It was further observed that an efficient and effective security 
sector (as that of the USA, Russian Federation and China) is vital to any government for 
economic prosperity, defence, and domestic stability and foreign policy decisions.  
 
10.8 Defending the state’s interests through democratic oversight in selected African 
countries 
Chapter 7was seized with examining and assessing the oversight role of parliamentarians 
regarding SSR in three selected African countries. 
It was noted that parliamentary oversight of security sector institutions in the three countries was 
in most cases achieved when a political consensus was reached among three major political 
actors. These actors consisted of the executive, the political party in power and the 
parliamentarians. Civilian leadership, the major political party in power and those in the security 
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institutions joined forces to oppose any reforms that had potential to weaken the security 
institutions. 
It was also noted that SSR is not a one-off event, but a continuous process that was aimed at 
providing adequate security to the sovereign state and its citizens. In order to maintain sovereign 
entities African states conduct only those SSRs that conform to their needs and those of the 
region at large. In the circumstances, parliamentary oversight is only relevant to the extent that it 
does not interfere with the sovereign status of the nations. 
The sovereign is thus careful to ensure that its security sector is adequately prepared to provide 
protection to citizens and property as part of its exercise in safeguarding national interests. 
Everything is done to prevent a situation of anarchy that affects not only national peace but also 
the proper running of economic activities. 
I propose four recommendations, as follows: 
First, in the face of security threats that might jeopardize peace and stability in the whole 
Southern African region, the executives of member states and experts within the security sector 
institutions should be united on the use of military intervene or diplomacy. 
Second, parliamentarians should have a thorough knowledge as well as an appreciation of 
defence budgets, military interventions and security needs of their country and those of the 
continent as a whole.  
Third, parliamentarians whose political parties constitute the majority in parliament should first 
make well informed assessments of a security threat to the continent or political disturbances in 
another country before they call for military intervention.  
Fourth, research must be conducted to determine effective ways of strengthening the security 
arms of government as well as devising ways of cooperating with each other to enable the 
countries to make accurate assessment of security threats and develop requisite levels of 
preparedness for military engagement with the enemy. 
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The foregoing recommendations are in appreciation of the need to maintain state sovereignty and 
state secrecy, prevent anarchy, and cultivate an environment where ethical practices stimulate 
economic activities with the least danger of courting corrupt practices. 
10.9 A new way of looking at SSR 
Chapter 8 afforded a critical analysis of the major arguments on SSR spanning chapters 2 to 7, 
thus exhausting most of the recommendations this study has generated. However, a major 
recommendation that was further elaborated in chapter 8 related to the need for SSR to address 
African experiences, grievances, norms, beliefs and values.  
Put differently, vigorous attempts should be made to redefine SSR through an Afro-centric 
perspective, thereby giving dignity to African values and sensibilities. Accordingly, it is 
recommended that a study, through an exhaustive research, be commissioned to examine 
appropriate options that advance the establishment of Afro-centric models of both SSIs and SSR. 
It is further submitted that such study would ease SS operation of both the institutions and 
reforms on the basis of an ethos that drives widely shared and common values. 
It does not require too much imagination that the idea of having home grown approach to 
security matters seeks to increase levels of self-esteem and a sense of ownership of policies, 
practices and principles in the management and control of SS operations. 
Increased levels of confidence in state sovereignty, state security and state secrecy also boost the 
government’s level of readiness to handle environments with potential to provoke anarchic 
situations. 
10.10 Safeguarding state sovereignty through a politically oriented SS in Sub Sahara 
Africa  
Chapter 8 concerned itself with the centrality of sovereignty as it impacts SSR in the SADC. 
Hobbes and Bodin argue that every sovereign state has some basic interests to protect, including, 
and not limited to territory, national infrastructure, and national interest. In addition, the state 
was also obligated to safeguard its citizens against both internal and external threats.  
It was noted, however, that the discourse on sovereignty paid particular attention to Kant’s ideas 
of sovereignty while ignoring, to a large extent, Bodin and Hobbes’ theories which accord the 
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civilian leader and security sector institutions unfettered power and control over national security 
issues.  
It was observed that powerful nations accepted Kant’s conception of sovereignty, which 
advanced the notion that human security interests were sacred and needed to be protected 
wherever they were violated.  
Situations of anarchy in the global arena thus received prioritised attention, with powerful 
nations embroiled under the guise of safeguarding human rights as advanced by the 
‘responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine’. Indeed, a lot of messy situations have been created in 
the wake of efforts that seek to contain a scourge called terrorism. In many instances, if not all, it 
has been the case of a leopard accusing its young one of smelling like a goat, a sure sign of ill 
intent to benefit financially, economically and strategically out of the unclear and blurred 
circumstances of a weak nation. 
Strong nations such as Britain, France and even NATO have unleashed wars on weaker nations 
such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, among others, on trumped up charges of terrorism and abuse of 
citizens when the real reason was motivated by the desire of the predatory nations to pursue 
economic benefits out of anarchical situations the accused countries found themselves in. Such 
circumstances are always traced to direct or indirect dabbling by strong nations in the internal 
affairs of a weak nation. 
Invariably, the stronger nations also devised SSRs for the poor nations, effectively establishing a 
foothold that would assist them plunder, with impunity, the resources of these unfortunate 
victims. 
The chapter also gave prominence to calls for SSRs in countries perceived as not particularly 
friendly to western countries because of the historical circumstances surrounding the attainment 
of independence of the targeted countries. Most countries in the SADC region gained their 
independence through armed struggles that were supported by the eastern bloc that was 
demonised by the west as propelled by an evil system called communism. 
Of significance was the fact that governments led by former liberation movements could not 
draw clear lines between the SS and state politics, a matter that Kant’s theory on SS did not 
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support. On the other hand, it was generally understood that strong bonds made between the 
civilians and the guerrillas could not be ignored in the new political dispensation. These well-
resourced, but undeveloped nations were thus impenetrable for as long as the historical military-
civilian relations remained intact in a post war dispensation that ushered independence. 
The SADC countries therefore are in dire need of protection from the historical predators. 
In light of this, the study made five observations upon which recommendations were generated 
in the interests of creating a stable SS for the sub region. 
First, states are sovereign entities and it is their ethical duty to safeguard their territorial integrity 
as well as protect citizens against any real or perceived security threats. The sovereign must 
exercise its authority, including the need to respect the rule of law and the observance of human 
rights.  
Second, states should not invade other sovereign states under the pretext of ‘responsibility to 
protect’. Such blatant abuse of international law has created anarchy in some states as 
exemplified by the Libyan case where since the demise of Kaddafi in 2011 Libya remains in total 
anarchy, six years on, and at the mercy of the very nations that pretended to be acting to protect 
ordinary Libyans. 
Third, regional SSR debates should be guided by the need to preserve and protect revolutionary 
morality which was the guiding principle during the liberation struggle in some African 
countries.  
Fourth, the separation of the military from the vanguard parties is not feasible and SSR in Africa 
in general and sub-Sahara Africa in particular should therefore democratize the liberation-
politically-oriented armies in line with the liberation movements’ security value systems. The 
armies should be professional, loyal and patriotic to the nation and observe the principles that 
guided the liberation of the continent. The principle of respecting the ‘masses’ which states that: 
“the military are the fish and the masses are the water” should be the guiding principle of 
military ethos. It becomes significant to devise SSR in the sub region with a clear bias towards 
indigenising the SS in order to weaken the Eurocentric approach to SSR.  .  
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Fifth, due to historical circumstances, sub Saharan Africa has entertained a complementary SSR 
concept where the civil authority and the military co-exist. This makes for a sustainable strategy 
that ensures peace and stability in the region thus paving way for a favourable environment for 
inclusive socio- economic development. It is noted that the sub region is the most peaceful in 
Africa. 
On the basis of the foregoing observations it is recommended that further study be conducted to 
examine ways and options that seek to marry the interests of the military and civilian authority. 
The objective of the study is to reinforce ways to propagate peaceful coexistence; reduce with a 
view to eliminate the danger of the military undertaking coups; strengthen civilian authority’s 
oversight responsibilities; undermine ingredients of anarchy; eliminate the possibility of hosting 
anarchy as an unavoidable reality as is the case with some countries notably the DRC, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Yemen, among other nations. 
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